The Road Toward Peace

by

CHARLES W. ELIOT

NORTH DAKOTA STATE UNIVERSITY
3 0109 00013 7862

D
523
E4
1915a

DATE DUE

APR 24 2006			

Subject To Recall After 2 Weeks

LIBRARY
NORTH DAKOTA
STATE UNIVERSITY
FARGO, NORTH DAKOTA

DEMCO

WITHDRAWN

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2026

https://archive.org/details/roadtowardpeace0000char_r0a6

By Charles W. Eliot

THE ROAD TOWARD PEACE.
UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION.
CHARLES ELIOT, LANDSCAPE ARCHITECT.

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
BOSTON AND NEW YORK

THE ROAD TOWARD PEACE

THE ROAD TOWARD PEACE

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY OF THE CAUSES OF THE EUROPEAN WAR AND OF THE MEANS OF PREVENTING WAR IN THE FUTURE

BY

CHARLES W. ELIOT

NEW AND ENLARGED EDITION

26877

BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
The Riverside Press Cambridge

COPYRIGHT, 1915, BY CHARLES W. ELIOT

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Published April 1915

Enlarged Edition
Published September 1915

D
522
E4
1915a

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

This edition differs from the first only by the addition of five new chapters, as follows: Chapter XV contains an exchange of letters with Mr. Salmon O. Levinson, of Chicago, on the fundamental conditions under which preliminary negotiations for peace might reasonably be opened. Chapter XVI is a letter to the *New York Times* of May 15, on fidelity to international agreements the tap-root of human progress. Chapter XVII is an address at the Lake Mohonk Conference on May 20, 1915, on the hopes for the future of Europe. Chapter XVIII is a Memorial Day address, delivered by me at Sanders Theatre, Harvard University, on the 31st of May last, on "The Moral Effects of War"; and Chapter XIX is a letter to the *New York Times* of July 18, on "Some Sure Inferences from Eleven Months of the Greatest of Wars."

Charles W. Eliot.

Asticou, Maine.
19 July, 1915.

PREFACE

For more than eight years past my mind has turned from time to time to the study of the causes of war, and of the means of preventing war. The first time I discussed in public the means of preventing war was at a meeting of the Canadian Club of Ottawa, on the 23d of February, 1907. The speech I made there is the first chapter in the present volume. In May of the same year, I took part in the discussions at the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration; and two short speeches which I made then form the second chapter of this volume. At the Lake Mohonk Conference of 1910, I read a paper on "The Fears which cause Increasing Armaments," which appears here as the third chapter. In 1911–12, I went round the world as an envoy of the Trustees of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to "procure material for a Report to the Trustees, through the Division of Intercourse and Education, as to what activities may wisely and helpfully be planned in and for the Asiatic countries, that will advance the cause of peace

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

THE COMPETITIVE ARMING OF THE NATIONS — A WAY OF ESCAPE 1

CHAPTER II

IS FORCE THE RIGHTFUL RULER? — INTERNATIONAL PLANS MUST PRECEDE INTERNATIONAL ACTION . 10

Force has ceased to be the main reliance in school and home discipline — Prescription is a diminishing element in college discipline — The supreme object in education is to acquire self-control — In government, protective force, which keeps peace, preserves order, and brings help, will always be necessary — Free governments use little force and that a police force — Reduction of armaments is impossible until there exists an International Court and a force behind the Court.

CHAPTER III

THE FEARS WHICH CAUSE THE INCREASING ARMAMENTS 17

The cutting-off of over-seas supplies of food and raw materials — Sudden invasion — The remedies, immunity for private property at sea and a Supreme Court with a force behind it.

CHAPTER IV

PRESENT AND FUTURE CAUSES OF WAR, ESPECIALLY IN THE ORIENT — ALIEN GOVERNMENT — CHINESE UNITY — JAPANESE AMBITIONS — THE DOMINATION OF THE PACIFIC 30

The future causes — The fear of invasion — The exemption of private property at sea — The Occidental

desire for ports, concessions, and spheres of influence in the East — The inexpediency of very large units of national territory and government — The sentiment of nationality — The universal objection to alien government — The ambitions of the Japanese — The domination of the Pacific impossible for any one nation, desirable for a combination of strong naval powers — International peace the interest of Japan — Many of the causes of war in time past continue to exist — Promising expenditures for the promotion of peace.

CHAPTER V

THE GREAT EUROPEAN WAR — ITS CAUSES, SCOPE, AND OBJECTS — WHAT GAINS FOR MANKIND CAN COME OUT OF IT 57

The chances of getting some gains for mankind out of the gigantic struggle — Secret negotiations a great mischief — the permanent national executive independent of popular control — the small state in Europe — the larger national units in Europe — The national desire for larger territories and for colonies — Competitive armaments and universal conscription are preparations for war not peace — Militarism is inconsistent with democratic society — the Allies are fighting for freedom and civilization — The American Government must be neutral, but American sympathies and hopes cannot be.

CHAPTER VI

TRUE NATIONAL GREATNESS — ARE ITS FOUNDATIONS IMPERIALISM OR DEMOCRACY, FIGHTING POWER OR SOLEMN PUBLIC COMPACTS? 71

Can the ideals of fighting power and domination be replaced by the ideals of peaceful competition, generous rivalry, and coöperation for mutual benefit — Can civilization enforce the inviolability of treaties and other solemn compacts between peoples?

CHAPTER VII

SOME GROUNDS FOR AMERICAN SYMPATHY WITH MODERN GERMANY — WHY AMERICAN OPINION FAVORS THE ALLIES IN THE GREAT WAR — THE MOST FAVORABLE ISSUE OF THE WAR 81

German commercial and industrial growth since the Franco-Prussian War — Achievements in Letters and Science in the nineteenth century — Administrative efficiency — Why American opinion favors the Allies — Why thoughtful Americans see but one possible issue of the War — For more than a generation the fallacy that Might makes Right has been poisoning the springs of German thought — Americans hope and expect that the present struggle will result in neither World-Empire nor ruin for the German Nation.

CHAPTER VIII

AMERICA'S DUTY IN REGARD TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 97

The great disappointments the War has brought to all persons who hoped that the human race was making steady progress in civilization — The destructiveness of the fighting — The violation of treaties and conventions — The abandonment of the chivalrous principle that the strong should protect, not crush, the weak — The disregard of the ameliorations of warfare which international law was supposed to have procured — The development of fierce hatreds between nations — The acceptance by Germany of the dogma that Might makes Right — American neutrality official or legal — Keep the industries going — No hoarding — Least possible reduction of expenditures, except expenditures on luxuries — Neither party will stop fighting till exhaustion threatens — Reasons for the American belief that England, France, and Russia will hold out longest — The obligations of the American people to England and France — Can we think of giving no aid to England or

France if she come near the end of her resources — Americans see whither the German policies and the teachings of the German leaders have led the German people.

CHAPTER IX

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR ARE AUTOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, NATIONAL DESIRES FOR EMPIRE, DISREGARD FOR TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS, AND FALSE PHILOSOPHIES — WHY GERMANY MUST BE DEFEATED 114

German desire for World-Empire — The invincible army and navy — The doctrine of military necessity — The religion of valor — What German domination would mean — Germany has never feared Russia — Empire or downfall, victory or ruin, the real mottoes of German leaders — Desirable outcomes of the War — No World-Empire for any race or nation — No chief executives with power to throw their countrymen into war — No secret diplomacy — No conscript armies — A league or Federal Council to prevent war, bring about the reduction of armaments, and secure the liberties of each and all the federated states — The justifiable war — The cause of righteous liberty is the cause of civilization.

CHAPTER X

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CHARLES W. ELIOT AND JACOB H. SCHIFF ABOUT THE WAR, BETWEEN NOVEMBER 24, AND DECEMBER 14, 1914 . . . 129

No lasting peace without the abandonment of Germany's intense desire for enlargement — American public opinion should express itself in favor of an early peace — A group of American publicists might induce the Governments of England, France, and Germany to listen to reasonable terms — The War ought not to stop until Germany sees that its declared policies cannot pre-

vail — Europe should now choose between the German ideal of the State and the Anglo-American — The combatants would not listen now to outsiders advising immediate peace — The United States has no right to any position as umpire — To stop the War now would be to leave humanity exposed to the certain recurrence of ferocious war — Make peace now to stop the destruction of life and capital — The perpetual ceasing of war is impracticable — Free-trade cannot be established throughout the world — The European nationalism of the past fifty years will not cease — England will not abandon her domination of the high seas — If England and her ally Japan come out victorious, the United States will be forced into heavy expenditures for defense — If the Allies are victorious, Russia will become the most powerful nation and England's Nemesis.

CHAPTER XI

THE WAR AN UNPRECEDENTED CALAMITY — SHALL ITS OUTCOME BE AN UNPRECEDENTED GAIN? . . 151

Unprecedented scale and destructiveness of the War — The most horrible calamity that has befallen the race — Each Government denies responsibility for it — Real causes are, (1) autocratic governments, (2) conscript armies and large military class, (3) bureaucracy, (4) the lust of empire — Germany has three times added to her territory in Europe by war — Has been aggressive in her search for colonies and in her eager desire for World-Empire — The Emperor as War Lord and Sovereign by Divine Right — The German conception of the State — the Beatitudes and the Religion of Valor — No such thing as World-Empire for any single nation — National militarism to be controlled by an international force under the direction of a European League or Council — The establishment of such a League or Council must precede reductions in national armaments — The examples of Switzerland, Great Britain, and the United States — Peace proposals should be minimum not maximum proposals.

CHAPTER XII

THE PILGRIMS' IDEALS — A FREE CHURCH IN A FREE STATE IN 1620 164

Religious liberty and toleration, civil and political liberty, and a chief executive elected for one year — A progressive church in a state created and controlled by free men — Stock in their commercial company paid for either in cash or in personal risk and service — An example of coöperative management — Every able-bodied citizen bore arms — The "United Colonies of New England" an early example of confederation — Europe has never got so far as the Pilgrims in 1643 — The Pilgrims proved that there is no safe substitute for the institution of private property — Compare the teachings of modern Socialism — The Pilgrims practiced "Each for All and All for Each" — The Pilgrim women courageous, capable, and strong — More truth and light are constantly to be won, and it is Truth that makes men free — This faith can rescue Europe from the present horrors and sufferings.

CHAPTER XIII

NATIONAL EFFICIENCY BEST DEVELOPED UNDER FREE GOVERNMENTS 181

The real causes of the War are states of mind, ambitions of princes and peoples, and popular emotions — The potent sentiment of nationality is independent of common language, size of territory, and form of government — Recent tendency toward larger national units — New conceptions of the State — Imperialism — The government of Germany the most autocratic in Europe — The Germans do not know what political and social liberty is, or understand parliamentary or party government — To them political liberty means public incapacity and weakness — The War a conflict between free and autocratic institutions — The exceptional position of Russia — Can the freer nations develop an efficiency

equal to the German — no liberty in German education — The German estimate of the intellectual and social influence of women — The limitations of German "academic freedom" — German efficiency depends on the subjection of the individual — All the freer nations believe in liberty as an essential element in the development of the individual, and therefore of national efficiency — The improvements in industries have proceeded from the freer countries, and not from the countries despotically governed — Germany cannot claim leadership in useful inventions or in literature, science, philosophy, or poetry — The War will test this theory of national efficiency.

CHAPTER XIV

LESSONS OF THE WAR TO MARCH NINTH 206

CHAPTER XV

PROPOSALS ON WHICH THE WAR MIGHT BE ENDED: CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR. SALMON O. LEVINSON 218

(1) There is to be no domination over Europe, or the rest of the world, by any single nation; (2) small states should be made secure in Europe; (3) freedom of the seas and of the channels connecting great seas should be secured by international guaranties; (4) acceptance of the "open door" should be general; (5) enlargements of territory should take place only with the inhabitants' consent; (6) adequate compensation must be made to Belgium; (7) an international council or tribunal for all Europe supported by an international force should be the aim of the negotiations — The great lessons of the war have been already taught — When will they be accepted?

CHAPTER XVI

THE SINKING OF THE LUSITANIA 226

The military necessity of sinking enemy vessels — The terrorizing policy of Germany — The doctrine that military necessity absolves a government from keeping international agreements — The German method of conducting war omits chivalry, mercy, and humanity — Neither party will acknowledge defeat until exhausted — Neutral nations can help the Allies to maintain their industries and commerce — Duty of neutrals to defend vigorously all their existing rights.

CHAPTER XVII

THE HOPES FOR THE FUTURE OF EUROPE . . . 236

The shock to cherished hopes and expectations concerning the progress of the white race — Six hopeful things: (1) the development of international law; (2) the sense of international obligation; (3) the possibilities of effective coöperation among nations; (4) the international federation or league; (5) the league of peace; (6) an argument for a league of peace based on existing alliances — The existence of at least one strong nation in Europe that regards no agreement as binding in the face of an immediate military necessity — War on the scale now possible and with the existing means of destruction is not an available means of settling international disputes — No nation will risk sudden invasion, but will seek somewhere the means of security — The best means an international council backed by an international force — The Swiss military system affords a means of transition from the armed camps of to-day to national forces strong for defense, but weak for aggression.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE MORAL EFFECTS OF WAR 247

The possible good effects of fighting on the patriot soldier — The bad effects on the soldier who fights in the

spirit and by the methods of highwaymen and pirates — Effects of war on the nation at war — A nation may be lifted by war out of selfishness, self-indulgence, and frivolity — Good wars and bad — Wars of resistance to alien rule, for increase of liberty for the people, and of defense against aggressors are good wars — Wars of conquest and aggressive wars for material advantages are bad wars — Resistance to the domination or rule of one nation over another is justifiable and expedient — The Great War in Europe should develop and bring into application the federative principle which the Civil War in the United States confirmed or reëstablished.

CHAPTER XIX

SOME SURE INFERENCES FROM ELEVEN MONTHS OF THE WORST OF WARS 260

The new methods in warfare — The supremacy of artillery and machine guns — The advantage of the defense over the attack — The new means of rapid transportation — Aerial warfare — The uselessness of forts — Mines and submarines in naval warfare — The impossibility of taking prizes into port — The predominance of land batteries over vessels — A nation which would be strong in war must be strong in manufacturing, and particularly in the metallurgical industries — A large nation cannot be starved — The war is imposing on coming generations intolerable burdens — if Germany succeeds, no small nation can have an independent existence — The best protection of small nations against an aggressive power like Germany is a league of nations which together are stronger than Germany and any probable allies — Given such a league, reduction of armaments, diminution of taxation, and durable peace might ensue — Toward this aim the present alliance of Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, and Japan is promising — The only way of escape from the present hell is the establishment of a rational international community.

APPENDIX

I. President Eliot's address at the special academic session called to confer the degree of Doctor of Laws on Prince Henry of Prussia, March 6, 1902 279

II. President Eliot's address at a banquet given March 6, 1902, by the City of Boston to Prince Henry of Prussia 283

THE ROAD TOWARD PEACE

THE ROAD TOWARD PEACE

CHAPTER I

THE COMPETITIVE ARMING OF THE NATIONS —A WAY OF ESCAPE[1]

I TOOK a very serious subject for my few minutes' talk to you to-day, when I wrote to your Secretary that I should like to speak about "The Way of Escape from the Competitive Arming of the Nations." Secretary Root alluded to what is to be my text when he spoke before you a few weeks ago. There is, in the history of the United States and Canada, a most extraordinary act, which, I believe, prophesies a way of escape from this monstrous and shameful evil, the competitive arming of the civilized nations against each other. Secretary Root alluded to it as a convention, a convention made in 1817 by the Government of Great Britain and the Government of the United States, to limit the armaments on the Great Lakes for both nations. That was a very ex-

[1] An address before the Canadian Club of Ottawa on the 23d of February, 1907.

traordinary document in its form. It was not a treaty; it was not a law; it was, as described in the proclamation of James Monroe, President of the United States, an "arrangement" — that was all. The two countries agreed that they would only maintain on the Great Lakes each one vessel of not exceeding one hundred tons and carrying one eighteen-pounder on Lake Ontario, two other vessels on the "Upper Lakes," as they were described, each of the same size and with the same gun, and one other on Lake Champlain. That was to be the absolute limit of the armaments of these two nations on the Great Lakes. Now that "arrangement," as President Monroe called it, was made under very extraordinary circumstances. It was the invention of John Quincy Adams. It was presented by him to our then Secretary of State, James Monroe, who, in the following year, became President. But the person who negotiated it on the part of the United States was only Deputy or Under-Secretary of State — it did not attain even the dignity of an "arrangement" by the Secretary of State. It was the simplest possible agreement for an heroic and monumental purpose.

What was the condition of things on the

Great Lakes at that time? The British Government then had in commission on the Lakes vessels mounting over three hundred guns, and was building at that moment two seventy-four-gun ships on the Lakes — actually building them at the time this arrangement was made. And what was the state of mind of the two nations, calm or excited? They had just come out of a war, and a war in which fighting on the Lakes bore a great part. Were not these extraordinary conditions under which to make a simple "arrangement" which does not cover twenty lines of printed paper, to secure a perfect peace of ninety years already without once transgressing this extraordinarily low limit of armament upon these Lakes on our borders? I say that this act prophesies the way of escape from competitive armaments.

If we consider the means of navigation in those days, the time required for voyages across the Lakes, and the dangers on the way, with only wind to propel the vessel, shall we not see that the Atlantic Ocean offers no greater obstacles to such an "arrangement" as this than the Lakes did then? We cross the Atlantic Ocean in six or seven days, with the greatest facility. We mount on what may be called platforms

heavy armaments, which are yet capable of proceeding through the roughest ocean in comparative steadiness. Our means for naval fighting on the instant are much greater, relatively to the Atlantic Ocean, than the means of these two peoples were for fighting on the Lakes in 1817. I say, therefore, that in this act of our two Governments there is a prophecy, a hopeful prophecy for the future.

What is the essence of this regulation? It is simply a self-denying ordinance which secures equal force to the two Governments on the Lakes, and prevents any surprise of one power by the other. And that is just what needs to be done on an international scale. Moreover, this little armament on the Lakes on either side is nothing but a police force. Now, that is exactly what we want all over the world — a self-denying ordinance and a police force furnished by all the civilized nations, combined to maintain a common force.

What is the difference between the police function and the soldier's or the sailor's function in war? I think the chief difference is that in the main the first is protective and the other destructive. Both imply the use of force; and we are a long way from the time when

government will not rest on force. At the bottom, the most civilized governments need force as the basis of their power and the means of executing their will. But there may be a great difference between force and force. A police force is, in the main, a protective force. Now and then, to be sure, it proceeds energetically against a criminal, an offender, a disturber of the peace. But far the greater part of the function of the police is protection. It goes quickly to the scene of any catastrophe; it preserves order on the highways, in crowds, and in industries; it maintains the peace. You have in Canada a splendid example of the legitimate, the indispensable, the omnipresent police force in your Northwest Mounted Police. There is a force eminently superior to that of the soldier. Any one of these police officers can arrest, — that is a very wholesome power, and it is just what we want between the nations; we want a force that can arrest the disturber. We want that bulwark for peace — a police force that can prevent disturbance, and deal effectively and finally with the disturber of the peace, whoever he is. He is probably a person temporarily out of his mind. He needs protection from himself, and all the rest of us need to be

protected from him. That is the true function of a police force, and that is what the civilized world greatly needs.

But then, you will say, police officers ordinarily act under the direction of a court, if there be an accessible court. It is quite convenient in the wilderness to have a police officer who is himself a magistrate, and that is just what you have provided. But, as a rule, an effective police acts under the orders of a court. There again, we have at The Hague a momentous prophecy of the reorganization of the civilized world to preserve peace, and to protect the productive industries. It is but the shadow, the ghost, you may say, of an effective court as yet; for behind every effective court must lie force — the police force. That is what the international tribunal will need and must have, to be an effective tribunal. Should we shrink from the prospect of such control, under the findings of an international court with force behind it to compel obedience? We are used to all that in the organization of every one of the civilized nations. In the structure and development of every nation that process, that habit of obedience to the mandate of a court enforced, marks the gathering growth of civil-

ization. And that is what the group of nations which is to make up the civilized world needs to create — the habit, as a group of nations, of submitting to the mandate of an international court enforced.

Now, we people who have come into this new land, out of the older nations that loved liberty and slowly gained it, always shrink from new submissions. But if we look back upon our own past — and that is the only way to look forward with insight into the future — do we not learn by our own experiences that here lies the way of peace and good-will? As I survey the numerous experiments of free government on the earth, the whole question of success in free government seems to resolve itself into the amount of good-will which can be developed under free government between the governors and the governed, and between the different classes of men who live together under one form of government. That is the test of success in free government — the total amount of good-will which it develops. Now, our Governments, the United States on one hand and Canada on the other, have been more successful than any other free governments in the world, so far as I know, in developing just that good-will among men.

We have great new strifes in both our countries, new strifes which have grown out of the astounding social and industrial changes of the last forty years. I see at this table one whom I am proud to claim as a graduate of Harvard University, whose business seems to be, as far as I understand it, to get in between the strivers in industrial contests. Now, these strifes have something to teach concerning international strifes. We have had such at their worst in the United States within the last fifteen years, and you have had them here in very serious form. We are both likely to have them in the future; because not all men on either side of these controversies are men of good-will — and so we are going to encounter this new form of struggle and contention. What is the way out of that? I believe that your House of Commons has been taking some action to-day which looks toward providing the most hopeful way out of these strifes, namely, through publicity — nothing but publicity. In the United States we are in the habit of complaining very much and very often about the publicity which our newspapers give to every fair and every foul happening in the United States. But, gentlemen, in that publicity lies the great hope of the world. It is the

hope of peace; it is the guaranty of peace; it is the way we are to find not only industrial peace, but peace between the civilized nations of the world. We are going to see the limitation of armaments, the international court, the international police force, and the compelled appeal to public opinion before war. That, as I understand it, is just what you are going to do with regard to industrial strifes — to compel appeal to public opinion before war. And there I find the promise of a better day in regard to competitive arming. What a hideous waste that arming is! Some eminent authorities maintain that the way to preserve peace is to make yourself formidable for war. Gentlemen, that is not the way of the United States and Canada since the year 1817. And is there a more completely successful example to be found anywhere of the way to escape competitive arming?

CHAPTER II

IS FORCE THE RIGHTFUL RULER? — INTERNATIONAL PLANS MUST PRECEDE INTERNATIONAL ACTION[1]

We have heard a great variety of suggestions this morning concerning the furtherance of this cause in institutions of education. Some of them have been practical suggestions as to what may be taught and done in schools and colleges. But I think most of them have been really suggestions that this holy cause is best to be furthered in educational institutions by a steady improvement in what Professor Willoughby called their moral climate. That change of moral climate is sure to bring about a state of public opinion which will mitigate the violence of nations. Now, there are a good many hopeful signs as to a change of moral climate in our institutions of education. I have personally seen several most encouraging changes in this respect. For instance, when I was a boy in the best public school of the city of Boston and the oldest

[1] A speech to the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration in May, 1907.

school in Massachusetts, the control used was physical force, the application of torture — that is the long and short of it; the control was force. Now that has disappeared from the American school system, and with it has gone the teaching that force is the rightful ruler. That change runs through the American family as well as the American school. There has been a wonderful improvement in home discipline in that respect, and that improvement goes our way, ladies and gentlemen. It goes toward the abandonment in all human affairs of the exercise of force as final control.

There is another climatic change which has been wrought in schools and colleges quite within the period of my observation. There used to be all through our school system and our college system a large element of prescription, — "Thou shalt" and "Thou shalt not!" There was a deplorably small element of cultivation of freedom of the will, of self-control in the individual.

The implicit obedience inculcation is another way of expressing subjection to force in government. It is essentially military in quality; and there again we have a change in all our educational institutions which goes the way of

this Conference. We cultivate now in the young, — that is, the wise teacher cultivates in the young, from the beginning and all through school life, the power of self-direction, self-control; and, after all, to acquire self-control is the supreme object in education. Here again is a broad change in education which goes the way of this Conference toward international self-control.

But are we to expect that the element of force is now going out of government? By no means. It must remain, as Commissioner Draper said, the ultimate appeal. But what kind of force is going to continue in the world? Not the force of army and navy, but the force we call police power, a force nineteen twentieths of the applications of which are protective. Force as protection is an entirely different thing from force as aggression. What the world is going to preserve as abiding force is the force we call police force, which keeps peace, preserves order, and brings help.

Universities and colleges illustrate, I believe, — at least in our country, — the coming form of government all over the world. The *coming* form — not to-morrow, not in the next decade, but we may fairly hope in the next century.

What is the characterization of college and university government? No force whatever, no penalty except exile — and that is enough — in all these college and university administrations of our country. In that condition they teach freedom, they teach self-government; and there is another thing they teach — good-will. Good-will among men results from all teaching which can be called world-wide, all teaching of the nature of different peoples, of their laws and customs, and of their religions. The greatest development in teaching that I know of during the last ten years in our institutions is the development of what is called comparative teaching: — comparative anatomy, comparative physiology, comparative psychology, and comparative pathology. This comparative teaching goes right into moral questions as well as physical questions. Much of the teaching of law has become comparative and much of the teaching of religion.

In all these ways the colleges and universities are widening out human sympathies, and bringing in a new epoch of good-will. The universities, it was said this morning, live to seek and to teach truth. Very true. Now, my present teachers in Biblical criticism have

taught me that the angels' song over the plains of Bethlehem is not rightly translated in the common version. It is not "Peace on earth, good-will to men"; the real meaning is, "Peace on earth to men of good-will." That is what the universities are helping to bring about, the increase of good-will; and then force will only be applied to men who lack good-will. There will always be some such men, therefore there will always be some force needed, so far as we can see; but the policies of the American universities as forms of government indicate that before very long the free governments of the world will find it necessary to use but little force and that a police force.

UNTIMELY PEACE PROPOSALS[1]

I suppose we are all agreed that both these objects are very desirable. They are elements in the great reform to which this Conference is committed; — no doubt about that. But the platform this year is drawn in a somewhat new manner. It urges that the Second Conference

[1] Remarks at the same Conference on proposals that the Conference recommend action at the Second Conference of The Hague on the Neutralization of Ocean Trade Routes, and on the Immediate Reduction of Armaments.

of The Hague take certain *action*. Is there a person in this room who can suppose for a moment that the Second Conference of The Hague can take *action* on either of these propositions? Our platform, as reported, urges positive, affirmative action at the Second Conference of The Hague on five important points. We must all agree that the neutralization of routes of commerce is impossible until there is a real court at The Hague, and a force to carry out its orders. A force must see to the execution of the neutralization of routes. We have examples of neutralization in the world already — admirable examples — Switzerland and the Suez Canal; — and how are those neutralizations enforced? When Swiss territory is to be held neutral, Switzerland puts an army of a hundred thousand men into the field; when the Suez Canal is to be held neutral, the whole navy of Great Britain enforces the order. Shall we forward the reforms we have in mind by urging action on either of these two proposals, when we all know that it is impossible for The Hague to take action? We might reasonably say, perhaps, that we ask The Hague to begin the study of a plan for the reduction of armaments. That looks possible; that looks feasible. Nothing

else is feasible. Is there a person in this room who would advise Germany to consent to an arbitration on the reduction of armaments? Germany, as Mr. Smiley has said, is surrounded by alien armies which can be rushed on to her territory at a week's notice. Can the United States, off here across the ocean, in a position of singular security, propose even that Germany shall consent to a discussion of the reduction of armaments until there is an international court and a force behind the court? It seems to me, from all my experience in carrying on reforms, that the first rule for a reformer is never to urge action toward a reform till he has prepared an adequate plan of action. We have no plan of action with regard to the reduction of armaments or the neutralization of ocean trade routes. Nobody has such a plan. We ought to have an international plan before we urge international action.

CHAPTER III

THE FEARS WHICH CAUSE THE INCREASING ARMAMENTS[1]

All peace promoters have been cheered by the progress made since Russia called the first Hague Conference toward the substitution of arbitration for war, and this meeting in particular has been greatly encouraged and stimulated to-day. It is plain, however, that much remains to be done before a permanent international supreme court is established with some adequate force behind it, whether control of credit, or armed police, or effective world-opinion, and that the race for armaments is hotter than ever.

There must, then, be some very strong reasons for the slow progress made toward an effective system of international arbitration, and for the continuance of the extraordinarily wasteful competition in providing armaments; for all the competing nations feel keenly the well-nigh intolerable burden of taxation which mod-

[1] A paper read at the Lake Mohonk Conference of May, 1910.

ern preparations for war on the instant, offensive or defensive, impose.

I find these reasons in two chronic apprehensions felt by all the civilized nations alike, — although the two are not equally felt by the different peoples, because of geographical and commercial diversities. The first of these chronic apprehensions is the fear lest the nation's exterior supplies of food or of the raw materials of its industries should be cut off. The second is the fear lest an immense hostile army should be thrown into the national territory with only a few days', or even a few hours', warning.

Either of these chronic apprehensions may be suddenly exalted to panic by occurrences of a really trivial nature. The speech of a minister before a legislature, a note from a ruler, or even a short series of articles in an influential newspaper may raise either of these chronic apprehensions to the dimensions of a panic. These fears are not fairly to be described as dreams, or illusions, or fantastic nightmares. They are not created, though they may be aggravated, by unscrupulous manufacturers, tradesmen, or newspapers. They are founded on historical facts, borne clearly in mind by the present generations, and on generally accepted axioms con-

cerning national well-being, as likely to be diminished by being conquered, or even invaded, and increased by any successful conquering.

These axioms may be as absurd as the duelling code now seems to most Anglo-Saxons, but like that code of so-called honor they are generally accepted in continental Europe and among large portions of the population of North and South America, and Great Britain. It is a solid fact that an overwhelming majority of the English people feel it to be for them a matter of life and death that they keep ready for instant action fleets capable of preventing invasion and the cutting-off of the food supplies and the raw materials which come to them over seas; and so long as they seriously dread catastrophes of that nature they will keep on building preponderant fleets. They must have security against such ruinous calamities.

England and Japan are the two nations which may reasonably feel most intensely the apprehension about their food and raw materials; but nations whose territories are not insular may also feel it to a high degree. Thus, Italy must import by sea both food and coal, France would suffer much if deprived of sea-borne cotton, and Germany needs to import by sea not

only much food, but a great variety of materials for her expanding industries. The territory of the United States is so vast, and extends through so many climates, that it is difficult for us to realize how formidable to any nation which cannot raise on its own soil all its food and most of the important materials of the industries by which it lives, is the dread of the cutting-off of a large portion of its food or its raw materials, or both. During far the greater part of the year England is not supposed to have in stock at any one time more than six weeks' supply of food for her population.

In view of such a fact we Americans ought to be able to realize that this dread of the cutting-off of essential supplies must be calmed and disposed of before the incessant preparations for war now going on can possibly be checked or stopped. A very important question, therefore, to be considered by those who wish to take effective measures to promote peace is this: What generally accepted rule of international action would give relief from this intolerable apprehension, and what new police forces would be necessary to secure the observance of that rule?

Confining our thoughts in the first place to

operations on the oceans, we easily see that the adoption by a decided majority of the great maritime powers of the principle of the immunity of private property at sea would in itself go far to relieve from this great apprehension the nations that suffer most from it. If during a naval war all merchant vessels were free to come and go on the open seas without danger of capture or of any interference, a nation at war would have little reason to dread the interruption of its supply of either food or raw material. To affect dangerously its supplies, its adversary would have to establish a real blockade of its ports, which is a difficult and costly operation in these days of high-speed vessels independent of wind. It may be observed in passing that changes in the definitions of blockade and contraband decidedly advantageous to neutrals were made by the Naval Conference in which Germany, the United States, Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the Netherlands participated at London in 1908–09.[1] This Conference did

[1] The Declaration issued by the Conference by Article 1, Chapter 1, limits blockade to ports and coasts belonging to or occupied by the enemy, which is a restrictive definition of high value.

In Article 28, Chapter 2 the following articles are declared

work of high value, although only ten selected nations joined in it. The precedent may prove a very useful one.

The adoption on paper of this doctrine of the immunity of private property on the sea would not suffice, however, to relieve the intense anxiety of the civilized peoples about their essential supplies. They must see in readiness a police force capable of securing the execution of such an agreement in all parts of the globe.

Can we imagine the creation of such a force? It must, of course, be an overwhelming international force, which no single nation would have a fair chance of successfully resisting, and it must be available in all the oceans. These conditions would be fulfilled if the group of nations which took part in the Naval Conference at London, or even a smaller group of na-

not to be contraband of war: Raw cotton, wool, silk, jute, flax, hemp, and the other raw materials of the textile industries, rubber, resins, gums and lacs, hops, raw hides, natural and artificial manures, ores, clays, lime, stone, bricks, slates and tiles, porcelains and glassware, paper, soaps, colors, varnishes, chemicals like soda, ammonia, and sulphate of copper, machines used in agriculture, mining, the textile industries and printing, precious stones, clocks and watches. It is obvious that this list, which is not the complete enumeration of Article 28, covers articles of great value to every manufacturing nation, and that this clear declaration that they are not contraband marks a decided advance in the law of maritime war.

tions having extensive seacoasts like England, France, Italy, the United States, Brazil, Chile, and Japan, would agree to the immunity of private property at sea, and to the use of their combined fleets, or any adequate portion thereof, to enforce that immunity in every part of the world.

The combinations mentioned would possess available ports in all the great divisions of the ocean. Several of the nations named have already expressed willingness to accept the doctrine of immunity for private property at sea. The United States has advocated it for many years. Other nations would probably wish to join such a league; but their adhesion would not be indispensable, though desirable. Coincident with this agreement there would have to be another, in order to check competition in naval armaments.

The nations entering such a league would have to make an agreement — subject to periodical revision — not to increase their fleets beyond their present limits, and to build new vessels, class by class, only in substitution for vessels past service. Limitation on the size as well as the number of vessels of each class would also be needed, and each nation would

have to be kept informed of the naval constructions undertaken by every other member of the league. Such agreements as these and such publicity seem not only possible but well worth while, if through such action that formidable dread of the cutting-off of food supplies and raw materials can be done away with. It is a hopeful fact that experienced public men in various countries are beginning to mention such novel agreements as not inconceivable.

The immunity of private property on the seas does not seem so remote as it once did, partly because the recent comparative immunity of private property on land during active warfare has not impaired the decisiveness of successful campaigns, and partly because the destruction of its mercantile marine has not proved to be in recent times, if indeed in any times, an effective mode of bringing a vigorous enemy to terms. During the Civil War of 1861–65 the United States lost nearly all its sea-going merchant vessels, and has never recovered its former position in the carrying trade of the world; but this fact has had no appreciable effect on the prosperity of the country. Nowadays any nation can easily get all its exports and imports carried in foreign bottoms

at low competitive prices. Moreover, looting on land and privateering at sea are no longer considered respectable.

An agreement of this nature with regard to naval forces and their international use might have a large incidental value. It might show the way to organize an international naval police force, subject to the orders of a permanent arbitral court of justice at The Hague. Other kinds of force can be imagined to secure the execution of the decrees of the court, as, for instance, the refusal of credit to a disobedient government; but all experience seems to testify that some adequate force must lie behind an international supreme court, as it always has behind every other court. Otherwise it may be feared that the court will not command in practice the confidence of civilized mankind.

The other chronic apprehension which prevents the progress of arbitration methods and the reduction of armaments is the apprehension of sudden and overwhelming invasion of national territory by hostile land forces. This incessant apprehension is extremely vivid, and is liable to explosive increment; and yet in this matter the civilized world has certainly made no inconsiderable progress. To be sure, modern

means of transportation by land and water have quickened the apprehension, and spread it over wider areas; but, on the other hand, the press, frequent mails, and telegraphs and telephones have developed effective means of dispelling ignorance, correcting misunderstandings, and giving warning of storms of passion. Certain distinct gains in respect to danger of invasion are plainly to be seen.

First, no part of the civilized world is now subject to sudden invasion by hordes of barbarians, armed as well, or nearly as well, as the people whose territory they invade. In all conflicts with barbarians civilization has now an immense advantage in respect to equipment for fighting. Secondly, it seems probable that dynastic wars will never occur again in the civilized world. Thirdly, certain small European states have maintained themselves successfully as to their territory for nearly one hundred years in the presence of much more powerful neighbors, and if the judgment of impartial money-lenders is to be accepted, the stable *per capita* wealth of the small states is greater and safer than that of the larger states. In a few instances, to be sure, the generation now passing off the stage has witnessed the forcible tak-

ing of parts of the territory of a small state by a larger one, and the surrender to the victors of portions of conquered territory. Fourthly, the great costliness of modern warfare in both blood and treasure tends to prevent the outbreak of actual war. Indeed, the costliness of mere preparation for war has increased by leaps and bounds during the past twenty years; and recently aviation has started expenditure of a new sort. The masses of the people begin to realize that they pay the costs of war; and they are not so dumb and helpless as they used to be. Hence, perhaps, the encouraging fact that huge armies, ready for instant action, have faced each other in Europe for forty years without once coming into collision. Fifthly, republican Switzerland has shown how the entire male population capable of bearing arms may be trained, and held in readiness for defensive warfare, without abridging seriously the industrial activities of the people, and without maintaining any standing army which could be used for offensive purposes outside the national territory.

These are all good omens for peace; but they afford no effectual security to any European people whose territory has not been de-

clared neutral against the sudden invasion of their territory by a formidable alien force capable of inflicting immense losses and of extorting a vast ransom. The Swiss experience, however, is more than an omen, for it shows one way of changing Europe from a group of fully armed camps, always ready for hostilities abroad, into a group of peace-expecting states, each maintaining a strong protective force, but no aggressive force. Civilized society is still founded on force, but that force should be a protective force. In practice it would be easier for a large state than for a small one to adopt this excellent Swiss method. Moreover, the territories of large states might be "neutralized" by agreement as well as the territories of small states.

On the whole, the only way in which promoters of peace can at this moment make head against the apprehension of invasion is to urge the making of arbitration treaties which contain no exceptions, and the establishment of a permanent court of arbitral justice. The reduction of armaments on land must await the establishment of such a supreme court, unless, indeed, neighboring nations by twos or threes can make local agreements for reduction analo-

gous to the invaluable arrangement made in 1817 between the United States and Great Britain concerning armaments on the Great Lakes.

CHAPTER IV

PRESENT AND FUTURE CAUSES OF WAR, ESPECIALLY IN THE ORIENT — ALIEN GOVERNMENT — CHINESE UNITY — JAPANESE AMBITIONS — THE DOMINATION OF THE PACIFIC.[1]

ADVOCACY of these slow-acting means of preventing wars in the East implies that within the superintended areas the probable causes of international war have changed within fifty years. Dynastic and religious wars, and wars in support of despotic government are no longer probable; and racial antipathies are held in check by the superintending European powers in all the countries to which that superintendence extends. Thus, the Pax Britannica has practically put an end to the racial and religious warfare which from time to time desolated the Asiatic countries over which British influence now extends. Small outbreaks of racial antipathy or religious fanaticism occur locally; but these are insignificant exceptions

[1] Extracts from a report made by Charles W. Eliot to the Trustees of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 1913.

to the prevailing tranquillity. The fighting Great Britain has done to establish and maintain this quieting influence has been fighting on a small scale compared with that which went on among European nations during the nineteenth century, or among Oriental peoples in many earlier centuries, and the Pax Britannica has therefore been a great contribution to the peace of the world.

It is not only in the East that the probable causes of international war have lately changed. All over the world, it is reasonable to suppose that wars for dynastic motives will occur no more, and that religious motives for warfare will hereafter be incidental or secondary instead of primary. It is also reasonable to believe that wars in support of absolute monarchs and despotic government will henceforth be unknown, so general is the world-wide movement toward constitutional government and free institutions — a movement from fifty to three hundred and fifty years old among the different nations of the West, but comparatively recent in the East.

What, then, will be the probable causes of international war in the future?

The causes of war in the future are likely to

be national distrusts, dislikes, and apprehensions, which have been nursed in ignorance, and fed on rumors, suspicions, and conjectures propagated by unscrupulous newsmongers, until suddenly developed by some untoward event into active hatred, or widespread alarm which easily passes into panic. While the Eastern peoples — Far and Near — will have some causes of their own for war, because in some instances neither their geographical limits nor their governmental institutions are as yet settled, among the Western peoples the most probable future causes of war, in addition to national antipathies, will be clashing commercial or industrial interests, contests for new markets and fresh opportunities for profitable investment of capital, and possibly, extensive migrations of laborers. All modern governments, in which life, liberty, and property are secured by public law, desire to extend the commerce and trade of their people, to develop their home industries by procuring markets for their products in foreign lands, to obtain in comparatively unoccupied or undeveloped parts of the earth opportunities for the profitable employment of their accumulated capital, and to gain room for a possible surplus of population in the fu-

ture. Eastern and Western peoples alike feel the desire for a large, strong governmental unit, too formidable to be attacked from without, too cohesive to be disintegrated from within. Both East and West exhibit the modern irrepressible objection to alien rule, especially when such rule, like that of the Manchus or the Turks, produces poverty and desolation, denies liberty, and prevents progress.

Several Western nations, which have the saving, or accumulating, habit, are eager to make loans to remote and comparatively poor nations which are in great need of money to pay for costly public works of transportation, conservancy, public health, and public security. In making such loans the bankers of each Western nation expect the support and protection of their own government. As security for such loans the borrowing government, national, provincial, or municipal, pledges some of its resources; and if the expected interest or dividend is not paid, the lender forecloses. Hence serious international complications. In this lending business the Western powers come into competition with each other, and stimulated by mutual jealousies, engage in aggressive operations against the Oriental peoples,

who have been as a rule helpless in their hands, until Japan adopted and improved on the Western military organization and methods of fighting, and succeeded for a short time in borrowing the money needed to pay the heavy costs of modern warfare.

The penetration of Oriental territories by traders and missionaries has given occasion for many attacks by Western powers on Oriental governments and peoples, on the theory that the citizen or subject of a Western government is to be protected by his own government, wherever he may wander or settle in Oriental communities. If any such adventurous citizen is harmed, there follows a "punitive expedition" with wholesale destruction of innocent property and life, and often an extension of the "sphere of influence" of the punisher. This protection of missionaries, traders, and travellers has often been the cause, or in many cases the excuse, for attacks by Western powers on Oriental communities, for the seizure of valuable ports and of territory adjacent thereto, and for the enforced payment of exaggerated indemnities which heavily burden later generations. Hence long-continued international dislikes and distrusts.

A people which has for centuries been under despotic rule will not have accumulated any considerable masses of capital, because private property will not have been safe from arbitrary seizure, and cannot have been transmitted safely from generation to generation. Throughout the East, therefore, the capital which is seeking investment in mines, plantations, factories, transportation companies, and so forth, is Western capital, and is likely to be for at least another generation, or until Japan and China can reap the full benefit of the security of capital under constitutional government. The Orient as a whole, and China in particular, will need for many years the continuous investment of Western capital in great public works, such as roads, railroads, defenses against flood, drought, and pestilences, schools, universities, and a civil service which lives on salaries, and collects and expends honestly a stable public revenue. As soon as the Republic of China can provide itself with a stable public revenue, it will come into the markets of the world for an indefinite series of large loans; and all the Western peoples will be eager to share in the lending. Japan, too, will need for many years large amounts of capital for the

furtherance of its governmental and industrial changes.

Through all the Oriental countries the mass of the people maintain a lower standard of living than that of any civilized Western people, whether European or American. This is partly a matter of climate and of density of population; but it is also a matter of tradition and custom. When the standard of living is close to the limits essential to the maintenance of health and bodily vigor, natural catastrophes like droughts, floods, earthquakes, and pestilences cause recurrent periods of immense human misery, from which recovery is slow. The misery of these masses in turn seriously depresses the courage or enterprise of the suffering nation, and commerce, trade, and manufacturing industries throughout the world, particularly in those Oriental countries where modern means of transportation and communication have not been adequately developed. Hence, frequent interruptions of trade, and disorders both interior and exterior; and hence, also, troublesome migrations. The chronic poverty of multitudinous Oriental peoples hinders the desired development of Western industries and commerce; because the poverty-stricken

millions cannot afford to buy the Western goods. To prevent such widespread miseries and such chronic poverty would be to remove the cause of many of the violences which break out from time to time in Oriental communities, and provoke or promote the intrusion of the stronger Western powers. Successful prevention would imply sound legislation, efficient local administration, and the liberal expenditure of money. Advocacy of such measures and help in executing them would promote peace and good-will. Here is a great field for Western benevolence, skilfully applying private endowments to public uses.

Some of the worst dissensions between Eastern and Western peoples have been caused in recent years by the dense ignorance and gross superstitions of Oriental populations. A good example of the contentions due to these causes is the Boxer insurrection in China, against which several Western powers took arms — when their Legations were attacked — with success so far as subduing the insurrection and procuring huge indemnities from China went, but with deplorable effects on the disposition of the Chinese people toward Japan and all the Western powers that sent troops to Peking,

with the single exception of the United States. The only real cure for ignorance and superstition is universal education, and that cure will take time.

Although the causes of war tend to become commercial and industrial, two other world-wide causes of war remain which are liable to take effect at any time in both the East and the West. The first is the fear of sudden invasion by an overwhelming force. This fear is as keenly felt in China and Japan as it is in Germany, France, and England; and there are no better defenses against it in the East than in the West. The neutralization of territory which protects some of the small European nations, like Switzerland and Belgium, rests rather upon the mutual jealousy of the greater powers than on any established practice among the European peoples, or any trustworthy sense of expediency and justice. The nearest approach in the East to the practice of neutralizing territory is the respect paid by the larger European powers to the Eastern possessions of smaller powers. Thus, England and France are respecting the Oriental possessions of The Netherlands and of Portugal; and all nations are now respecting the outlying possessions of Japan.

Whether the Eastern possessions of Western powers will in the future be transferred from one nation to another as a consequence of the issue of European conflicts — as they have been in the past — is a problem for the future. The only hope in the East, as in the West, for relief from this terrible apprehension of invasion lies in the progress of international law, and in the spreading opinion among publicists that there are better ways than war to settle international questions about territory, commercial intercourse, and sovereignty. This is a region in which all three divisions of the activities of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace are nearly concerned — Intercourse and Education, Economics, and International Law.

The other apprehension which may at any time become the cause of war is the fear lest the supplies of food and raw material which come to a country over seas should be cut off. Such insular countries as Great Britain and Japan are peculiarly subject to this apprehension; for either of them would be seriously distressed by even a short interruption of its supplies of food and raw material. Both these nations are therefore obliged to maintain navies more powerful than any likely to be brought against them. Hence the immense

burdens of competitive naval armaments. A remedy for this apprehension is, however, in sight. The doctrine that private property should be exempt from capture at sea, as it is already exempted from seizure without compensation on land, will, when adopted by a few nations which maintain strong navies, relieve the nations adopting it from the dread lest their food supplies and the supply of raw materials for their manufacturing industries should be cut off, and the export of their manufactured goods be made impossible or unsafe. To secure relief from this recurrent apprehension which prompts such exorbitant expenditure on navies, it would not be necessary that all the nations of the world should adopt the doctrine of the exemption of private property at sea from capture. Five or six of the stronger nations, adopting it and enforcing it against all comers, could immediately secure relief for themselves, and for any other nations that chose to join them in the adoption of the policy. The United States has advocated this doctrine for many years; but an effective adoption of it has been prevented by the reluctance of Great Britain to abandon the practice of seizing upon the ocean private property belonging to the subjects of her enemy. There are some

signs that Great Britain is approaching the conclusion that she has more to gain than to lose by the adoption of the policy of exemption.

A common reason for the aggressions of Western powers in Eastern countries has been their desire to possess or control ports in the East through which Western trade with the teeming Oriental populations could be safely conducted. Great Britain, France, Germany, and The Netherlands all possess some ports, and in China the first three powers exercise a strong control over other ports by means of treaties and leases forced upon China. Russia's keen desire for better ports in Eastern waters than she now possesses has been a leading motive in her Eastern policy for many years. The statesmen of Japan felt that it was absolutely necessary for her to possess the ports of the Korean peninsula. When once a nation gets possession of ports which originally and properly made part of another nation's territory, the possessing nation feels that it must defend them against all comers; hence incessant preparations for war and ever-increasing armaments. The peace of the world would be promoted if no nation, Occidental or Oriental, possessed or controlled a port on another nation's territory.

The peace of the world is also threatened by the constant efforts of most of the trading nations to enlarge their territories, or "spheres of influence," in remote parts of the world, whether sparsely or densely populated. It seems to make little difference whether these enlargements are likely to be profitable or not; they will be acquired at a venture.

In Europe and America, the creation of new and large units of government went on actively during the last half of the nineteenth century, and is still in progress by natural growth and new affiliations. Among political theorists doubts begin to be expressed about the expediency of these very large units of national territory and government. Evidence has been produced that the smaller nations in Europe are more prosperous than the larger; perhaps because they waste less on armies, navies, and armaments. There are those who think that China would be better off if Thibet, Mongolia, and Manchuria should be absorbed respectively by Great Britain, Russia, and Japan, leaving the eighteen provinces of China proper as a compact and manageable whole. These objections to exaggerated size still remain in the region of speculation and not of practice; and the desire

of trading nations for more and always more territory remains a threatening source of international contests.

Recent events, however, in both the Near and the Far East indicate clearly that the government of large populations by an alien race is getting increasingly difficult, and may in time become impossible. The unrest in India, the abdication of the Manchus in China, and the Balkan war all illustrate the fact that the government of large populations by an alien authority is likely to be more and more resented and ultimately resisted; and that no amount of good will and good works by an alien government will be able to overcome the opposition of native races to such a government, just because it *is* alien. Because of the strength and vitality of this racial sentiment against alien government, it is likely that the task of governing and supervising large native populations from a distance by rulers, judges, and administrators of a very different race will prove to be increasingly troublesome and costly; so that freedom of commerce and trade will come to be sought by other means.

Against these formidable difficulties, what forces could the Provisional Government bring to bear to unify China, and construct a strong,

stable government for the eighteen federated provinces? These forces were only sentiments; but they were just such sentiments as have brought into being on other continents firm and enduring governments. The first was the sentiment of Chinese nationality; the second was the objection to an alien government, that of the Manchus, which was only a sham government; and the third was the sentiment of common resistance to the aggressions which the Western powers had been committing for a hundred and fifty years on Chinese soil.

The sentiment of nationality is vast, vague, and hard to define; but the history of Europe and America is full of instances of its tremendous potency. It does not seem to need a common language, or a pure race, or a smooth blend of somewhat different races, or the same climate, or identity of the sources of livelihood. It is not necessarily based on similar histories, common traditions, or even the same religion. If we may judge from European and American experience, the sentiment of nationality is based on similar social standards or needs, on common ideals, on like passions good and bad, on a love of independence and liberty, on a preference for a large, comprehensive governmental unit over a small

one, and on the desire to resist common dangers, wrongs, or aggressions from without. This last desire is very unifying the world over. Experience of misgovernment tends to unite the misgoverned, just as an earthquake, a destructive storm, a conflagration, or a flood always brings out in many of the sufferers a very practical brotherliness. Such seem to be the sources of the present development among the Chinese of a potent sentiment of nationality.

When several races live side by side on the same soil and form a community, it often happens that the ideals of one of these races dominate the development of all. This result has often been conspicuous in history, and is still exemplified in the present life of certain nations to which several different racial elements have contributed without being blended. The most essential element in the modern idea of nationality is identity of ideals, and of customs which are the offspring of ideals.

I have already mentioned in this report the growth in many regions of the world of the objection to alien government as such. It appears on a small scale and a large, in barbarous and semi-barbarous countries, and in countries which have long been civilized. It may be successfully

repressed for long periods, though recognized. It may be long concealed by multitudes who feel it hotly; but it tends more and more throughout the world to break out at last, and win the day.

The motive of resistance to foreign oppression works wonders toward the formation of new national units, as has been forcibly illustrated in Europe during the past year. All China has had such bitter experience of oppression and robbery on the part of Western nations, that she inevitably possesses a strong unifying force in this common sense of unjust suffering.

All the enterprising Occidental nations are interested in determining accurately what the desires and ambitions of the Japanese people really are. The Japanese have proved by their achievements during the past forty-five years that as a race they possess fine physical, mental, and moral qualities. They possess in high degree intelligence, inventiveness, commercial and industrial enterprise, persistence, and the moral qualities which bring success in industries and commerce. They have learnt and put into practice all the Occidental methods of warfare on sea and land, and have proved that they can face in battle not only the yellow races, but the

white. Are they then a dangerous or a safe addition to the world's group of national industrial and commercial competitors? Is their demonstrated strength dangerous to the peace of the world and to the white race? To answer these questions, it is indispensable to form a clear and just idea of Japanese desires and ambitions.

The Japanese are not a numerous people; for they number less than one half the population of the United States. They are not a colonizing people. The Japanese Government has had great difficulty in inducing Japanese to settle in Formosa, and at the present moment it has similar difficulties in Korea and Manchuria. To be sure, the climate of Formosa is too hot for the Japanese; but that of Korea and Manchuria resembles that of Japan. They are commercially adventurous, and will travel far and wide as pedlers, or in search of work and trade; but they are not colonists. They are a homing people, like the French. They have no more use for the Philippines than Americans have. If a Japanese trader makes money in a foreign country, he will take his family and his money back to Japan as soon as he can. They do not intermarry with women of any foreign race, affording thus a strong contrast to the white

race when in foreign parts. The inexpedient crossing of unlike races will not be promoted by them in any part of the world.

The Japanese are not a warlike people, although within a few years they have waged two defensive wars, one with China and the other with Russia. They possess, indeed, admirable martial qualities, and make obedient, tough, and courageous soldiers in their country's service. Their fundamental motive in fighting, however, is not a natural love of it, such as is exhibited, or used to be exhibited, by some Occidental peoples, but a simple, profound loyalty to their country, and to the authoritative representatives of their country's power and will. In their intense patriotism pride, loyalty, and love are fused into a sentiment which completely dominates the private soldier, the officer, and the whole military and naval service. Still they are not an aggressive, conquering people; and they feel no motive for acquiring new territory, except near-by territory which they believe to be necessary to the security of their island empire.

The Japanese are accused, chiefly by Occidental army and navy men, of intending to "dominate the Pacific"; but Japan has no such

intention. All Japanese statesmen and political philosophers recognize the fact that Japan is, and always will be, unable to "dominate the Pacific." No one nation in the world could possibly control the Pacific Ocean. For that purpose a combination of at least four powers having strong navies would be necessary. Five or six powers combined, such, for example, as Great Britain, Germany, France, the United States, Japan, and Russia or Italy, could do it; and could at the same time dominate all the other oceans and seas. Such a group would possess ports and coaling stations on all the seas and oceans. It would be convenient, though not indispensable, if one strong South American government on the Atlantic Coast and one on the Pacific Coast joined the group. There are many who think a control of the oceans by such a combination would be desirable; because it would tend to remove some of the apprehensions which cause war and preparation for war, and to check in their early stages offenses committed or contemplated by one nation against another.

All Japanese leaders are fully aware that it would be impossible for either Japan or the United States to send an army of a hundred

thousand men with their baggage, animals, stores, and munitions, across the Pacific Ocean in safety, although the fleet should be convoyed by scores of battleships and armored cruisers. The means of attack at night by almost invisible vessels on a wide-extended fleet in motion are quite adequate to arrest or destroy any such expedition, if the attacking force were even tolerably alert and vigorous. If by miracle such an army should effect a landing on either shore, it could achieve nothing significant, unless the first expedition should be immediately followed by a second and a third. The scale of modern warfare between nations is too large for such remote expeditions, — no matter what the resources of the nation that should be rash enough to attempt them.

Japan, being heavily burdened with debts incurred in carrying on her wars with China and Russia and making internal improvements, could not borrow the money necessary in these days for waging aggressive war on a large scale at a distance, although she might fight successfully on the defensive at or near home. That much she could doubtless do, as many other poor nations have done; but her financial condition is such that she will be prevented from

engaging in offensive war for at least a generation to come. Moreover, all the capital which Japanese merchants, manufacturers, and financiers can possibly accumulate during the next thirty years, is urgently needed for the execution of public works and the expansion of industrial undertakings at home. The industrial and commercial interests of Japan require peace with all the other nations of the world. As Count Terauchi said to me at Seoul, "There is no interest of Japan which could possibly be promoted by war with the United States or any other nation; and conversely, there is no interest of the United States which could possibly be promoted by war with Japan." Such, as I have said before, was the opinion of every Japanese statesman and man of business with whom I talked in the summer of 1912; and many of these gentlemen said that they had never met any Japanese political or commercial leader who was not of that opinion. The entire commerce between Japan and the United States is for the mutual advantage of each country, and the United States is Japan's best customer. War between the two countries is not to be thought of; and to suppose that Japan would commit an act of aggression against the United States which would necessarily cause

war is wholly unreasonable, fantastic, and foolish, — the product of a morbid and timorous imagination.

Japanese statesmen are not in favor of any extensive migrations of Japanese people to other lands. They want Japanese emigrants from their native islands to settle in neighboring Japanese territories. They hold that the Japanese home industries need all the labor the population can furnish. Japanese economists greatly prefer to the planting of Japanese capital or labor in foreign lands the recent methods of planting foreign capital in Japan. When an American corporation, which is conducting at home a successful industry, sells its patents and methods to a body of Japanese capitalists, and then takes a considerable portion of the stocks and bonds of the Japanese company, American capital finds a profitable investment, the Japanese laborers remain at home, and the product of Japanese industry is sold to advantage in the markets of the world. Japan wants foreign markets for its manufactured products. War, or any other action or event which interrupts commercial relations with other countries is adverse to Japanese interests.

The right state of mind of Americans towards

Japan is one of hearty good-will and cordial admiration. Japan should receive every privilege in the United States which the "most favored nation" possesses; and that is all Japan wants from the United States, except the respect due to its achievements, and to the physical, intellectual, and moral qualities which have made these achievements possible. All classes in Japan, the uneducated as well as the educated, the poor as well as the rich, are sensitive about being treated, or thought of, as if they were a backward, semi-civilized, untrustworthy people. They wish to be regarded as a worthy member of the family of civilized nations.

Wars and preparations for war continue, because many of the causes of war in time past continue to exist. The Occidental peoples have for several centuries fought oftener and harder than the Oriental; and the Christianity which prevails among them has little, if any, tendency to prevent their fighting among themselves, sometimes with ferocity, or to prevent them from attacking non-Christian peoples, if they think it their interest to do so. The Eastern peoples, Far and Near, as has been already mentioned, will have some causes of their own for war; because in some important instances

neither their geographical limits nor their governmental institutions are as yet settled. One Eastern people has recently acquired the whole of the Occidental art of war with its subsidiary sciences, and other Eastern peoples are on the way to the same acquisition. War will last until its causes are rooted out, and that extirpation will prove a slow and hard task. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is just entering, therefore, on labors which will last for generations. Its reliance must be on the slow-acting forces of education, sanitation, and conservation, on the promotion of mutual acquaintance and advantageous commercial intercourse with the resultant good-will among nations, and on the steady, patient use of the civilizing agencies which humane democracy and applied science have invented and set at work within the past hundred years.

From the observations recorded in the above Report, certain inferences may be drawn concerning profitable expenditures for the promotion of international peace by the Division of Intercourse and Education of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It may be safely inferred that action in any of the following directions will bring nearer the coming of

peace:—(1) Create or support agencies competent to reduce, relieve, or prevent, so far as is each day possible, the wrongs, miseries, and illusions which have caused, and are still causing, wars. (2) Strengthen public opinion in favor of publicity in governmental and commercial transactions. (3) Suspect and probe all secrecies and hidings in the family, in industries, in legislation, and in administration. Oppressions and robberies are generally concocted in secret. It is one of the worst consequences of long-continued and severe oppression, that the resistance to it and revolution must be nursed in secret. Inquire, bring light, and publish. (4) Cultivate in all nations trusteeship, public spirit, and the application of private money to public uses. (5) Create or foster, in addition to universal elementary education, permanent educational agencies such as libraries, hospitals, dispensaries, training-schools for nurses, and technical and professional schools in countries which lack these instrumentalities. (6) Recognize frankly the present necessity of maintaining in all countries armed forces for protective duty against aggression from without, or disintegration from within. (7) Strengthen international public opinion in favor of an international naval force

to secure peace and order on the seas, and a freedom that cannot be interrupted for water-borne commerce. (8) Foster those religious sentiments and those economic, industrial, and political principles which manifestly tend to purify and strengthen family life, and to secure liberty, domestic joys, public tranquillity, and the people's health, morality, and general well-being.

CHAPTER V

THE GREAT EUROPEAN WAR — ITS CAUSES, SCOPE, AND OBJECTS — WHAT GAINS FOR MANKIND CAN COME OUT OF IT[1]

THE American people without distinction of party are highly content with the action of their National Administration on all the grave problems presented to the Government by the sudden outbreak of long-prepared war in Europe — a war which already involves five great states and two small ones. They heartily approve of the action of the Administration on mediation, neutrality, aid to Americans in Europe, discouragement of speculation in foods, and, with the exception of extreme protectionists, admission to American registry of foreign-built ships; although the legislation on the last subject, which has already passed Congress, is manifestly inadequate.

Our people cannot see that the war will necessarily be short, and they cannot imagine how it can last long. They realize that history gives

[1] A letter published in the *New York Times* of September 2, 1914.

no example of such a general interruption of trade and all other international intercourse as has already taken place, or of such a stoppage of the production and distribution of the necessaries of life as this war threatens. They shudder at the floods of human woe which are about to overwhelm Europe.

Hence, thinking Americans cannot help reflecting on the causes of this monstrous outbreak of primitive savagery — part of them come down from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and part developed in the nineteenth — and wondering what good for mankind, if any, can possibly come out of the present cataclysm.

The whole people of the United States, without regard to racial origin, are of one mind in hoping that mankind may gain out of this prodigious physical combat, which uses for purposes of destruction and death all the new forces of nineteenth-century applied science, some new liberties and new securities in the pursuit of happiness; but at this moment they can cherish only a remote hope of such an issue. The military force which Austria-Hungary and Germany are now using on a prodigious scale, and with long-studied skill, can only be met by similar military force, and this resisting force is sum-

moned more slowly than that of Austria-Hungary and Germany; although the ultimate battalions will be heavier. In this portentous physical contest the American people have no part; their geographical position, their historical development, and their political ideals combine to make them for the present mere spectators; although their interests — commercial, industrial, and political — are deeply involved. For the moment, the best thing our Government can do is to utilize all existing neutrality rights, and, if possible, to strengthen or develop those rights; for out of this war ought to come more neutral states in Europe, and greater security for neutralized territory.

The chances of getting some gains for mankind out of this gigantic struggle will be somewhat increased if the American people, and all other neutral peoples, arrive through public discussion at some clear understanding of the causes and the possible and desirable issues of the war, and the sooner this public discussion begins, and the more thoroughly it is pursued, the sounder will probably be the tendencies of public sentiment outside of the contending nations, and the conclusions which the peace negotiations will ultimately reach.

When one begins, however, to reflect on the probable causes of the sudden lapse of the most civilized parts of Europe into worse than primitive savagery, he comes at once on two old and widespread evils in Europe from which America has been exempt for at least one hundred and fifty years. The first is secret diplomacy with power to make issues and determine events, and the second is autocratic national executives who can swing the whole physical force of the nation to this side or that without consulting the people or their representatives.

The actual catastrophe proves that secret negotiations, like those habitually conducted on behalf of the "Concert of Europe," and alliances between selected nations, the terms of which are secret, or, at any rate, not publicly stated, cannot avert in the long run outrageous war, but can only produce postponements of war, or short truces. Free institutions, like those of the United States, take the public into confidence, because all important movements of the Government must rest on popular desires, needs, and volitions. Autocratic institutions have no such necessity for publicity. This Government secrecy as to motives, plans, and purposes must often be maintained by disregarding truth, fair deal-

ing, and honorable obligations, in order that, when the appeal to force comes, one Government may secure the advantage of taking the other by surprise. Duplicity during peace and the breaking of treaties during war come to be regarded as obvious military necessities.

The second great evil, under which certain large nations of Europe — notably Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary — have long suffered and still suffer, is the permanent national executive, independent of popular control through representative bodies, holding strong views about rights of birth and religious sanctions of its authority, and really controlling the national forces through some small council and a strong bureaucracy. So long as executives of this sort endure, so long will civilization be liable to such explosions as have taken place this August, though not always on so vast a scale.

Americans now see these things more clearly than European lovers of liberty, because Americans are detached from the actual conflicts by the Atlantic, and because Americans have had no real contact with the feudal or the imperial system for nearly three hundred years. Pilgrim and Puritan, Covenanter and Quaker, Lutheran

and Catholic alike left the feudal system and autocratic government behind them when they crossed the Atlantic. Americans, therefore, cannot help hoping that two results of the present war will be: (1) The abolition of secret diplomacy and secret understandings, and the substitution therefor of treaties publicly discussed and sanctioned, and (2) the creation of national executives — emperors, sultans, kings, or presidents — which cannot use the national forces in fight until a thoroughly informed national assembly, acting with deliberation, has agreed to that use.

The American student of history since the middle of the seventeenth century sees clearly two strong though apparently opposite tendencies in Europe: First, the tendency to the creation and maintenance of small states such as those which the Peace of Westphalia (1648) recognized and for two centuries secured in a fairly independent existence, and, secondly, a tendency from the middle of the nineteenth century toward larger national units, created by combining several kindred states under one executive. This second tendency was illustrated strongly in the case of both Germany and Italy, although the Prussian domination in Germany

has no parallel in Italy. Somewhat earlier in the nineteenth century the doctrine of the neutralization of the territories of small states was established as firmly as solemn treaties could do it. The larger national units had a more or less federative quality, the components yielding some of their functions to a central power, but retaining numerous independent functions. This tendency to limited unification is one which Americans easily understand and appreciate. We believe in the federative principle, and must therefore hope that out of the present European horror will come a new development of that principle, and new security for small states which are capable of guaranteeing to their citizens "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" — a security which no citizen of any European country seems to-day to possess.

Some of the underlying causes of the horrible catastrophe the American people are now watching from afar are commercial and economic. Imperial Germany's desire for colonies in other continents — such as Great Britain and France secured earlier as a result of keen commercial ambitions — is intense. Prussia's seizure of Schleswig in 1864–65 had the commercial motive; and it is with visions of ports

on the North Sea that Germany justifies her present occupation of Belgium. The Russians have for generations desired to extend their national territory southward to the Ægean and the Bosphorus, and eastward to good harbors on the Pacific. Lately they pushed into Mongolia and Manchuria, but were resisted successfully by Japan. Austria-Hungary has long been seeking ports on the Adriatic, and lately seized without warrant Herzegovina and Bosnia to promote her approach toward the Ægean, and is now trying to seize Serbia with the same ends in view. With similar motives Italy lately descended on Tripoli, without any excuse except this intense desire for colonies — profitable or unprofitable. On the other hand, the American people, looking to the future as well as to the past, object to acquisitions of new territory by force of arms; and since the twentieth century opened they have twice illustrated in their own practice — first in Cuba, and then in Mexico — this democratic objection. They believe that extensions of national territory should be brought about only with the indubitable consent of the majority of the people most nearly concerned. They also believe that commerce should always be a means of promoting good-

will, and not ill-will, among men, and that all legitimate and useful extensions of the commerce of a manufacturing and commercial nation may be procured through the policy of the "open door" — which means nothing more than that all nations should be allowed to compete on equal terms for the trade of any foreign people, whether backward or advanced in civilization. No American Administration has accepted a "concession" of land in China. They also believe that peaceable extensions of territory and trade will afford adequate relief from the economic pressure on a population too large for the territory it occupies, and that there is no need of forcible seizure of territory to secure relief. It is inevitable, therefore, that the American people should hope that one outcome of the present war should be — no enlargement of a national territory by force or without the free consent of the population to be annexed, and no colonization except by peaceable commercial and industrial methods.

One of the most interesting and far-reaching effects of the present outbreak of savagery is likely to be the conviction it carries to the minds of thinking people that the whole process of competitive armaments, the enlistment

of the entire male population in national armies, and the incessant planning of campaigns against neighbors, is not a trustworthy method for preserving peace. It now appears that the military preparations of the last fifty years in Europe have resulted in the most terrific war of all time, and that a fierce ultimate outbreak is the only probable result of the system. For the future of civilization this is a lesson of high value. It teaches that if modern civilization is to be preserved, national executives — whether imperial or republican — must not have at their disposal immense armaments and drilled armies held ready in the leash; that armaments must be limited, an international supreme court established, national armies changed to the Swiss form, and an international force adequate to deal with any nation that may suddenly become lawless agreed upon by treaty and held always in readiness. The occasional use of force will continue to be necessary even in the civilized world; but it must be made not an aggressive, but a protective, force, and used as such — just as protective force has to be used sometimes in families, schools, cities, and commonwealths.

At present, Americans do not close their eyes to the plain fact that the brute force which Ger-

many and Austria-Hungary are now using can only be overcome by brute force of the same sort in larger measure. It is only when negotiations for peace begin that the great lesson of the futility of huge preparations for fighting to preserve peace can be given effect. Is it too much to expect that the whole civilized world will take to heart the lessons of this terrible catastrophe, and coöperate to prevent the recurrence of such losses and woes? Should Germany and Austria-Hungary succeed in their present undertakings, the civilized nations would be obliged to bear continuously, and to an ever-increasing amount, the burdens of great armaments, and would live in constant fear of sudden invasion, now here, now there — a terrible fear, against which neither treaties nor professions of peaceable intentions would offer the least security.

It must be admitted, however, that the whole military organization, which has long been compulsory on the nations of continental Europe, is inconsistent in the highest degree with American ideals of individual liberty and social progress. Democracies can fight with ardor, and sometimes with success, when the whole people is moved by a common sentiment or passion; but the structure and discipline of a modern

army like that of Germany, Austria-Hungary, or Russia has a despotic or autocratic quality which is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of democratic society. To make war in countries like France, Great Britain, and the United States requires the widespread, simultaneous stirring of the passions of the people on behalf of their own ideals. This stirring requires publicity before and after the declaration of war and public discussion; and the delays which discussion causes are securities for peace. Out of the present struggle should come a check on militarism — a strong revulsion against the use of force as means of settling international disputes.

It must also be admitted that it is impossible for the American people to sympathize with the tone of the imperial and royal addresses which, in summoning the people to war, use such phrases as "My monarchy," "My loyal people," or "My loyal subjects"; for there is implied in such phrases a dynastic or personal ownership of peoples which shocks the average American. Americans inevitably think that the right way for a ruler to begin an exhortation to the people he rules is President Wilson's way — "My fellow countrymen."

It follows from the very existence of these American instincts and hopes that, although the people of the United States mean to maintain faithfully a legal neutrality, they are not, and cannot be, neutral or indifferent as to the ultimate outcome of this titanic struggle. It already seems to them that England, France, and Russia are fighting for freedom and civilization. It does not follow that thinking Americans will forget the immense services which Germany has rendered to civilization during the last hundred years, or desire that her power to serve letters, science, art, and education should be in the least abridged in the outcome of this war, upon which she has entered so rashly and selfishly, and in so barbarous a spirit. Most educated Americans hope and believe that by defeating the German barbarousness the Allies will only promote the noble German civilization.

The presence of Russia in the combination against Germany and Austria-Hungary seems to the average American an abnormal phenomenon; because Russia is itself a military monarchy with marked territorial ambitions; and its civilization is at a more elementary stage than that of France or England; but he resists present apprehension on this score by recalling

that Russia submitted to the "Concert of Europe" when her victorious armies were within seventeen miles of Constantinople, that she emancipated her serfs, proposed the Hague Conferences, initiated the "Douma," and has lately offered — perhaps as war measures only — autonomy to her Poles and equal rights of citizenship to her Jews. He also cannot help believing that a nation which has produced such a literature as Russia has produced during the last fifty years must hold within its multitudinous population a large minority which is seething with high aspirations and a fine idealism.

For the clarification of the public mind on the issues involved, it is important that the limits of American neutrality should be discussed and understood. The action of the Government must be neutral in the best sense; but American sympathies and hopes cannot possibly be neutral; for the whole history and present state of American liberty forbids. For the present, thinking Americans can only try to appreciate the scope and real issues of this formidable convulsion, and so be ready to seize every opportunity that may present itself to further the cause of human freedom, and of peace at last.

CHAPTER VI

TRUE NATIONAL GREATNESS — ARE ITS FOUNDATIONS IMPERIALISM OR DEMOCRACY, FIGHTING POWER OR SOLEMN PUBLIC COMPACTS?[1]

THERE is nothing new in the obsession of the principal European nations that, in order to be great and successful in the world as it is, they must possess military power available for instant aggression on weak nations, as well as for effective defence against strong ones.

When Sir Francis Bacon wrote his essay on "The True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates," he remarked that forts, arsenals, goodly races of horses, armaments, and the like would all be useless "except the breed and disposition of the people be stout and warlike." He denied that money is the sinews of war, giving preference to the sinews of men's arms, and quoted Solon's remark to Crœsus, "Sir, if any other come that hath better iron than you, he will be master of all this gold" — a truly Bismarckian proposition. Indeed, Sir Francis Bacon says explicitly

[1] A letter published in the *New York Times* of Sept. 22, 1914.

that "the principal point of greatness in any state is to have a race of military men."

Goethe, reflecting on the wretchedness of the German people as a whole, found no comfort in the German genius for science, literature, and art, or only a miserable comfort which "does not make up for the proud consciousness of belonging to a nation strong, respected, and feared." Because Germany in his time was weak in the military sense, he could write: "I have often felt a bitter grief at the thought of the German people, which is so noble individually, and so wretched as a whole"; and he longed for the day when the national spirit, kept alive and hopeful, should be "ready to rise in all its might, when the day of glory dawns."

"The day of glory" was to be the day of military power. Carlyle said of Germany and France in November, 1870, "that noble, patient, deep, pious, and solid Germany should be at length welded into a nation, and become Queen of the Continent, instead of vaporing, vainglorious, gesticulating, quarrelsome, restless, and oversensitive France, seems to me the hopefullest public fact that has occurred in my time." How did Germany attain to this position of "Queen of the Continent"? By creat-

ing and maintaining, with utmost intelligence and skill, the strongest army in Europe — an army, which, within six years, had been used successfully against Denmark, Austria, and France. Germany became "Queen" by virtue of her military power.

In the same paper, Carlyle said of the French Revolution, of which he was himself the great portrayer, "I often call that a celestial infernal phenomenon, the most memorable in our world for a thousand years; on the whole, a transcendent revolt against the devil and his works (since shams are all and sundry of the devil, and poisonous and unendurable to man)." Now, the French Revolution was an extraordinary outbreak of passionate feeling and physical violence on the part of the French nation, both at home and abroad; and it led on to the Napoleonic wars, which were tremendous physical struggles for mastery in Europe.

In a recent public statement two leading philosophical writers of modern Germany, Professors Eucken and Haeckel, denounce the "brutal national egoism" of England, which, they say, "recognizes no rights on the part of others, and, unconcerned about morality or unmorality, pursues only its own advantage"; and

they attribute to England the purpose to hinder at any cost the further growth of German greatness. But what are the elements of that German greatness which England is determined to arrest by joining France and Russia in war against Germany and Austria-Hungary? The three elements of recent German greatness are the extension of her territory — contiguous territories in Europe and in other continents colonial possessions; the enlargement of German commerce and wealth; and to these ends the firm establishment of her military supremacy in Europe. These are the ideas on the true greatness of nations which have prevailed in the ruling oligarchy of Germany for at least sixty years, and now seem to have been accepted, or acquiesced in, by the whole German people. In this view, the foundation of national greatness is fighting power.

This conception of national greatness has prevailed at many different epochs, — Macedonian, Roman, Saracen, Spanish, English, and French, — and, indeed, has appeared from time to time in almost all the nations and tribes of the earth; but the civilized world is now looking for better foundations of national greatness than force and fighting.

The partial successes of democracy in Europe have much increased the evils of war. Sir Francis Bacon looked for a fighting class; under the feudal system when a baron went to war he took with him his vassals, or that portion of them that could be spared from the fields at home. Universal conscription is a modern invention, the horrors of which, as now exhibited in Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and France, much exceed those of earlier martial methods. There has never been such an interruption of agricultural and industrial production, or such a rending of family ties in consequence of war as is now taking place in the greater part of Europe. Moreover, mankind has never before had the use of such destructive implements as the machine gun, the torpedo, and the dynamite bomb. The progress of science has much increased the potential destructiveness of warfare.

Thinking people in all the civilized countries are asking themselves what the fundamental trouble with civilization is, and where to look for means of escape from the present intolerable conditions. Christianity in nineteen centuries has afforded no relief. The so-called mitigations of war are comparatively trivial. The recent

Balkan wars were as ferocious as those of Alexander. The German aviators drop aimless bombs at night into cities occupied chiefly by non-combatants. The North Sea is strewn with floating mines which may destroy fishing, freight, or passenger vessels of any nation, neutral or belligerent, which have business on that sea. The ruthless destruction of the Louvain Library by German soldiers reminds people who have read history that the destroyers of the Alexandria Library have ever since been called fanatics and barbarians. The German army tries to compel unfortified Belgian cities and towns to pay huge ransoms to save themselves from destruction — a method which the Barbary States, indeed, were accustomed to use against their Christian neighbors, but which has long been held to be appropriate only for brigands and pirates — Greek, Sicilian, Syrian, or Chinese.

How can it be that the Government of a civilized state commits, or permits in its agents, such barbarities? The fundamental reason seems to be that most of the European nations still believe that national greatness depends on the possession and brutal use of force, and is to be maintained and magnified only by military and naval power.

In North America there are two large communities — heretofore inspired chiefly by ideals of English origin — which have never maintained conscripted armies, and have never fortified against each other their long frontier — Canada and the United States. Both may fairly be called great peoples even now; and both give ample promise for the future. Neither of these peoples lacks the "stout and warlike" quality of which Sir Francis Bacon spoke; both have often exhibited it. The United States suffered for four years from a civil war, characterized by determined fighting in indecisive battles, in which the losses, in proportion to the number of men engaged, were often much heavier than any thus far reported from the present battlefields in Belgium and France. There being, then, no lack of martial spirit in these two peoples, it is an instructive phenomenon that power to conquer is not their ideal of national greatness. Much the same thing may be said of some other self-governing constituents of the British Empire, such as Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. They, too, have a better ideal of national greatness than that of military supremacy.

What are the real ambitions and hopes of the

people of the United States and the people of Canada in regard to their own future? Their expectations of greatness certainly are not based on any conception of invincible military force, or desire for the physical means of enforcing their own will on their neighbors. They both believe in the free commonwealth, administered justly, and with the purpose of securing for each individual all the freedom he can exercise without injury to his neighbors and the collective well-being. They desire for themselves, each for itself, a strong government, equipped to perform its functions with dignity, certainty, and efficiency; but they wish to have that government under the control of the deliberate public opinion of free citizens, and not under the control of any Prætorian Guard, Oligarchic Council, or General Staff, and they insist that the civil authority should always control such military and police forces as it may be necessary to maintain for protective purposes.

They believe that the chief object of government should be the promotion of the public welfare by legislative and administrative means; that the processes of government should be open and visible, and their results be incessantly published for approval or disapproval. They believe

that a nation becomes great through industrial productiveness and the resulting internal and external commerce, through the gradual increase of comfort and general well-being in the population, and through the advancement of science, letters, and art. They believe that education, free intercourse with other nations, and religious enthusiasm and toleration are means of national greatness, and that in the development and use of these means force has no place. They attribute national greatness in others, as well as in themselves, not to the possession of military force, but to the advance of the people in freedom, industry, righteousness, and goodwill.

They believe that the ideals of fighting power and domination should be replaced by the ideals of peaceful competition in production and trade, of generous rivalry in education, scientific discovery, and the fine arts, of coöperation for mutual benefit among nations different in size, natural abilities, and material resources, and of federation among nations associated geographically or historically, or united in the pursuit of some common ends and in the cherishing of like hopes and aspirations. They think that the peace of the world can be best promoted by sol-

emn public compacts between peoples — not princes or cabinets — compacts made to be kept, strengthened by mutual services and good offices, and watched over by a permanent international judicial tribunal authorized to call on the affiliated nations for whatever force may be necessary to induce obedience to its decrees.

Will not the civilized world learn from this horrible European war — the legitimate result of the policies of Bismarck and his associates and disciples — that these democratic ideals constitute the rational substitute for the imperialistic ideal of fighting force as the foundation of national greatness? The new ideals will still need the protection and support, both within and without each nation, of a restrained public force, acting under law, national and international, just as a sane mind needs as its agent a sound and strong body. Health and vigor will continue to be the safeguards of morality, justice and mercy.

CHAPTER VII

SOME GROUNDS FOR AMERICAN SYMPATHY WITH MODERN GERMANY — WHY AMERICAN OPINION FAVORS THE ALLIES IN THE GREAT WAR — THE MOST FAVORABLE ISSUE OF THE WAR[1]

THE numerous pamphlets which German writers are now distributing in the United States, and the many letters about the European war which Americans are now receiving from German and German-American friends, are convincing thoughtful people in this country that American public opinion has some weight with the German Government and people, or, at least, some interest for them; but that the reasons which determine American sympathy with the Allies, rather than with Germany and Austria-Hungary, are not understood in Germany, and are not always appreciated by persons of German birth who have lived long in the United States.

It would be a serious mistake to suppose that Americans feel any hostility or jealousy toward

[1] A letter published in the *New York Times* of October 2, 1914.

Germany, or fail to recognize the immense obligations under which she has placed all the rest of the world; although they now feel that the German nation has been going wrong in theoretical and practical politics for more than a hundred years, and is to-day reaping the consequences of her own wrong-thinking and wrong-doing.

There are many important matters concerning which American sympathy is strongly with Germany: (1) The unification of Germany, which Bismarck and his co-workers accomplished, naturally commended itself to Americans, whose own country is a firm federation of many more or less different States, containing more or less different peoples. While most Americans did not approve Bismarck's methods and means, they cordially approved his accomplishment of German unification. (2) Americans have felt unqualified admiration for the commercial and financial growth of Germany during the past forty years, believing it to be primarily the fruit of well-directed industry and enterprise. (3) All educated Americans feel strong gratitude to the German nation for its extraordinary achievements in letters, science, and education within the last hundred years. Jealousy

of Germany in these matters is absolutely foreign to American thought, and that any external power or influence should undertake to restrict or impair German progress in these respects would seem to all Americans intolerable, and, indeed, incredible. (4) All Americans who have had any experience in governmental or educational administration recognize the fact that German administration — both in peace and in war — is the most efficient in the world; and for that efficiency they feel nothing but respect and admiration, unless the efficiency requires an inexpedient suppression or restriction of individual liberty. (5) Americans sympathize with a unanimous popular sentiment in favor of a war which the people believe to be essential to the greatness, and even the safety, of their country — a sentiment which prompts to family and property sacrifices very distressing at the moment, and irremediable in the future; and they believe that the German people are inspired today by just such an overwhelming sentiment.

How is it, then, that, with all these strong American feelings tending to make them sympathize with the German people in good times or bad, in peace or in war, the whole weight of American opinion is on the side of the Allies

in the present war? The reasons are to be found, of course, in the political and social history of the American people, and in its governmental philosophy and practice to-day. These reasons have come out of the past, and are entrenched in all the present ideals and practices of the American Commonwealth. They inevitably lead Americans to object strongly and irrevocably to certain German national practices of great moment, practices which are outgrowths of Prussian theories and experiences that have come to prevail in Germany during the past hundred years. In the hope that American public opinion about the European war may be a little better understood abroad, it seems worth while to enumerate those German practices which do not conform to American standards in the conduct of public affairs: —

(1) Americans object to the committal of a nation to grave measures of foreign policy by a permanent executive — czar, kaiser, or king — advised in secret by professional diplomatists who consider themselves the personal representatives of their respective sovereigns. The American people have no permanent executive, and the profession of diplomacy hardly exists among them. In the conduct of their national

affairs they utterly distrust secrecy, and are accustomed to demand and secure the utmost publicity.

(2) They object to placing in any ruler's hands the power to order mobilization or declare war in advance of deliberate consultation with a representative assembly, and of coöperative action thereby. The fact that German mobilization was ordered three days in advance of the meeting of the Reichstag confounds all American ideas and practices about the rights of the people and the proper limits of the executive authority.

(3) The secrecy of European diplomatic intercourse and of international understandings and terms of alliance in Europe is in the view of ordinary Americans not only inexpedient, but dangerous and unjustifiable. Under the Constitution of the United States no treaty negotiated by the President and his Cabinet is valid until it has been publicly discussed and ratified by the Senate. During this discussion the people can make their voice heard through the press, the telegraph, and the telephone.

(4) The reliance on military force as the foundation of true national greatness seems to thinking Americans erroneous, and in the long

run degrading to a Christian nation. They conceive that the United States may fairly be called a great nation; but that its greatness is due to intellectual and moral forces acting through adequate material forces, and expressed in education, public health and order, agriculture, manufacturing, and commerce, and the resulting general well-being of the people. It has never in all its history organized what could be called a standing or a conscripted army; and, until twenty years ago, its navy was very small, considering the length of its seacoasts. There is nothing in the history of the American people to make them believe that the true greatness of nations depends on military power.

(5) They object to the extension of national territory by force, contrary to the wishes of the population concerned. This objection is the inevitable result of democratic institutions; and the American people have been faithful to this democratic opinion under circumstances of considerable difficulty — as, for example, in withdrawing from Cuba, the rich island which had been occupied by American troops during the short war with Spain (1898), and in the refusing to intervene by force in Mexico for the protection of American investors, when

that contiguous country was distracted by factional fighting. This objection applies to long-past acts of the German Government, as well as to its proceedings in the present war — as, for example, to the taking of Schleswig-Holstein and Alsace-Lorraine, as well as to the projected annexation of Belgium.

(6) Americans object strenuously to the violation of treaties between nations on the allegation of military necessity, or for any other reason whatever. They believe that the progress of civilization will depend in future on the general acceptance of the sanctity of contracts or solemn agreements between nations, and on the development by common consent of international law. The neutralization treaties, the arbitration treaties, the Hague Conferences, and some of the serious attempts at mediation, although none of them go far enough, and many of them have been rudely violated on occasion, illustrate a strong tendency in the civilized parts of the world to prevent international wars by means of agreements deliberately made in time of peace. The United States has proposed and made more of these agreements than any other power, has adhered to them, and profited by them. Under one such

agreement, made nearly a hundred years ago, Canada and the United States have avoided forts and armaments against each other, although they have had serious differences of opinion and clashes of interests, and the frontier is three thousand miles long and for the most part without natural barriers. Cherishing the hope that the peace of Europe and the rights of its peoples may be secured through solemn compacts (which should include the establishment of a permanent international judicial tribunal, supported by an international force), Americans see, in the treatment by the German Government of the Belgium neutralization treaty as nothing but a piece of paper which might be torn up on the ground of military necessity, evidence of the adoption by Germany of a retrograde policy of the most alarming sort. That single act on the part of Germany — the violation of the neutral territory of Belgium — would have determined American opinion in favor of the Allies, if it had stood alone by itself — the reason being that American hopes for the peace and order of the world are based on the sanctity of treaties.

(7) American public opinion, however, has

been greatly shocked in other ways by the German conduct of the war. The American common people see no justification for the dropping of bombs, to which no specific aim can be given, into cities and towns chiefly inhabited by non-combatants, the burning or blowing up of large portions of unfortified towns and cities, the destruction of precious monuments and treasuries of art, the strewing of floating mines through the North Sea, the exacting of ransoms from cities and towns under threat of destroying them, and the holding of unarmed citizens as hostages for the peaceable behavior of a large population under threat of summary execution of the hostages in case of any disorder. All these seem to Americans unnecessary, inexpedient, and unjustifiable methods of warfare, sure to breed hatred and contempt toward the nation that uses them, and therefore to make it difficult for future generations to maintain peace and order in Europe. They cannot help imagining the losses civilization would suffer if the Russians should ever carry into Western Europe the kind of war which the Germans are now waging in Belgium and France. They have supposed that war was to be waged in this century

only against public armed forces and their supplies and shelters.

These opinions and prepossessions on the part of the American people have obviously grown out of the ideals which the early English colonists carried with them to the American wilderness in the seventeenth century, out of the long fighting and public discussion which preceded the adoption of the Constitution of the United States in the eighteenth century, and out of the peculiar experiences of the free Commonwealths which make up the United States, as they have spread across the almost uninhabited continent during the past hundred and twenty-five years.

The experience and the situation of modern Germany have been utterly different. Germany was divided for centuries into discordant parts, had ambitious and martial neighbors, and often felt the weight of their attacks. Out of war came accessions of territory for Prussia, and at last German unity. The reliance of intelligent and patriotic Germany on military force as the basis of national greatness is a natural result of its experiences. Americans, however, believe that this reliance is unsound both theoretically and practically. The wars in Europe

since 1870–71, the many threatenings of war, and the present catastrophe seem to Americans to demonstrate that no amount of military preparedness on the part of the nations of Europe can possibly keep the peace of the Continent, or indeed prevent frequent explosions of destructive warfare. They think, too, that preparation for war on the part of Germany better than any of her neighbors can make will not keep her at peace or protect her from invasion, even if this better preparation include advantages of detail which have been successfully kept secret. All the nations which surround Germany are capable of developing a strong fighting spirit; and all the countries of Europe, except England and Russia, possess the means of quickly assembling and getting into action great bodies of men. In other words, all the European states are capable of developing a passionate patriotism, and all possess the railroads, roads, conveyances, telegraphs, and telephones which make rapid mobilization possible. No perfection of military forces, and no amount of previous study of feasible campaigns against neighbors, can give peaceful security to Germany in the present condition of the great European states. In the

actual development of weapons and munitions, and of the art of quick entrenching, the attacking force in battle on land is at a great disadvantage in comparison with the force on the defensive. That means indecisive battles and ultimately an indecisive war, unless each party is resolved to push the war to the utter exhaustion and humiliation of the other — a long process which involves incalculable losses and wastes, and endless miseries. Americans have always before them the memory of their four years' civil war, which, although resolutely prosecuted on both sides, could not be brought to a close until the resources of the Southern States in men and material were exhausted. In that dreadful process the quick capital of the Southern States was wiped out.

Now that the sudden attack on Paris has failed, and adequate time has been secured to summon the slower-moving forces of Russia and England, and these two resolute and persistent peoples have decided to use all their spiritual and material forces in coöperation with France against Germany, thoughtful Americans can see but one possible issue of the struggle, whether it be long or short, namely, the defeat of Germany and Austria-

Hungary in their present undertakings, and the abandonment by both peoples of the doctrine that their salvation depends on militarism and the maintenance of autocratic executives entrusted with the power and the means to make sudden war. They believe that no human being should ever be trusted with such power. The alternative is, of course, genuine constitutional government, with the military power subject to the civil power.

The American people grieve over the fruitless sacrifices of life, property, and the natural human joys which the German people are making to a wrong and impossible ideal of national power and welfare. The sacrifices which Germany is imposing on the Allies are fearfully heavy; but there is reason to hope that these will not be fruitless, for out of them may come great gains for liberty and peace in Europe.

All experienced readers on this side of the Atlantic are well aware that nine tenths of all the reports they get about the war come from English and French sources, and this knowledge makes them careful not to form judgments about details until the events and deeds tell their own story. They cannot even tell to which side victory inclines in a long, far-

extended battle, until recognizable changes in the positions of the combatants show what the successes or failures must have been. The English and French win some advantage so far as the formation of public opinion in this country is concerned; because those two Governments send hither official reports on current events more frequently than the German Government does, and with more corroborative details. The amount of secrecy with which the campaign is surrounded on both sides is, however, a new and unwelcome experience for both the English and the American public.

The pamphlets by German publicists and men of letters which are now coming to this country, and the various similar publications written here, seem to indicate that the German public is still kept by its Government in ignorance about the real antecedents of the war and about many of the incidents and aspects of the portentous combat. These documents seem to Americans to contain a large amount of misinformation about the attack of Austria-Hungary on Serbia, the diplomatic negotiations and the correspondence between the sovereigns which immediately preceded the war, and the state of mind of the Belgian and English peo-

ples. American believers in the good sense and good feeling of the common people naturally imagine, when an awful calamity befalls a nation, that the people cannot have been warned of its approach, else they would have avoided it. In this case they fear that the German Emperor, Chancellery, and General Staff have themselves been misinformed in important respects, have made serious miscalculations which they are proposing to conceal as long as possible, and are not taking the common people into their confidence. American sympathies are with the German people in their sufferings and losses, but not with their rulers, or with the military class, or with the professors and men of letters who have been teaching for more than a generation that Might makes Right. That short phrase contains the fundamental fallacy which for fifty years has been poisoning the springs of German thought and German policy on public affairs.

Dread of the Muscovite does not seem to Americans a reasonable explanation of the present actions of Germany and Austria-Hungary, except so far as irrational panic can be said to be an explanation. Against possible, though not probable, Russian aggression, a firm

defensive alliance of all Western Europe would be a much better protection than the single Might of Germany. It were easy to imagine also two new "buffer" states — a reconstructed Poland and a Balkan Confederation. As to French "revenge," it is the inevitable and praiseworthy consequence of Germany's treatment of France in 1870–71. The great success of Germany in expanding her commerce during the past thirty years makes it hard for Americans to understand the hot indignation of the Germans against the British because of whatever ineffective opposition Great Britain may have offered to that expansion. No amount of commercial selfishness on the part of insular England can justify Germany in attempting to seize supreme power in Europe and thence, perhaps, in the world.

Finally, Americans hope and expect that there will be no such fatal issue of the present struggle as the destruction or ruin of the German nation. On the contrary, they believe that Germany will be freer, happier, and greater than ever, when once she has got rid of the monstrous Bismarck policies and the Emperor's archaic conception of his function, and has enjoyed twenty years of real peace.

CHAPTER VIII

AMERICA'S DUTY IN REGARD TO THE EUROPEAN WAR [1]

DUTIES often grow out of sentiments and beliefs, and in this instance they clearly do; so that I propose in the first place to speak of the great disappointments which this war and the second war in the Balkans have brought to thoughtful Americans and to all persons, indeed, who hoped that the human race was making some progress toward humane, just, and merciful conditions of life.

We have been startled by the outbreak, the apparently sudden outbreak, of the worst fighting that the world has ever seen in regard to destruction of life and property, and of precious treasures of letters and art. That is the literal fact. No war of former times has been so destructive of things that we imagined the human race in its civilized parts held to be precious and inviolable.

Then, most Americans believed that one of

[1] An address before the Business Women's Club of Boston, October 15, 1914.

the chief methods of progress in civilization was expressed in the phrase, "the sanctity of contracts." You are all business women. You have known that modern business absolutely depends on the sanctity of contracts. It depends also upon the faith of man in man. All the commercial and financial agencies of the modern world are built on credit; and what is credit but the faith of man in man that all will observe the sanctity of a contract or agreement?

Lately, we saw in the Balkans that a bond of union, under which a considerable war had been fought against an alien ruler, suddenly broke to pieces; and on the rupture came one of the most ferocious wars that the world has ever seen, a war as savage as that of the Greek revolution of 1822, which at the time was supposed to be characterized by unusual ferocity. And then we were brought to this sudden outburst of warlike fury in Europe; and one of the most civilized nations in Europe immediately declared by its acts — not in words, though a declaration in words was not altogether lacking — that a solemn treaty, only a few years old, was to signify for that nation nothing whatever, absolutely nothing. The treaty of neutrality

which protected Belgium was violated in the first moments of the war. These things have brought to Americans a desperate disappointment.

The whole structure of our government rests on a single contract entered into by thirteen parties, the Constitution of the United States. We are thoroughly accustomed to the principle of federation, the joining together of distinct independent States in a common union for common purposes; and we regard that union, that federation, as the very foundation of our national life. Are such contracts, such conventions, such agreements, to be regarded in Europe as of no effect, as "pieces of paper," as the German Chancellor said, to be torn up because of what he called military necessity, which only meant that a nation going to war may take the easiest, shortest, quickest way of attacking its opponent, no matter what neutral territory may stand in the way? This total disregard of the sanctity of a contract is the heaviest of our many serious disappointments within the last two months and a half.

And then we Americans had fondly hoped that the conception of chivalry was to be preserved in the modern world, that the chival-

rous man was still to exist, that a chivalrous knighthood might continue to exist, that the chivalrous principle of the strong defending and protecting the weak would develop, not dwindle, in the civilized world. Americans illustrate this state of mind, this chivalrous habit, in their treatment of women and children; and they have done so for many generations. Suddenly we find a strong nation which claims the highest degree of civilization absolutely disregarding all considerations of chivalrous action towards weaker powers. The attack by Germany on Belgium was a violent attack of a sudden on an army and a nation that was infinitely weaker than Germany, — no comparison whatever between little Belgium and great Germany in any sort of power or force; and to-day Belgium has been devoured, is extinct, if Europe shall permit her to be extinguished.

We had hoped that the methods of war and the ethics of war had been shown to be capable of amelioration, of improvement. Both Conferences of the Hague labored much over ameliorations of the practices in war. This present war has blown all those efforts to the winds.

Americans, as a rule, have believed that the human race was really making a slow progress

toward justice between man and man, and between nation and nation, and was making a slow progress toward the development of individual liberty. We said in our Declaration of Independence that all men are entitled to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"; and now we see that there is not a man or woman in Europe that has any title to life, or liberty, or the pursuit of happiness. This is another heavy disappointment to the American people.

We had hoped that the world was making some progress toward the Christian ideal of mercy, gentleness, and love as the supreme motives in human conduct; and suddenly we discover that in the most advanced nation in Europe as regards science, pure and applied, there is during war no mercy, no humanity, and that hatred quickly takes the place of friendliness, and is developed with an astonishing speed and amplitude into a fierce and abiding passion.

These disappointments weigh upon us the more because we see no issue possible of the present struggle except after long months or years of desperate warfare. The prevailing German philosophy of government and of national greatness is built upon the dogma — "Might

makes Right." It seems to be a new religion among the leading Prussians that force is the only basis of national greatness and of moral dignity, and valor the highest virtue, no matter in what cause valor is displayed.

You are all women. Do you believe that might makes right? Have you ever believed it? Has the history of the human race, up from savagery to what we call civilization, suggested to you that might is the real source of right, is the only foundation of just relations between man and woman? In savage life the greater strength, power, and endurance of the man gives him absolute control over the woman; and he has always exercised it. Here in this most fortunate and blessed country we have had a totally different conception of right relations between man and woman, between adults and children, between the state and its citizens. We absolutely deny that might makes right. We believe that the foundations of the family and of the state are moral, and that these moral foundations have superseded in some measure the ancient tenet that the strong have the right to dominate the weak.

You perceive that the American objection to the political philosophy of Germany at the

present day, and to its militarism, is absolutely fundamental. Our objections go to the roots of the matter, and we are irreconcilable to the whole philosophy which prevails in Germany, apparently without denial or exception in any class of society. I say "apparently," because none of us feel that at present we have access to the fundamental sentiments of the mass of the German population. We have access to the expressed views of the philosophers, poets, and historians. We, of course, have access to the expressed views of their military authorities, active or retired. We have access to the archaic conceptions which the German Emperor cherishes of his function, and of the God-given powers of himself and his family. But we have not access at this moment to the underlying sentiments of the masses of the German people; and it will probably be years before we learn them. So, thinking of these things, we have to qualify our use of the word "prevail" with the word "apparently," or the phrase "so far as we can see"; and we are permitted to hope that we do not see far enough.

Such being the gulf between American sentiments and German sentiments as they appear to-day, and this gulf being a matter of political

and religious conviction, how are our duties as a nation to be determined in the present crisis and catastrophe for mankind?

We have no difficulty in recognizing the justice, indeed the indispensable quality of the action of our Government, the official action of the nation, in the present horrible conditions. We all believe that our Government has been right in declaring neutrality in the actual combat for the United States. We all believe that at present we must deal equally with the combatants on the two sides — that if we sell food to one group, we must also sell food to the other; that we must pay our debts, no matter to which side. So much we are doing. We are paying our debts, no matter whether the debt is due to a German, an Austrian, a Frenchman, or an Englishman. We also keep open the lines of traffic, whether those lines run into English or French ports, or into any other port of Europe not blockaded. Our surplus food is going to all the combatants at this moment; because neutral ports give access to Germany and Austria as well as to England, France, and Russia.

But this neutrality is official or legal, as it were. It must be maintained until new conditions determine new actions. But it is, of

course, quite impossible for us to be neutral as regards our feelings and beliefs, our sentiments and hopes; quite impossible, because the cause in which Germany and Austria-Hungary are fighting is the cause of imperialism, of militarism, of governments by force, using against other nations the extreme of skilfully directed, highly trained force. We see upon the other side the two freest large nations in Europe combined with a military empire. These two freest nations — England and France — are nations to which we of this country are deeply indebted for our own safety, freedom, and faith in liberty under law. Therefore, neutrality in our hearts is quite out of the question.

But under these conditions what can we do, what can you do to help agonized Europe? You can do everything in your power, and advise all persons over whom you have influence, to do everything in their power to keep our own industries going, to maintain the business, the work, the productiveness of this country; to restore the lines of exchange suddenly ruptured after a careful building up which has taken at least three centuries; and to restore the lines of transportation for the international exchange of goods. You can do everything in

your power to prevent all kinds of hoarding within our country, within our domestic circles, hoarding of money, goods, or provisions — flour, for example, and sugar — and of purchasing beyond the usual demands of the family. All these things hurt. They hurt because they tend to an unreasonable rise of prices immediately, and on the spot. Discourage all such selfish precautions.

Every man who employs other persons should now continue to employ as many as possible of the people he has been accustomed to employ. To reduce unnecessarily expenditures on the employment of labor is an unwise and unpatriotic thing at this moment.

Are there no expenditures that we may properly reduce? Certainly there are. But at this moment I think of only one class of expenditures which might well be reduced, namely, expenditures on luxuries, particularly on luxuries which are, to say the least, silly or injurious. There are a good many such luxuries in the American community on which serious savings might be made; but those are the only expenditures which it is even justifiable to reduce at this time, unless the money to meet normal expenditures is actually lacking. No fear of

future loss of income justifies retrenchment now.

I have been speaking of our own expenditures and the employment of labor in our own country; but can we not do something for other countries in similar directions? We can continue to supply to the utmost the industries of all other countries, and particularly the industries of the European countries, with the raw materials they need for their own factories. We shall be truly neutral in so doing, if the conditions permit us to supply the raw materials of their industries, or parts of them, to all the combatants. We may not be able to serve all the nations that are at war; but should do it so far as it is possible. This is one of the neutral duties.

The prospect is that the war will last until one or other of the combatants is thoroughly exhausted. One cannot conceive of Germany submitting to defeat until she has exhausted her supplies of men, money, and food. And I am sure we shall have equal difficulty in conceiving that England will stop until she is thoroughly exhausted. Fortunately, from our point of view, there is no more resolute or dogged people in the world than the English,

and we remember in that connection with satisfaction that many of us are of English extraction.

As to France — a new thrill of feeling and sentiment has gone through France. Every one that returns from France says that the people seemed changed, externally and internally. They are sober and serious, and they go about their daily work with a grave determination to prevent by any sacrifices the extinction, or the reduction in power, of the French nation.

But what shall I say of Russia? It is the momentary, yes, the rather permanent belief in Germany, that the Russians may be justly described as barbarians, semi-civilized people, Oriental people, incapable of that high degree of organization, and that practice of individual liberty under law which characterize the promising Occidental peoples. And it is true that the Russians are an immense mass of people only lately risen from the condition of serfs, and that they are ruled by a despotic ruler who is surrounded by an autocratic group of high public officials. But we Americans have learnt in recent years a good deal about the Russians; and we find in them some qualities which give us hope for the huge nation, which often seems

slumbering or half-awake as regards both commercial and political activity. We have had a large number of Russians poured in upon us of recent years, and we have found them to be an industrious, intelligent, romantic people, capable of all the highest sentiments of human nature, and having at heart a great ambition toward liberty and an expanding and improving life. I had occasion to observe while I was President of Harvard College that there were no more intelligent students in the University than the Russians. They had the defects of peoples that have been for generations under despotic rule, and doubtless on an immense scale they still exhibit those defects.

Many Americans have made acquaintance within the last fifteen years with modern Russian literature. It is in high degree imaginative, hopeful, and pathetic, though often revolutionary in the proper sense of that word — that is, looking to great changes in family and social life, and in the life of the Government. Tolstoy represents an immense movement of the Russian mind. It was the Czar of Russia that called the first Hague Conference. The Czar instituted the Douma, which has had already an interesting and truly remarkable career, considering

that none of its members had any experience of political liberty. I admit that none of these things may go very deep, except the Russian literature. That goes deep into the heart and mind of the nation. That makes a deep impression on the heart and mind of the whole civilized world.

We have further to observe that three important steps have already been taken by Russia since this war broke out, all of them of a highly progressive nature. One is the offer to the Poles to reconstitute the Kingdom of Poland; another is to give Jews full civic rights in Russia; and the third is the imperial order prohibiting the manufacture and use of the strong alcoholic spirit that the Russians have been in the habit of drinking. That last outcome of this sudden war is a very striking one. What if an immense temperance reform should date from August, 1914, all over Russia?

We must not, therefore, accept the German view that this war is really waged to resist a new irruption of the barbarians into Europe. It is more than doubtful whether the Russians are barbarians. It is more than doubtful whether the spirit in which the Russians are now fighting be not more accordant with the American

spirit than the spirit which animates the German Empire.

We must bear in mind — indeed, we are not in danger of forgetting — the deep obligations which this American nation lies under to England and France. The obligations are so deep that it is quite in vain to expect us to be in our hearts neutral during the development of this fearful catastrophe. The American people is ordinarily accused of being materialistic, of seeking the dollar, and not caring much about anything else, except the luxuries or comforts that the dollar can buy. How often we have heard that of late. It is a total misconception with regard to the fundamantal beliefs and practices of the American people. We are an idealistic people. When our ideals are attacked and seem to us to be in danger, there is no people in the world that more promptly throws to the winds all material interests. When our ideals are seriously attacked, we are absolutely reckless with regard to our property, national or individual, and we care for our material resources only as means of defending our moral theories and our hopes for mankind.

We must hope and pray that we shall not be drawn into this most horrible war of all time.

But that escape will be due to the fact that Russia, England, and France have succeeded in defeating Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Prophecy as to issues is impossible under such conditions as those we are now witnessing; but it is not impossible to prophesy that the American people will be true to their quality, true to their history, true to their obligations to England and to France. We all know that the American ideals came from England across the Atlantic with the Pilgrim Fathers and the Puritans, and have since moved majestically across the continent; and we all know that that "celestial-infernal phenomenon," as Carlyle called the French Revolution, carried all about the civilized and half-civilized world the fundamental conceptions concerning the rights of man, and the uplifting power of liberty. The French nation, after that "celestial-infernal phenomenon," wandered in the wilderness for more than two generations; but at last they have attained to a republican form of government, which has already lasted more than forty years. Can we think of giving no aid to France if she comes to the end of her resources? Can we think of bringing no aid to England if she be reduced to like straits? Happily we do not need to an-

ticipate so direful an issue. But let us not confuse our minds and wills by failing to see whither the German policies lead, whither the teachings of Bismarck, Treitschke, and Bernhardi have led Germany. Let us not dream of abandoning our faith that human relations should be, nay, shall be, determined, not by arrogant force, but by considerations of justice, mercy, love, and good-will.

CHAPTER IX

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR ARE AUTOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, NATIONAL DESIRES FOR EMPIRE, DISREGARD FOR TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS, AND FALSE PHILOSOPHIES — WHY GERMANY MUST BE DEFEATED [1]

EACH one of the principal combatants in Europe seems to be anxious to prove that it is not responsible for this cruelest, most extensive, and most destructive of all wars. Each Government involved has published the correspondence between its chief executive and other chief executives, and between its Chancellery or Foreign Office and the equivalent bodies in the other nations that have gone to war, and has been at pains to give a wide circulation to these documents. To be sure, none of these Government publications seems to be absolutely complete. There seem to be in all of them suppressions or omissions which only the future historian will be able to report — perhaps after many years. They reveal, however, the dilapidated state of the Con-

[1] A letter published in the *New York Times* on November 17, 1914.

cert of Europe in July, 1914, and the flurry in the European Chancelleries which the ultimatum sent by Austria-Hungary to Servia produced. They also testify to the existence of a new and influential public opinion about war and peace, to which nations that go to war think it desirable to appeal for justification or moral support.

These publications have been read with intense interest by impartial observers in all parts of the world, and have in many cases determined the direction of the readers' sympathy and good-will; and yet none of them discloses or deals with the real sources of the unprecedented calamity. They relate chiefly to the question who struck the match, and not to the questions who provided the magazine that exploded, and why did he provide it. Grave responsibility, of course, attaches to the person who gives the order to mobilize a national army or to invade a neighbor's territory; but the real source of the resulting horrors is not in such an order, but in the governmental institutions, political philosophy, and long-nurtured passions and purposes of the nation or nations concerned.

The prime source of the present immense disaster in Europe is the desire on the part

of Germany for world-empire, a desire which one European nation after another has made its supreme motive, and none that has once adopted it has ever completely eradicated. Germany arrived late at this desire, being prevented until 1870 from indulging in it, because of her lack of unity, or rather because of being divided since the Thirty Years' War into a large number of separate, more or less independent states. When this disease, which has attacked one nation after another through all historic times, struck Germany, it exhibited in her case a remarkable malignity, moving her to expansion in Europe by force of arms, and to the seizure of areas for colonization in many parts of the world. Prussia, indeed, had long believed in making her way in Europe by fighting, and had repeatedly acted on that belief. Shortly before the achievement of German unity by Bismarck, she had obtained by war in 1864 and 1866 important accessions of territory, and leadership in all Germany.

With this desire for world-empire went the belief that it was only to be obtained by force of arms. Therefore, united Germany has labored with utmost intelligence and energy to prepare the most powerful army in the world, and to

equip it for instant action in the most perfect manner which science and eager foresight could contrive. To develop this supreme military machine universal conscription — an outgrowth of the conception of the citizens' army of France during the Revolution — was necessary; so that every young man in Germany physically competent to bear arms might receive the training of a soldier, whether he wished it or not, and remain at the call of the Government for military duty during all his years of competency, even if he were the only son of a widow, or a widower with little children, or the sole support of a family or other dependents. In order to the completeness of this military ideal the army became the nation and the nation became the army to a degree which had never before been realized in either the savage or the civilized world. This army could be summoned and put in play by the chief executive of the German nation with no preliminaries except the consent of the hereditary heads of the several states which united to form the Empire in 1870–71 under the domination of Prussia, the Prussian King, become German Emperor, being commander-in-chief of the German army. At the word of the Emperor this army can be sum-

moned, collected, clothed, equipped and armed, and set in motion toward any frontier in a day. The German army was thus made the largest in proportion to population, the best equipped, and the most mobile in the world. The German General Staff studied incessantly and thoroughly plans for campaigns against all the other principal states of Europe, and promptly utilized — secretly, whenever secrecy was possible — all promising inventions in explosives, ordnance, munitions, transportation, and sanitation. At the opening of 1914 the General Staff believed that the German army was ready for war on the instant, and that it possessed some significant advantages in fighting — such as better implements and better discipline — over the armies of the neighboring nations. The army could do its part toward the attainment of world-empire. It would prove invincible.

The intense desire for colonies, and for the spread of German commerce throughout the world, instigated the creation of a great German navy, and started the race with England in navy building. The increase of German wealth, and the rapid development of manufactures and commercial sea-power after 1870–71, made it possible for the Empire to devote im-

mense sums of money to the quick construction of a powerful navy, in which the experience and skill of all other shipbuilding nations would be appropriated and improved on. In thus pushing her colonization and sea-power policy, Germany encountered the wide domination of Great Britain on the oceans; and this encounter bred jealousy, suspicion, and distrust on both sides. That Germany should have been belated in the quest for foreign possessions was annoying; but that England and France should early have acquired ample and rich territories on other continents, and then should resist or obstruct Germany when she aspired to make up for lost time, was intensely exasperating. Hence chronic resentments, and — when the day came — probably war. In respect to its navy, however, Germany was not ready for war at the opening of 1914; and, therefore, she did not mean to get into war with Great Britain in that year. Indeed, she believed — on incorrect information — that England could not go to war in the summer of 1914. Neither the Government nor the educated class in Germany comprehends the peculiar features of party government as it exists in England, France, and the United States; and, therefore, the German leaders were sur-

prised and grievously disappointed at the sudden popular determination of Great Britain and Ireland to lay aside party strife and take strenuous part in the general European conflict.

The complete preparation of the German army for sudden war, the authority to make war always ready in the hands of the German Emperor, and the thorough studies of the German Staff into the most advantageous plans of campaign against every neighbor, conspired to develop a new doctrine of "military necessity" as the all-sufficient excuse for disregarding and violating the contracts or agreements into which Prussia or the new Germany had entered with other nations. To gain quickly a military advantage in attacking a neighbor came to be regarded as proper ground for violating any or all international treaties and agreements, no matter how solemn and comprehensive, how old or how new. The demonstration of the insignificance or worthlessness of international agreements in German thought and practice was given in the first days of the war by the invasion of Belgium, and has been continued ever since by violation on the part of Germany of numerous agreements concerning the conduct of war into which Germany entered with

many other nations at the Second Hague Conference.

This German view of the worthlessness of international agreements was not a cause of the present war, because it was not fully evident to Europe, although familiar and of long standing in Germany; but it is a potent reason for the continuance of the war by the Allies until Germany is defeated; because it is plain to all the nations of the world, except Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey at the moment, that the hopes of mankind for the gradual development of international order and peace rest on the sanctity of contracts between nations, and on the development of adequate sanctions in the administration of international law. The new doctrine of military necessity affronts all law, and is completely and hopelessly barbarous.

World-empire now, as always, is to be won by force — that is, by conquest and holding possession. So Assyria, Israel, Macedonia, Athens, Rome, Islam, England, and France have successively believed and tried to accomplish in practice. United Germany has for forty years been putting into practice, at home and abroad, the doctrine of force as the source of

all personal and national greatness and all worthy human achievements. In the support of this doctrine, educated Germany has developed and accepted the religion of valor and the dogma that Might makes Right. In so doing it has rejected with scorn the Christian teachings concerning humility and meekness, justice and mercy, brotherhood and love. The objects of its adoration have become Strength, Courage, and ruthless Will-Power; let the weak perish and help them to perish; let the gentle, meek, and humble submit to the harsh and proud; let the shiftless and incapable die; the world is for the strong, and the strongest shall be ruler. This is a religion capable of inspiring its followers with zeal and sustained enthusiasm in promoting the national welfare at whatever cost to the individual of life, liberty, or happiness, and also of lending a religious sanction to the extremes of cruelty, greed, and hate. It were incredible that educated people who have been brought up within earshot of Christian ethics and within sight of gentle men and women should all be content with the religion-of-valor plan. Accordingly, the finer German spirits have invented a supplement to that Stone Age religion. They have set up for

worship a mystical conception of the State as a majestic and beneficent entity which embraces all the noble activities of the nation and guides it to its best achievements. To this ideal State every German owes duty, obedience, and complete devotion. The trouble with this supplement to the religion of valor is that it dwells too much on submission, self-sacrifice, and discipline, and not enough on individual liberty and self-control in liberty. Accordingly when the valiant men got control of the Government and carried the nation into a ferocious war, they swept away with them all the devotees of this romantic and spiritual State. The modern German is always a controlled, directed, and drilled person, who aspires to control and discipline his inferiors; and in his view pretty much all mankind are his inferiors. He is not a freeman in the French, English, or American sense; and he prefers not to be.

The present war is the inevitable result of lust of empire, autocratic government, sudden wealth, and the religion of valor. What German domination would mean to any that should resist it the experience of Belgium and Northern France during the past three months aptly demonstrates. The civilized world can now see

where the new German morality — be efficient, be virile, be hard, be bloody, be rulers — would land it. To maintain that the power which has adopted in practice that new morality, and in accordance with its precepts promised Austria its support against Servia and invaded Belgium and France in hot haste, is not the responsible author of the European War, is to throw away memory, reason, and common sense in judging the human agencies in current events.

The real cause of the war is this gradually developed barbaric state of the German mind and will. All other causes — such as the assassination of the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, the sympathy of Russia with the Balkan States, the French desire for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, and Great Britain's jealousy of German aggrandizement — are secondary and incidental causes, contributory, indeed, but not primary and fundamental. If any one ask who brought the ruling class in Germany to this barbaric frame of mind, the answer must be Bismarck, Moltke, Treitschke, Nietzsche, Bernhardi, the German Emperor, their like, their disciples, and the military caste.

Many German apologists for the war attribute it to German fear of Russia. They say that, al-

though Germany committed the first actual aggression by invading Belgium and Luxemburg on the way to attack France with the utmost speed and fierceness, the war is really a war of defense against Russia, which might desirably pass over, after France has been crushed, into a war against Great Britain, that perfidious and insolent obstacle to Germany's world-empire. The answer to this explanation is that, as a matter of fact, Germany has never dreaded, or even respected, the military strength of Russia, and that the recent wars and threatenings of war by Germany have not been directed against Russia, but against Denmark, Austria, France, and England. In her colonization enterprises it is not Russia that Germany has encountered, but England, France, and the United States. The friendly advances made within the last twenty years by Germany to Turkey were not intended primarily to strengthen Germany against Russia, but Germany against Great Britain through access by land to British India. In short, Germany's policies, at home and abroad, during the past forty years have been inspired not by fear of Russia, or of any other invader, but by its own aggressive ambition for world-empire. In the

present war it thinks it has staked its all on "empire or downfall."

Those nations which value public liberty, and believe that the primary object of government is to promote the general welfare by measures and policies founded on justice, good-will, and respect for the freedom of the individual, cannot but hope that Germany will be completely defeated in its present undertakings; but they do not believe that Germany is compelled to choose between a life of domination in Europe and the world and national death. They wish that all her humane culture and her genius for patient and exact research may survive this hideous war, and guide another Germany to great achievements for humanity.

If the causes of the present immense catastrophe have been correctly stated, the desirable outcomes of the war are, no world-empire for any race or nation, no more "subjects," no executives, either permanent or temporary, with power to throw their fellow-countrymen into war, no secret diplomacy justifying the use for a profit of all the lies, concealments, deceptions, and ambuscades which are an inevitable part of war, and assuming to commit nations on international questions, and no conscription armies

that can be launched in war by executives without consulting independent representative assemblies. There should come out from this supreme convulsion a federated Europe, or a league of the freer nations, which should secure the smaller states against attack, prevent the larger from attempting domination, make sure that treaties and other international contracts shall be public and be respected until modified by mutual consent, and provide a safe basis for the limitation and reduction of armaments on land and sea, no basis to be considered safe which could fail to secure the liberties of each and all the federated states against the attacks of any outsider or faithless member. No one can see at present how such a consummation is to be brought about, but any one can see already that this consummation is the only one which can satisfy the lovers of liberty under law, and the believers in the progress of mankind through loving service each to all and all to each.

Extreme pacifists shrink from fighting evil with evil, hell with hell, and advise submission to outrage, or at least taking the risk of being forced into resigned submission. The believers in the religion of valor, on the other hand, pro-

claim that war is a good thing in itself, that it develops the best human virtues, invigorates a nation become flaccid through ease and luxury, and puts in command the strong, dominating spirit of a valid nation or race. What is the just mean between these two extremes? Is it not that war is always a hideous and hateful evil, but that a nation may sometimes find it to be the least of two evils between which it has to choose? The justifiable and indeed necessary war is the war against the ravager and destroyer, the enemy of liberty, the claimant of world-empire. More and more the thinkers of the world see, and the common people more and more believe instinctively, that the cause of righteous liberty is the cause of civilization. In the conference which will one day meet to settle the terms of peace, and therefore the future conditions of life in Europe, the example of the American Republic in regard to armaments and war, the publicity of treaties, and public liberty, security, and prosperity may reasonably have some influence.

CHAPTER X

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CHARLES W. ELIOT AND JACOB H. SCHIFF ABOUT THE WAR, BETWEEN NOVEMBER 24 AND DECEMBER 14, 1914

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.,
November 24, 1914.

DEAR MR. SCHIFF: —

It was a great relief to me to read just now your interview in the *New York Times* of November 22, for I have been afraid that your judgment and mine, concerning the desirable outcome of this horrible war, were very different. I now find that at many points they coincide.

One of my strongest hopes is that one result of the war may be the acceptance by the leading nations of the world of the precept or law — there shall be no world-empire for any single nation. If I understand you correctly, you hold the same opinion. You wish neither Germany nor England to possess world-empire. You also look forward, as I do, to some contract or agreement among the leading nations which shall prevent competitive armaments. I entirely agree

with you that it is in the highest degree undesirable that this war should be prolonged to the exhaustion of either side.

When, however, I come to your discussion of the means by which a good result toward European order and peace may be brought out of the present convulsion, I do not find clear guidance to present action on your part or mine, or on the part of our Government and people. Was it your thought that a congress of the peoples of North and South America should now be convened to bring to bear American opinion on the actual combatants while the war is going on? Or is it your thought that the American nations wait until there is a lull or pause in the indecisive fighting?

So far as I can judge from the very imperfect information which reaches us from Germany, the confidence of the German Emperor and people in their "invincible" army is not much abated, although it clearly ought to be. It is obvious that American opinion has some weight in Germany; but has it enough weight to induce Germany to abandon her intense desire for Belgium and Holland and extensive colonial possessions? To my thinking, without the abandonment of that desire and ambition

on the part of Germany, there can be no lasting peace in Europe and no reduction of armaments.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES W. ELIOT.

NEW YORK,
November 25, 1914.

MY DEAR DR. ELIOT: —

I am just in receipt of your thoughtful letter of yesterday, which it has given me genuine pleasure to receive. While it is true that I have not found myself in accord with many of the views to which you have given public expression concerning the responsibility for this deplorable conflict, and the unfortunate conditions it has created, I never doubted that as to its desirable outcome we would find ourselves in accord, and I am very glad to have this confirmed by you, though as to this, our views could not have diverged.

As to the means by which a desirable result toward European order and peace may be brought about out of the chaos which has become created, it is, I confess, difficult to give guidance at present. What needs first, in my opinion, to be done, is to bring forth a healthy and insistent public opinion here for an early

peace without either side becoming first exhausted, and it was my purpose in the interview I have given, to set the American people thinking concerning this. I have no idea that I shall have immediate success, but if men like you and others follow in the same line, I am sure American public opinion can before long be made to express itself emphatically and insistently in favor of an early peace. Without this, it is not unlikely that this horrible slaughter and destruction may continue for a very, very long time.

Yours most faithfully,

JACOB H. SCHIFF.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.,
November 28, 1914.

DEAR MR. SCHIFF: —

I think, just as you do, that the thing which most needs to be done is to induce Germany to modify its present opinion that the nation must fight for its very life to its last mark, and the last drop of its blood. Now, every private letter that I have received from Germany, and every printed circular, pamphlet, or book on the war which has come to me from German sources, insists on the view that, for Germany, it is a question between world-empire or utter

downfall. There is no sense or reason in this view, but the German philosophers, historians, and statesmen are all maintaining it at this moment.

England, France, and Russia have no such expectations or desires as regards the fate of Germany. What they propose to do is to put a stop to Germany's plan of attaining world-empire by militarism. Have you any means of getting into the minds of some of the present rulers of Germany the idea that no such alternative as life or death is presented to Germany in this war, and that the people need only abandon their world-empire ambitions, while securing safety in the heart of Europe and a chance to develop all that is good in German civilization?

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES W. ELIOT.

THE GREENBRIER,
WHITE SULPHUR SPRINGS,
WEST VIRGINIA.
December 1, 1914.

DEAR DR. ELIOT: —

I have received to-day your letter of the 28th ult., and I hasten to reply to it; for I know of nought that is of more importance than the discussion between earnest men of

what might be done to bring to cessation this horrible and senseless war.

I believe you are mistaken — though in this I am stating nothing, absolutely, but my personal opinion — that Germany would not listen to the suggestion for a restoration of peace until it has either come into a position to dictate the terms, or until it is utterly crushed. Indeed; I rather feel, and I have indications that such is the case, that England is unwilling to stop short of crushing Germany, and it is now using all the influence it can bring to bear in this country to prevent public opinion being aroused in favor of the stoppage of hostilities and reëstablishment of peace.

The same mail which brought your letter this morning brought me also a letter from a leading semi-military man, whom I know by name, but not personally. It is so fine and timely, that I venture to enclose a copy for your perusal. Why would not you, and perhaps Dr. Andrew D. White, who — is it not a coincidence? — has likewise written me to-day on the subject of my recent *Times* interview, be the very men to carry out the suggestions made by my correspondent?

Perhaps no other two men in the entire country are so greatly looked up to by its peo-

ple for guidance as you — in the first instance — and Dr. White. You could surely bestow no greater gift upon the entire civilized world than if now, in the evening of a life which has been of such great value to mankind, you would call around you a number of leading, earnest Americans with the view of discussing and framing plans through which American public opinion could be crystallized and aroused to the point where it will insistently demand that these warring nations come together, and, with the experience they have made to their great cost, make at least an attempt to find a way out. I cannot but believe that the Governments of England, France, and Germany — if not Russia — will have to listen, if the American people speak with no uncertain voice. Do it and you will deserve and receive the blessing of this and of coming generations!

Yours most faithfully,

JACOB H. SCHIFF.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.,
December 3, 1914.

DEAR MR. SCHIFF: —

I thank you for your letter of December 1 and its interesting enclosure.

Although every thoughtful person must earnestly desire that the waste and destruction of this greatest of wars should be stopped as soon as possible, there is an overpowering feeling that the war should go on until all the combatants, including Germany, have been brought to see that the governmental régime and the state of the public mind in Germany which have made this war possible are not consistent with the security and well-being of Europe in the future.

Personally, I feel strongly that the war ought to go on so long as Germany persists in its policies of world-empire, dynastic rule, autocratic bureaucracy, and the use of force in international dealings. If the war stops before Germany sees that those policies cannot prevail in twentieth-century Europe, the horrible wrongs and evils which we are now witnessing will recur; and all the nations will have to continue the destructive process of competitive armaments. If peace should be made now, before the Allies have arrived at attacking Germany on her own soil, there would result only a truce of moderate length, and then a renewal of the present horrors.

I cannot but think that Europe now has a

chance to make a choice between the German ideal of the State and the Anglo-American ideal. These two ideals are very different; and the present conflict shows that they cannot coexist longer in modern Europe.

In regard to the suggestion which your correspondent made to you that a conference of private persons should now be called in the hope of arriving at an agreed-upon appeal to the combatants to desist from fighting and consider terms of settlement, I cannot but feel (1) that such a conference would have no assured status; (2) that the combatants would not listen; and (3) that the effort would, therefore, be untimely now, though perhaps useful later.

One idea might possibly bring about peace, if it fructified in the mind of the German Emperor — the idea, namely, that the chance of Germany's obtaining dominating power in either Europe or the world having already gone, the wise thing for him to do is to save United Germany within her natural boundaries for secure development as a highly civilized, strong nation in the heart of Europe. Surplus population can always emigrate happily in the future as in the past.

The security of Germany would rest, how-

ever, on an international agreement to be maintained by an international force; whereas, the example which Germany has just given of the reckless violation of international agreements is extremely discouraging in regard to the possibility of securing the peace of Europe in the future.

Although this war has already made quite impossible the domination of Germany in Europe, or in the world, the leaders of Germany do not yet see or apprehend that impossibility. Hence, many earnest peace-seekers have to confess that they do not see any means whatever available for promoting peace in Europe now, or even procuring a short truce.

I wish I could believe with you that the Governments of England, France, Germany, and Russia would listen to the voice of the American people. They all seem to desire the good opinion and moral support of America; but I see no signs that they would take American advice, or imitate American example. President Wilson seems to think that this country will be accepted as a kind of umpire in this formidable contest; but surely we have no right to any such position. Our example in avoiding aggression on other nations, and in declining

to enter the contest for world-power, ought to have some effect in abating European ambitions in that direction; but our exhortations to peace and good-will will, I fear, have little influence. There is still a real contest on between democracy and oligarchical methods.

You see, my dear Mr. Schiff, that I regard this war as the result of long-continuing causes which have been gathering force for more than fifty years. In Germany, all the forces of education, finance, commercial development, a pagan philosophy, and government have been preparing this war since 1860. To stop it now, before these forces have been overwhelmingly defeated, and before the whole German people is convinced that they are defeated, would be to leave humanity exposed to the certain recurrence of the fearful convulsion we are now witnessing.

If anybody can show me any signs that the leaders of Germany are convinced that there is to be no world-empire for Germany or any other nation, and no despotic Government in Europe, I shall be ready to take part in any effectual advocacy of peace.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES W. ELIOT.

New York,
December 5, 1914.

Dear Dr. Eliot: —

Your letter of December 3 reached me this morning, and has given me much food for thought.

I wish I could follow you in the position you have taken; for I like nought better than to sit at the feet of a master like you and be instructed. But, much as I have tried, even before our recent correspondence was begun, to get at your viewpoint as from time to time published, I have not been able to convince myself that you occupy a correct position. Please accept this as expressed in all modesty, for I know were you not thoroughly convinced of the justice of the position you have taken from the start you would not be so determined in holding to it.

I am perfectly frank to say that I am amazed and chagrined when you say that you feel strongly that the war ought to go on until the Allies have arrived at attacking Germany on her own soil, which, if this is at all likely to come, may take many months yet and will mean sacrifice of human life on both sides more appalling than anything we have seen yet since

the war began. So you are willing that, with all the human life that has already perished, practically the entire flower of the warring nations shall become exterminated before even an effort be made to see whether these nations cannot be brought to reason, cannot be made to stop and to consider whether, with the experience of the past four months before them, it would not be better to even now make an effort to find a way in which the causes that have led to this deplorable conflict can be once and forever eradicated?

That it will be possible to find at this time any method or basis through the adoption of which the world would become entirely immune against war I do not believe, even by the establishment of the international police force such as you and others appear to have in mind.

The perpetual cessation of all war between the civilized nations of the world can, as I see it, only be brought about in two ways, both Utopian and likely impracticable for many years to come. War could be made only to cease entirely if all the nations of Europe could be organized into a United States of Europe and if free trade were established throughout the world. In the first instance, the extreme nationalism, which

has become so rampant during the past fifty years and which has been more or less at the bottom of every war, would then cease to exist and prevail, and in the second event, namely, if free trade became established throughout the world, the necessity for territorial expansion and aggression would no longer be needed, for, with the entire world open on equal terms to the commerce and industry of every nation, territorial possession would not be much of a consideration to any peoples.

You continually lay stress upon the danger of the domination of Germany in Europe and in the world. I believe I have already made myself quite clear in my recent *New York Times* interview, which has called forth this correspondence between us, that neither would I wish to have Germany come into a position where it might dominate Europe, and more or less the world, nor do I believe that the German nation, except perhaps a handful of extremists, has any such desires.

I believe I have also made myself quite clear in the interview to which I have referred that my feelings are not anti-English, for I shall never forget that liberal government and all forms of liberalism have had their origin, ever

since the Magna Charta, in that great nation whom we so often love to call our cousins. But with all of this, can you ignore the fact that England even to-day, without the further power and prestige victory in the present conflict would give her, practically dominates the high seas, that she treats the ocean as her own and enforces her dictates upon the waters even to our very shores? That this is true the past four months have amply proved.

I am not one of those who fear that the United States, as far as can now be foreseen, will get into any armed conflict with Great Britain or with Japan, her permanent ally, but I can well understand that many in our country are of a different opinion, and it takes no prophet to foresee that, with England coming out of this war victorious and her and Japan's power on the high seas increased, the demand from a large section of our people for the acquisition and possession by the United States of an increased powerful navy and for the erection of vast coast defenses, both on the Atlantic and Pacific shores, will become so insistent that it cannot be withstood. What this will mean to the American people in lavish expenditures and in increased taxation I need not here further go into.

Yes, my dear and revered friend, I can see nought but darkness if a way cannot be soon found out of the present deplorable situation as it exists in Europe.

But even if the Allies are victorious, it will mean, as I am convinced, the beginning of the descent of England as the world's leader and the hastened ascendency of Russia, who, not to-day or to-morrow, but in times to come, is sure to crowd out England from the world's leadership. A Russia that will have become democratic in its government, be it as a republic or under a truly constitutional monarchy; a Russia in which education will be as free as it is in our own country; a Russia in which the people can move about and make homes in the vast territory she possesses wherever they can find most happiness and prosperity; a Russia with its vast natural resources of every kind fully developed, is bound to be the greatest and most powerful nation on the earth.

But I am going too far into the future and I must return to the sad and deplorable present. I only wanted to show how England's alliance with this present-day Russia and its despotic, autocratic, and inhuman Government may, if the Allies shall be victorious, prove possibly in

the nearer future, but certainly in the long run, England's Nemesis.

Before closing I want to correct the impression you appear to have received that I have meant to suggest a conference of private persons for the purpose of agreeing upon an appeal by them to the nations of Europe to desist from fighting and consider terms of settlement. I know this would be entirely impracticable and useless, but what I meant to convey to you was my conviction that if you and men like you, of whom I confess there are but too few, were to make the endeavor to rouse public opinion in the United States to a point where it should insistently demand that this terrible carnage of blood and destruction cease, it would not be long before these warring Governments would take notice of such sentiments on the part of the American people; and what should be done at once is the stoppage of the furnishing of munitions of war to any of the belligerents, as is unfortunately done to so great an extent at present from this country.

We freely and abundantly give to the Red Cross and the many other relief societies, but we do this, even if indirectly, out of the very profits we derive from the war material we sell

to the belligerents, and with which the wounds the Red Cross and other relief societies endeavor to assuage are inflicted.

Yours most faithfully,

JACOB H. SCHIFF.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.,
December 8, 1914.

DEAR MR. SCHIFF: —

Your letter of December 5 tells me what the difference is between you and me in respect to the outcome of the war — I am much more hopeful or sanguine of the world's getting good out of it than you are. Since you do not hope to get any good to speak of out of it, you want to stop it as soon as possible. You look forward to future war from time to time between the nations of Europe and to the maintenance of competitive armaments. You think that the lust of dominion must continue to be felt and gratified, now by one nation and now by another; that Great Britain can gratify it now, but that she will be overpowered by Russia by and by.

I am unwilling to accept these conditions for Europe, or for the world, without urging the freer nations to make extraordinary efforts to reach a better solution of the European inter-

national problem which, unsolved, has led down to this horrible pit of general war.

I have just finished another letter to the *New York Times*, which will probably be in print by the time you get back to New York, so I will not trouble you with any exposition of the grounds of my hopefulness. It is because I am hopeful that I want to see this war fought out until Germany is persuaded that she cannot dominate Europe, or, indeed, make her will prevail anywhere by force of arms. When that change of mind has been effected, I hope that Germany will become a member of a federation firm enough and powerful enough to prevent any single nation from aiming at world-empire, or even pouncing on a smaller neighbor.

There is another point on which I seem to differ from you: I do not believe that any single nation has now, or can ever hereafter have, the leadership of the world, whereas you look forward to the existence of such leadership or domination in the hands of a single great power. Are there not many signs already, both in the East and in the West, that the time has passed for world-empire?

Very sincerely and cordially yours,

CHARLES W. ELIOT.

New York,
December 14, 1914.

Dear Dr. Eliot: —

I have delayed replying to your valued letter of the 8th inst. until after the appearance of your further letter to the *New York Times*, to which you had made reference, and, like everything emanating from you, the contents of your last *Times* letter have evoked my deepest interest.

Had our recent correspondence not already become more extended than you likely had intended it to become when you first wrote me on the subject of my *Times* interview of some weeks ago, I should go into your latest arguments at greater length. As it is, I shall only reiterate that I find myself unable to follow you in your belief and hope, that world-empire and world-leadership, as this now exists, is likely to cease as a consequence of the present war, much as we all may desire this.

England has taken up arms to retain her world-dominion and leadership; and to gain it, Germany is fighting. How can you, then, expect that England, if victorious, would be willing to surrender her control of the oceans and the dominion over the trade of the world she possesses

in consequence, and where is there, then, room for the hope you express that world-leadership may become a thing of the past with the termination of the present conflict?

I repeat, with all my attachment for my native land and its people, I have no inimical feeling toward England, have warm sentiments for France, and the greatest compassion for brave, stricken Belgium.

Thus, "with malice toward none," and with the highest respect for your expressed views, I am still of the opinion that there can be no greater service rendered to mankind than to make the effort, either through the force of the public opinion of the two Americas or otherwise, to bring these warring Governments together at an early moment, even if this can only be done without stopping their conflict, so that they may make the endeavor, whether — with their costly experience of the last five months, with the probability that they now know better what need be done to make the extreme armaments on land and sea as unnecessary as they are undesirable in the future — a basis cannot be found upon which disarmament can be effectively and permanently brought about.

This, at some time, they will have to come to, in any event, and must there first more human lives be sacrificed into the hundreds and hundreds of thousands, and still greater havoc be wrought, before passions can be made to cease and reason be made to return?

If, as you seem to think, the war need go on until one country is beaten into a condition where it must accept the terms the victor chooses to impose, because it can no longer help itself to do else, the peace thus obtained will only be the harbinger of another war in the near or distant future, bloodier probably than the present sanguinary conflict, and through no compact which might be entered into will it be possible to actually prevent this.

Twenty centuries ago Christianity came into the world with its lofty message of "peace on earth and good-will to men," and now, after two thousand years, and at the near approach of the season when Christianity celebrates the birth of its founder, it is insisted that the merciless slaughter of man by man we have been witnessing these last months must be permitted to be continued into the infinite.

Most faithfully yours,

JACOB H. SCHIFF.

CHAPTER XI

THE WAR AN UNPRECEDENTED CALAMITY, DUE TO AUTOCRACY, MILITARISM, SECRET BUREAUCRACY, AND LUST OF EMPIRE — SHALL IT BRING FORTH A COUNCIL OF EUROPE, AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE, ABOVE-BOARD DIPLOMACY, AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS?[1]

THE great war has now been going on long enough to enable mankind to form approximately correct views about its vast extent and scale of operations, its sudden interference with commerce and all other helpful international intercourse, its unprecedented wrecking of family happiness and continuity, its wiping out, as it proceeds, of the accumulated savings of many former generations in structures, objects of art, and industrial capital, and the huge burdens it is likely to impose on twentieth-century Europe. From all these points of view, it is evidently the most horrible calamity that has ever befallen the human race, and the most crucial trial to which civilization has been ex-

[1] A letter published in the *New York Times* December 11, 1914.

posed. It is, and is to be, the gigantic struggle of these times between the forces which make for liberty and righteousness and those which make for the subjection of the individual man, the exaltation of the state, and the enthronement of physical force directed by a ruthless collective will. It threatens a sweeping betrayal of the best hopes of mankind.

Each of the nations involved, horrified at the immensity of the disaster, maintains that it is not responsible for the war; and each Government has issued a statement to prove that some other Government is responsible for the outbreak. This discussion, however, relates almost entirely to actions by monarchs and cabinets between July 23 and August 4 — a short period of hurried messages between the chancelleries of Europe — actions which only prove that the monarchs and ministers for foreign affairs could not, or at least did not, prevent the long-prepared general war from breaking out. The assassination of the Archduke and Duchess of Hohenberg, on the 28th of June, was in no proper sense a cause of the war, except as it was one of the consequences of the persistent aggressions of Austria-Hungary against her southeastern neighbors. Neither was Russian mobil-

ization in four military districts on July 29 a cause of the war; for that was only an external manifestation of the Russian state of mind toward the Balkan peoples, a state of mind well known to all publicists ever since the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. No more was the invasion of Belgium by the German army on August 4 a true cause of the war, or even the cause, as distinguished from the occasion, of Great Britain's becoming involved in it. By that action, Germany was only taking the first step in carrying out a long-cherished purpose, and in executing a judicious plan of campaign prepared many years in advance. The artificial panic in Germany about its exposed position between two powerful enemies, France and Russia, was not a genuine cause of the war; for the General Staff knew they had crushed France once, and were confident they could do it again in a month. As to Russia, it was, in their view, a huge nation, but very clumsy and dull in war.

The real causes of the war are all of many years' standing; and all the nations now involved in the fearful catastrophe have contributed to the development of one or more of these effective causes. The fundamental causes are: (1) The maintenance of monarchical Govern-

ments, each sanctioned and supported by the national religion, and each furnished with a cabinet selected by the monarch, — Governments which can make war without any previous consultation of the peoples through their elected representatives; (2) the constant maintenance of conscript armies, through which the entire able-bodied male population is trained in youth for service in the army or navy, and remains subject to the instant call of the Government till late in life, the officering of these permanent armies involving the creation of a large military class likely to become powerful in political, industrial, and social administration; (3) the creation of a strong, permanent bureaucracy within each nation for the management of both foreign and domestic affairs, much of whose work is kept secret from the public at large; and finally, (4) the habitual use of military and naval forces to acquire new territories, contiguous or detached, without regard to the wishes of the people annexed or controlled. This last cause of the war is the most potent of the four, since it is strong in itself, and is apt to include one or more of the other three. It is the gratification of the lust for world-empire.

Of all the nations taking part in the present war, Great Britain is the only one which does not maintain a conscript army; but, on the other hand, Great Britain is the earliest modern claimant of world-empire by force, with the single exception of Spain, which long since abandoned that quest. Every one of these nations except little Servia has yielded to the lust for empire. Every one has permitted its monarch or its cabinet to carry on secret negotiations liable at any time to commit the nation to war, or to fail in maintaining the peace of Europe or of the Near East. In the crowded diplomatic events of last July, no phenomenon is more striking than the exhibition of the power which the British people confide to the hands of their Foreign Secretary. In the interests of public liberty and public welfare no official should possess such powers as Sir Edward Grey used admirably — though in vain — last July. In all three of the empires engaged in the war there has long existed a large military caste which exerts a strong influence on the Government and its policies, and on the daily life of the people.

These being the real causes of the terrific convulsion now going on in Europe, it cannot

be questioned that the nation in which these complex causes have taken strongest and most complete effect during the last fifty years is Germany. Her form of government has been imperialistic and autocratic in the highest degree. She has developed with great intelligence and assiduity the most formidable conscript army in the world, and the most influential and insolent military caste. Three times since 1864 she has waged war in Europe, and each time she has added to her territory without regard to the wishes of the annexed population. For twenty-five years she has exhibited a keen desire to obtain colonial possessions; and since 1896 she has been aggressive in this field. In her schools and universities the children and youth have been taught for generations that Germany is surrounded by hostile peoples, that her expansion in Europe and in other continents is resisted by jealous powers which started earlier in the race for foreign possessions, and that the salvation of Germany has depended from the first, and will depend till the last, on the efficiency of her army and navy and the warlike spirit of her people. This instruction, given year after year by teachers, publicists, and rulers, was first generally accepted in Prussia,

but now seems to be accepted by the entire empire as unified in 1871.

The attention of the civilized world was first called to this state of the German mind and will by the triumphant policies of Bismarck; but during the reign of the present Emperor the external aggressiveness of Germany and her passion for world-empire have grown to much more formidable proportions. Although the German Emperor has sometimes played the part of the peacemaker, he has habitually acted the war-lord in both speech and bearing, and has supported the military caste whenever it has been assailed. He is by inheritance, conviction, and practice a divine-right sovereign whose throne rests on an "invincible" army, an army conterminous with the nation. In the present tremendous struggle he carries his subjects with him in a rushing torrent of self-sacrificing patriotism. Mass-fanaticism and infectious enthusiasm seem to have deprived the leading class in Germany, for the moment, of all power to see, reason, and judge correctly — no new phenomenon in the world, but instructive in this case because it points to the grave defect in German education — the lack of liberty and, therefore, of practice in self-control.

The twentieth-century educated German is, however, by no means given over completely to material and physical aggrandizement and the worship of might. He cherishes a partly new conception of the state as a collective entity whose function is to develop and multiply, not the free, healthy, and happy individual man and woman, but higher and more effective types of humanity, made superior by a strenuous discipline which takes much account of the strong and ambitious, and little of the weak or meek. He rejects the ethics of the Beatitudes as unsound, but accepts the religion of Valor, which exalts strength, courage, endurance, and the ready sacrifice by the individual of liberty, happiness, and life itself for Germany's honor and greatness. A nation of sixty millions holding these philosophical and religious views, and proposing to act on them in winning by force the empire of the world, threatens civilization with more formidable irruptions of a destroying host than any that history has recorded. The rush of the German army into Belgium, France, and Russia and its consequences to those lands have taught the rest of Europe to dread German domination, and — it is to be hoped — to make it impossible.

The real cause of the present convulsion is, then, the state of mind or temper of Germany, including her conception of national greatness, her theory of the State, and her intelligent and skilful use of all the forces of nineteenth-century applied science for the destructive purposes of war. It is, therefore, apparent that Europe can escape from the domination of Germany only by defeating her in her present undertakings; and that this defeat can be brought about only by using against her the same effective agencies of destruction and the same martial spirit on which Germany itself relies. Horrible as are the murderous and devastating effects of this war, there can be no lasting peace until Europe as a whole is ready to make some serious and far-reaching decisions in regard to governmental structures and powers. In all probability the sufferings and losses of this widespread war must go farther and cut deeper before Europe can be brought to the decisions which alone can give securities for lasting peace against Germany on the one hand and Russia on the other, or to either of these nations, or can give security for the future to any of the smaller nations of Continental Europe. There can, indeed, be no security

for future peace in Europe until every European nation recognizes the fact that there is to be no such thing in the world as one dominating nation — no such thing as world-empire for any single nation — Great Britain, Germany, Russia, Japan, or China. There can be no sense of security against sudden invasion in Europe so long as all the able-bodied men are trained to be soldiers, and the best possible armies are kept constantly ready for instant use. There can be no secure peace in Europe until a federation of the European states is established, capable of making public contracts intended to be kept, and backed by an overwhelming international force subject to the orders of an international tribunal. The present convulsion demonstrates the impotence toward permanent peace of secret negotiations, of unpublished agreements, of treaties and covenants that can be broken on grounds of military necessity, of international law if without sanctions, of pious wishes, of economic and biological predictions, and of public opinion unless expressed through a firm international agreement, behind which stands an international force. When that international force has been firmly established it will be time to con-

sider what proportionate reductions in national armaments can be prudently recommended. Until that glorious day dawns, no patriot and no lover of his kind can expect lasting peace in Europe or wisely advocate any reduction of armaments.

The hate-breeding and worse than brutal cruelties and devastations of the war with their inevitable moral and physical degradations ought to shock mankind into attempting a great step forward. Europe and America should undertake to exterminate the real causes of the catastrophe. In studying that problem the coming European conference can profit by the experience of the three prosperous and valid countries in which public liberty and the principle of federation have been most successfully developed — Switzerland, Great Britain, and the United States. Switzerland is a democratic federation which unites in a firm federal bond three different racial stocks speaking three unlike languages, and divided locally and irregularly between the Catholic Church and the Protestant. The so-called British Empire tends strongly to become a federation ; and the methods of government both in Great Britain itself and in its affiliated commonwealths are becom-

ing more and more democratic in substance. The war has brought this fact out in high relief. As to the United States, it is a strong federation of forty-eight heterogeneous States which has been proving for a hundred years that freedom and democracy are safer and happier for mankind than subjection to any sort of autocracy, and afford far the best training for national character and national efficiency. Republican France has not yet had time to give this demonstration, being encumbered with many survivals of the Bourbon and Napoleonic régimes, and being forced to maintain a conscript army.

It is an encouraging fact that every one of the political or governmental changes needed is already illustrated in the practice of one or more of the civilized nations. To exaggerate the necessary changes is to postpone or prevent a satisfactory outcome from the present calculated destructions and wrongs and the accompanying moral and religious chaos. Ardent proposals to remake the map of Europe, reconstruct European society, substitute republics for empires, and abolish armaments are in fact obstructing the road toward peace and goodwill among men. That road is hard at best.

The immediate duty of the United States is presumably to prepare, on the basis of its present army and navy, to furnish an effective quota of the international force, servant of an international tribunal, which will make the ultimate issue of this most abominable of wars, not a truce, but a durable peace.

In the mean time, the American peoples cry with one voice to the German people, like Ezekiel to the House of Israel — "Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways; for why will ye die?"

CHAPTER XII

THE PILGRIMS' IDEALS — A FREE CHURCH IN A FREE STATE IN 1620[1]

RECENT events in Europe have satisfied many Americans that the essential difference between nations is a difference of ideals. Thus, the principal ideals of Germany are national efficiency through a forceful discipline, and domination over other peoples as the result of that efficiency, while the governmental or political ideals of Great Britain since Cromwell's Commonwealth have always contained a large element of public liberty and individual independence. The fundamental cause of the European war is the difference in the ideals of government, national greatness, and national welfare of Germany and Austria on the one hand, and France and Great Britain on the other. The principal difference between the people of the United States and the nations of Europe is a difference of ideals concerning human welfare and the means of promoting it, the ideals of the United

[1] An address on Forefathers' Day, 1914, before the New England Society in the City of New York.

States containing a much larger element of liberty and independence for the individual, and of public confidence in the fruits of individual liberty, than any European nation exhibits, except Switzerland. In order that different races or stocks should live peacefully and helpfully beside each other under the same free governments, conjoined but not commingled, as in the United States of to-day, it is only necessary that they should all come to cherish the same ideals of public liberty, public justice, and coöperative management. That is the true assimilation of different stocks or races, and none other is needed.

As a matter of fact, the present ideals of the people of the United States are in a large measure identical with the ideals which were dear to the Pilgrim First-comers or Forefathers, who, to the number of 233, landed at Plymouth between December, 1620, and July, 1623. These were the Separatist immigrants, who had suffered severely in England for conscience' sake, and had dared the perils of the ocean and the wilderness to found a new commonwealth where they might enjoy freedom to worship God in the way they preferred. I wish to review this evening the ideals of the Pilgrims, and to point

out in what measure their ideals have become those of the American people.

The most precious of the Pilgrim ideals was that of civil and religious liberty. It was a religious bond which held them together in their flight from Scrooby at great loss and under many hardships, and during their twelve years' exile in Holland, where by great industry and frugality a few of them repaired somewhat their broken fortunes. It was a religious motive which governed the adult males of the Mayflower company, only forty-one in number, in signing a compact, just before they landed on the Massachusetts shore, by which they set up a government that rested exclusively on the consent of those to be governed and on manhood suffrage. These few plain men then and there did an immortal deed, the sudden fruitage of the experience of their church in England and in Holland, and of the doctrines taught them by their pastor and elders. The words of that compact cannot be too often quoted: "We, whose names are under written, . . . having undertaken for the glory of God and advancement of the Christian faith, and honor of our King and country, to plant the first colony in the northern parts

of Virginia, do, by these presents, solemnly and mutually in the presence of God and of one another, covenant and bind ourselves together into a civil body politic for our better ordering and preservation, and furtherance of the ends aforesaid." That is the ideal origin for a free state. By following that ideal, town, city, and state governments have been firmly planted all across the American continent. By how many generations were the signers of that compact in advance of their times? Let the Schleswig-Holstein of 1864 answer; let the Alsace-Lorraine of 1870 answer; let the Belgium of to-day answer. More than two hundred years later Cavour, struggling for Italian unity, cried out for a free church in a free state. Nearly three hundred years later a French republic broke with a great church long established in France. In both cases the doctrine of the Mayflower Pilgrims found new applications; for the Pilgrims brought with them to Plymouth the conception not only of a free state, but also of a free church. Pastor Robinson's church was called Separatist, and later Independent; and later still its polity was known as Congregational. It had no bishop and no synod. There was no ecclesiasticism and no mysticism about it. The

congregation elected their pastor and elders, their church welcoming to the communion service members of the Anglican, Genevan, Lutheran, Dutch, and Presbyterian churches. From these Separatists, transplanted to the Massachusetts wilderness, sprang, therefore, a government founded on civil and religious liberty, and a complete toleration of all religions by the state. John Robinson's doctrine, that God had never yet revealed his whole will, and that more truth and light were yet to break forth, is now the doctrine of all liberals the world over. The advance of natural science within the last one hundred and fifty years has made this doctrine of expectation familiar to all thinking people; but the Pilgrims accepted and practised it as a religious doctrine, and gave it practical expression in the church and the state they organized in 1620.

After the compact or covenant had been signed in the cabin of the Mayflower by the forty-one adult males, these same men proceeded to elect a governor for the commonwealth thus constituted; and every year thereafter they elected their chief executive to serve for the term of one year. This short-term, elected executive was maintained in the old colony until

1692, when, to their great regret, the descendants of the Forefathers found themselves absorbed into the Royal Province of Massachusetts, which extended from Nova Scotia to the Vineyard Archipelago, and was provided with a royal governor. To liberals the world over this achievement of the Pilgrims seems more significant to-day than it ever has before; because a prime cause of the fearful catastrophe which has lately befallen Europe is the retention there of hereditary, permanent executives over whom the mass of the people have no control whatever, and who can make war without consulting anybody but a cabinet they have themselves selected, or a few other hereditary executives. In 1620 this small band of English Non-Conformists gave the first example in the world of a free and progressive church in a state created and controlled by free men, both church and state being led and served by elected officers.

The Pilgrims were plain, laboring people, who all worked with their hands, and expected to get their living as "Planters" on the wild shores of northern Virginia. As a matter of fact, they made their living by farming, fishing, hunting, and practising the elementary

trades of a new settlement. A few of them were good writers and intelligent business men; but many of their leaders and officers found it more convenient to make their mark than to write their signature on deeds or records; and it is probable that few of the women could write, though more could read. They could all, however, take in and appreciate the exhortations of their ministers orally communicated. Such being their quality, it is remarkable that the Articles of Agreement under which the Pilgrims set sail from England contained sound principles affecting the relations of capital to labor which have not secured wide adoption in the industrial and commercial world of to-day.

The Pilgrims sailed from England under articles of agreement which were to govern the proceedings of a stock company, — the shares of which were held by two classes of persons, one called "Adventurers," and the other "Planters." The adventurers were men who merely put capital into the outfitting of the expedition. The planters were persons who crossed the ocean, and were to bear the hardships and the labors of the expedition. The planters might, or might not, put capital into the venture. Some did acquire shares in the

stock company as adventurers by putting in money or money's worth in goods; but the greater part did not hold shares, except as planters. Every planter being aged sixteen years and upwards, received on going a single share in the stock company, rated at ten pounds. A planter who carried with him his wife and children or servants was allowed for every person sixteen years old and upward a share in the company and a share for every two children between ten and sixteen years old. Every child under ten who went in the ship was to receive in the ultimate division of the holdings of the company fifty acres of unmanured land. All the planters were to be fed and clothed out of the common stock and goods of the company. Each planter was to work four days in each week for the company, and two for himself and family. At the end of seven years, each planter, head of a family or a group, should own the house and garden land occupied by him and his. The undertaking entered into on these terms was a strong case of coöperation and coöperative management for a short term of years, with acquisition by every head of a family at the end of that short term of a house and garden.

The first assignments of land at Plymouth were made by lot, had equal areas, and were supposed to be of very nearly equal value. The family, rather than the individual, was the social unit used in the allotment. When fifteen cattle arrived in 1627 for distribution among the colonists, with some she goats and swine, these animals were distributed among twelve groups into which the one hundred and fifty-six planter owners of the company's stock were divided for the purpose, each animal to be kept for ten years, and then returned to the public store with one half its increase. Another example of coöperative management intended to encourage individual responsibility and effort!

The Pilgrims thoroughly understood that capital and labor must coöperate, in order to successful production; and they acted consistently on this understanding. Being fed and clothed at the expense of the company, they were willing to work for the company two thirds of their time without wages; but they obtained shares in the company without payment of cash, in consideration of the risk they ran in putting their lives and capacities at the service of the company in a dangerous venture, and in investing two thirds of their labor for seven years

with the company. Moreover, in return for the assumption of these risks and for their labor, each family would obtain possession at the end of seven years of a house and land, on which, however, they would probably have spent the other third of their working time. This economic arrangement could not have been brought about, except in a homogeneous community which was thoroughly democratic in principle and practice. Is there any industrial organization to-day in which democracy and the recognition of the laborers' contribution in risk and work to the cost of production are better recognized, or more wisely dealt with, than in the Pilgrims' Stock Company? Ultimately the planters bought out the adventurers, and owned the whole stock. What prophets the Pilgrims were of far-away reforms!

The Pilgrims recognized that they had leaders; and the common people selected these leaders with great judgment, and whenever they found a good one were constant toward him; but the manners and customs of the community were extremely simple, and all men were equal before the law. On the other hand, the Pilgrims never tried to prevent the diversities in regard to possessions which inevitably

arise in any free community. Only despotism, autocratic or socialistic, can prevent the diversity in men's capacity from producing diversity in possessions. Nothing of the feudal system came across the ocean with the Pilgrims, and nothing of ecclesiastical control.

For the protection of the colony, every able-bodied citizen was expected to bear arms. Every youth learnt the use of the simple weapons which were then available for the chase and for war. The Pilgrims started the New England muster and militia system, prototype of the admirable military organization of republican Switzerland which is now suggesting a way out of European militarism.

In 1643, after a six years' discussion begun by Plymouth, a confederation called "The United Colonies of New England," was formed by the four colonies of Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven to make common cause in offensive and defensive war. Each confederate was to choose annually two church-members as its commissioners in the league, each colony having the same number of representatives without regard to population. No single colony was to make war. The quota which each colony contributed to the

intercolonial force was proportionate to the number of its able-bodied males between the ages of sixteen and sixty. This confederation was loose and ill-defined; but it was maintained for forty years, and supplied ideas for several later federations on the American continent. Obviously, it might suggest some clauses in the constitution of the now much-desired United States of Europe, such as the equal representation of the several states in the central council, the quota of each state in the international force proportionate to its military population, and the rule that no single state shall make war. In this direction Europe has never got so far as the Pilgrims had in 1643.

Down in the spring of 1623, all labor in fishing and farming had been in common; and the product in food had been placed in the public store to be shared equally by all the workers, whether they worked zealously and effectively, or languidly and shiftlessly; otherwise, there had been no community of goods. In the spring of that year the supply of food in the public storehouse was very low; and there was serious apprehension of a famine before a new crop could be gathered. The straits were all the more serious because the colony possessed at the time

no domestic animals that yielded milk or meat. No cattle were imported until 1624. The governor under such conditions could not keep the people hard at work; and it distinctly appeared that the motive of common benefit was inferior in stimulating force to the motive of personal, individual or family possession. The elders of the Pilgrims were practical men, who saw that a new method of dealing with the labor question was urgently needed, particularly in view of the approaching scarcity of food. They, therefore, assigned a lot for one year to each household, at the rate of an acre for every member. The lots were to be cultivated at the pleasure of the holders, who were to own the crops, after giving a small portion to the public treasury. This introduction of the principle of private ownership, in addition to the well-distributed ownership of shares in the stock of the company, produced an important effect,—a much larger area was planted, and men, women, and children worked with a new ardor in the cultivation of their own lots. It took the leaders of the Pilgrims only two years and a half to learn that the institution of private property appeals to a good side of human nature, and that there is no safe substitute for it. To be

sure, they learned this lesson under conditions of severe anxiety and stress. To-day the civilized world has to listen to many socialistic prophets and disputants who close their eyes to the patent fact that the mass of mankind need the stimulus of private property in order to maintain a fair degree of industry and frugality.

Two years before the Pilgrims left Leyden, their pastor, John Robinson, and their elder, William Brewster, united in a letter which ended with five reasons for the proposed emigration. The fourth reason is as follows: "We are knit together in a body in a most strict and sacred bond and covenant of the Lord, of the violation whereof we make great conscience, and by virtue whereof we do hold ourselves straightly tied to all care of such other's good, and of the whole by every one, and so mutually." It would be hard to find a better statement than that of the fundamental conception of modern non-militant socialism — each for all and all for each; but the Pilgrims were not forerunners of socialism; because they fully appreciated the advantages of the institution of private property not only for stimulating industry and frugality, but also for strengthening the family bond. Their unit of social organization

was the family; and they had no thought of permitting the lazy and improvident to plant themselves on the backs of the energetic and prudent members of the community. The philosophic socialism of the nineteenth century would tend to weaken the family bond, and would subject the individual human being to a harsh collective despotism, against which the Pilgrim spirit would have revolted.

No sketch of the Pilgrims would be adequate which did not mention the heroism of their women. The women that came to America from that Separatist flock in Leyden washed, cooked, made clothing, bore, nursed, and tended children, and watched anxiously for the return of the men, who often had to go to distant fields or woods, or on remote fishing expeditions, or on exploring and hunting parties. What the risks were that the women took may be illustrated by the single fact, that out of the eighteen women who were on board the Mayflower, fourteen were buried in unmarked graves within six months of the day that the Mayflower anchored within the hook of Cape Cod. Nothing daunted, other women of the Pilgrim mind came over from Holland and England to take the places of the dead, and maintain the stag-

gering colony; and ever since just such women have accompanied the pioneering line of adventurous free men, as it has moved slowly across the continent for nearly three centuries. The Pilgrim women deserve, and please God shall have, the same reward which Jesus promised to the woman who broke over his body the alabaster box of precious ointment: "whereso-ever this Gospel shall be preached in the whole world, there shall also this that this woman hath done be told for a memorial of her." The Pilgrim ideal of woman was the courageous, capable, strong, devoted type, sacrificing self for love and duty, and rejoicing in her work. Is there any better type to-day? Are there not some inferior types in public evidence?

Within the last few months, I have been often asked in letters — signed or unsigned — what America owes to England. If I had answered these questions, one element in my reply would have been: America owes to England the ideals of the Pilgrims — a debt never to be forgotten. Another element in my reply would have been: America owes to England John Milton's preaching of civil and religious liberty — a preaching contemporaneous with many of the experiences of that group of brave men and women who

risked their all in the little colony on the desolate coast of Massachusetts, not in search of gold or trade, but only hoping that they and their children might be free. The American people believes, as the Pilgrim Church believed, that more truth and light are constantly to be made known to man, and that it is truth that makes men free. More truth — scientific, philosophical, or religious — more freedom for mankind. If this faith can now be implanted in the international mind of Europe as the moral issue of the present cataclysm, the huge sorrow and desolation of that Continent may yet be turned into gladness and hope.

CHAPTER XIII

NATIONAL EFFICIENCY BEST DEVELOPED UNDER FREE GOVERNMENTS[1]

THE causes of this fearful war are often discussed as if they were to be sought in the month before the war actually broke out. We hear men talking as if the exchange of telegrams and notes between the monarchs just before the war could supply an intelligent understanding of the causes of the outbreak. We hear the conversations between the various chancelleries of Europe in July spoken of as if the real cause of the war was to be found in them, or, indeed, in the sequence of the orders given for mobilization. I have even read articles in which the cause of the war was found in the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne.

Now, to my mind, all these so-called causes are merely superficial events, which might more properly be called the occasions than the causes of the war. To my thinking, the causes of the

[1] An address before the Harvard Club of Boston, January 15, 1915, revised and enlarged.

war are very deep-seated, and have to be traced back through long years, and, indeed, through generations of men. They are states of mind rather than events. They have their sources in racial feelings and to some extent in religious differences; in the ambitions of princes; in long-cherished aspirations and ambitions of peoples; in continuously developed policies of governments; and deeper still in great popular emotions. If such are the real causes of the war, we need to consider carefully the historical development of these aspirations, ambitions, and emotions, which have had a national scope.

This war has brought out very strongly the sentiment of nationality, — a sentiment the origins and conditions of which are peculiarly difficult to appreciate and understand. Many people think that a common language is necessary to the development of the sentiment of nationality; but how many instances there are in the world in which many languages are used in the territory ascribed to a nation. At this moment there is no country which nourishes a stronger spirit of nationality than little Switzerland, the model republic of the world. Now, in that small territory four languages are used, each by thousands of people; and in the legis-

lative assembly, if a member does not speak at the rostrum in French or German, an interpreter is placed beside the orator who keeps along with him; so that the two voices are going on at the same time. Belgium is a strong nationality as regards sentiment, but at least two quite different languages are spoken in that country. In the vast territory of China many dialects exist, so different that the people of one section may not understand the people of any other. One almost wishes that a common language could be spoken of as a source or necessary condition of a strong sentiment of nationality; but there are too many cases in the world where a strong national feeling prevails, and yet there is no common language. We Americans have been in the habit of thinking that the use of the English language all over our immense territory has contributed to our sense of national unity and well-being; and, indeed, it probably has. Nevertheless, that test of nationality will not hold in the modern world.

The national sentiment in Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and Russia is to-day intense, and, so far as we can see, equally intense in all these countries. Apparently little

distinction can be drawn between national sentiment in an immobile empire like Russia, under an autocratic government like that of Germany, in a sober, experienced, constitutional monarchy like that of England, or in a new republic like France. We do not find the cause or source of this intense popular sentiment in the form of government to which the people are accustomed. And yet one cannot imagine any satisfactory settlement of this terrible world-conflict, which will not take more account than any settlement of a European war has ever done before, of this emotion or sentiment of nationality.

The experience of Europe during the last sixty years has been peculiar in one respect, — it has been a period in which peoples who possess a common language, or a common sentiment of nationality, and are derived from similar racial stocks, have succeeded in getting together in larger entities. That has been emphatically the case with Germany and with Italy; and until the Second Balkan War the well-wishers for Europe hoped that it was going to be the case in the whole Balkan region; but the second war defeated all such hopes. What great changes have been wrought in Europe since the close of the Thirty Years'

War! That war ended in the recognition and establishment of a large number of separate, independent, small states and principalities. When this present war ends, we may reasonably expect that it will result in the development of some new large states in Europe, federations, perhaps, and some new small states, but also in a greater security for the smaller states over against the larger.

Several European nations have been infected at various times — England first, since the decline of Spain — with a false and dangerous conception of the state as an imperial being, independent of ordinary ethical considerations, entitled to the unquestioning obedience and service of its subjects, aiming at the development of strong types of men and women without much regard to the freedom or happiness of the individual, and claiming dominion over neighbors, oceans, or remote possessions in other parts of the world. British imperialism had sound commercial and industrial objects, and was qualified by much domestic freedom, and the policy of free trade. Being an island, Great Britain tried to rule the seas, in order that her indispensable supplies of food and raw materials might never be cut off. Her Con-

tinental imitators have not had her domestic freedom, her affiliated free commonwealths, her free trade, or her strong reason for possessing mastery of the oceans; but they have had, and some of them still have, the imperialistic fever in its hottest form.

If, then, we must look for the causes of this unprecedented convulsion in these deep-rooted popular aspirations and ambitions, what shall we say about the slow but steady growth of these sentiments in Germany? Some people ascribe this widespread war to the German Emperor or Cabinet, or to some particular German teachers and authors, or to the growth of a strong, united military caste in Germany. All those influences doubtless contributed in some measure to the outbreak; but the real cause of the successive military aggressions on the part of Germany since 1864 lies in the gradual prevalence throughout that nation, and particularly throughout its educated classes, of an exaggerated estimate of the bodily and spiritual merits of the German people, and of a belief that the national greatness and the progress of characteristic German civilization were to be attained through the development of the most tremen-

dous national Force that could possibly be contrived and brought into being, and through the gratification of the intense German desire for domination in Europe, and later in the world.

The Government of Germany is the most autocratic in Europe. It has always been so in Prussia; and since German unification in 1871 that description applies to the whole of Germany. One of the most extraordinary phenomena in connection with this ferocious war is the unanimous opinion among German scholars, historians, statesmen, and diplomats, and indeed throughout the educated classes, that — as was lately said to me in a letter from a German friend — "We Germans are just as free as you Americans are." They really believe that. This unanimous opinion is a complete demonstration of the effect of the autocratic Government which has long existed in Germany on the spirit and temper of the German people as a whole. They do not know what political and social liberty is. They have no conception of such liberty as we enjoy. They know nothing at all about the liberty England has won through Parliamentary government, through party government. Their complete ignorance on that subject is the explanation of the fatal mistake the German

Government made in going to war last summer before they knew what England was going to do, or could do. The German Government thoroughly believed that in the existing condition of party government in England, with the Ulster disturbance unsettled, and the trades-union difficulties on hand, England not only would not go to war, but could not. One could not have a better illustration of the complete ignorance of the German people as to what political and social liberty really is. The German diplomats misinformed their government about the state of Great Britain and Ireland, and of France, in spite of their ample system of resident informers; because neither they nor their informers understood the political action of a free people. At this moment, the German Government is being misinformed in like manner about the state of American public opinion. To the German mind political liberty means public incapacity and weakness — particularly in war.

In the earlier steps of the war, Germany met with a series of surprises; because the German Government and the military caste in Germany did not understand what comparatively free peoples value, what their ideals are, and what they

are capable of undertaking and enduring in defense of their ideals. For instance, the German doctrine about the justifiableness of violating a contract or a treaty on grounds of military necessity was universally accepted in Germany as right. Germans do not know how free peoples regard the sanctity of contract, not only for business purposes, but for political purposes, to say nothing of honorable obligation. Nothing could be franker than the original explanation which the German Chancellor gave of the breaking of the treaties concerning the neutrality of Belgium; but his frankness is evidence that he did not understand in the least the freeman's idea of the sanctity of contract — the foundation of all public law and usage in a free country. In a country despotically or autocratically ruled, there is no such condition of public opinion.

More and more, as time goes on, this war develops into a conflict between free institutions and autocratic institutions. Of course, the position of Russia as an ally of France and England somewhat shrouds or complicates this fact; because the Russian people is by inheritance and in some respects by nature a people which submits to despotic government. Her

exceptional position as an ally of two free countries is due to a long-nourished indignation against Austria-Hungary and Germany for presenting obstacles year after year and generation after generation to the gratification of Russian ambition for aggrandizement in the Balkan countries and the Near East. That ambition and some stirrings toward liberty may have put Russia in its exceptional position by the side of two free countries.

If, now, we take it for granted that the question between free and autocratic institutions in Europe, the question of more public liberty, the question of civilization developing under the forms of free government rather than under the forms of autocratic government, is the real issue this war is to decide, it becomes a very interesting study for all the freer peoples how German efficiency is going to turn out in competition with such efficiency as the freer nations develop. The military result of the war is going to turn on the comparative efficiency of the military and naval forces of the opposing parties, and on the efficiency with which the economic resources of the several nations are used. Numbers are

so enormous on each side that the result will not be determined so much by mere numbers, as by the efficiency of the armed forces of the combatants, and of their industrial and financial forces.

German efficiency has been an object of great admiration, not only in this country, but in England, France, and Russia, for twenty-five or thirty years. We have all admired it in the recent commercial and industrial development of Germany — not less remarkable because it started about sixty years ago from a low level. We have admired it, too, in the efficiency of her military and naval development. It is an extraordinary phenomenon in the history of the nineteenth century — this wonderful efficiency; but German efficiency is of a peculiar type. It is an efficiency in administration — in business administration, in municipal government strikingly, and in all the national government bureaus. It is an efficiency which takes hold of every child in Germany at birth, and follows every youth and every man and woman through life until death. It is that very efficiency which has prevented the last two generations of Germans from knowing anything about liberty. It is in the highest

degree an autocratic efficiency in all walks of German life, including education and the relations between the sexes. The whole course of elementary and secondary education for every German boy or girl is determined by the Government, and there is no election by the pupil in it, no choice by the child, except in its later stages the choice between a technical school or a gymnasium; and even that choice is often made not by the child, but for him.

A significant illustration of the German regard for strength and force, and contempt for weakness and gentleness, is to be found in the low estimate they place on the social and intellectual influence of women. A German woman at her best is a successful housewife, and diligent attendant on husband and children; she is seldom the intellectual and spiritual comrade of her husband and the inspirer of her grown-up children, as a woman is in the freer countries of Europe and in America. The contrast between the status of the German woman and that of the American woman is strong indeed. The German woman of to-day has grown up and lived in an atmosphere of compulsion and discipline which no American woman has had to endure for two centuries past.

The Germans are fond of mentioning their "academic freedom," the freedom of their learned men; but that is much exaggerated in German descriptions of their university life. The German universities are chiefly supported and ruled by the Government; and there are no free endowed institutions to compete with them. The whole world is deeply indebted in unnumbered ways to the German universities of the last hundred years; but for any vital teaching of civil and religious liberty one must go back to individual German teachers and preachers of an earlier time. The entrance to every learned and scientific profession in Germany, and to the highly trained military and naval caste is strictly guarded and controlled by the Government.

German efficiency, however, is a very real and formidable thing in all the competitions of the civilized world; so that the most interesting question to be studied as to the probable outcome of the European War is this — is Germany with its autocracy more efficient or less efficient than France and England with their liberties? The German way of procuring industrial and commercial efficiency is to make each individual man, in the first place, a man

well trained for the exact service he is to render, and then to keep him under a severe discipline which will result in his doing every time exactly what he has been trained to do. He may also be induced in some measure to a perfect subordination by a bonus, prize, or honorary reward. That is the German method of efficiency all the way through industrial life — giving instruction and training enough to produce the amount of skill needed for the daily task, and then enforcing that subjection of the worker which results in thorough coördination and coöperation in the complex process of production. The efficiency of their military system is obtained in like manner — by thorough training which leads to the instinctive coöperation of the individual with a mass of comrades, and to an absolute obedience unto death.

Now, what have the freer nations to say about their chance in industrial and military competition with the German autocratic system? They say in speech and action, "We believe a man or a nation will develop greater mental capacity and moral force with freedom than without it. Our philosophy of life teaches that

doctrine; our history illustrates it; our practice and experience prove it." Seven nations conspicuously illustrate to-day the worth of liberty in national development, — Great Britain and her affiliated Commonwealths, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States, and, in addition, the Scandinavian group of peoples. Italy struggled long under various oppressors. She won at last unity and freedom; because she brought forth such independent spirits as Dante, Leonardo da Vinci, Savonarola, Galileo, Michael Angelo, Cavour, and Garibaldi. The Dutch were pioneers in the long fight for liberty. Since Elizabeth's adventurers ran about the oceans, Cromwell marshalled his Independents, and Milton taught civil and religious liberty and freedom for the press, English political, industrial, and religious life has been instinct with liberty. The French political philosophers of the eighteenth century set forth eloquently the rights of Man; and the French Revolution strove boldly, though ignorantly, to win those rights, and, in spite of its violences and crudities, spread through the world the potent conceptions of liberty, equality, and fraternity. The mutual jealousy of their neighbors has

permitted Belgium and Switzerland to prosper in comparative freedom. The Pilgrim Fathers planted on American soil the seeds of the best English and Dutch liberties; and from those seeds there came, in three centuries, a solid growth of liberty under law, — the widest liberty, political, industrial, and social that the world has ever known, conceived by free spirits, embodied in legislation, and cherished in the hearts of a multitudinous people. The Scandinavian peoples have suffered much from more powerful neighbors, but have never lost the adventurous spirit of the Norsemen, or failed to exercise that right of private judgment which was the best teaching of the Protestant Reformation, or ceased to manifest the sturdy, independent spirit of their race. The Scandinavian emigrants to America make admirable citizens of the American Republic without any change of disposition or character.

The efficiency of all these nations is based on a high degree of personal initiative and of political and industrial freedom, — not on the subjection or implicit obedience of the individual, but on the energy and good-will in work which result from individual freedom, ambition, and initiative.

If this doctrine is correct, the remarkable increase of industrial and commercial efficiency during the past one hundred and fifty years should have proceeded from the freer nations, and not from the nations governed autocratically. It is an interesting inquiry, therefore, whether this wonderfully increased efficiency has proceeded from Russia, Germany, Austria, and Turkey, or from England, France, Italy, Holland, Scandinavia, and the United States. A brief review of the sources of the important discoveries and inventions, which have made the industries of the civilized world vastly more effective since 1830 than they ever were before, will convince any impartial person that the means of improvement have come from the free countries, and not from the countries despotically governed. Going back to the latter part of the eighteenth century, we find that propulsion by steam on land and water was first made commercially successful by Englishmen and Americans, and that English and French chemists made the fundamental discoveries in chemical theory. In the early part of the nineteenth century, the development of the factory system with steam-driven machinery was an English achievement, and later an American.

Coming on in the nineteenth century, it was Americans who developed the telegraph and telephone as industrial implements, and thereby changed in large measure the habits of industrial, commercial, and financial life, and in many respects of domestic and family life also. It was an Italian who invented and introduced in practice wireless telegraphy, — a delightful instance of the transmission of a genius for physics in the same nation through centuries. It was Americans who invented and made commercially practical electric lighting and the wide diffusion of mechanical power by electricity. The explosive engine was developed as an industrial agent in France; and the gasolene motor and the automobile have been French, English, and American developments. The aeroplane heavier than air was invented by Professor Langley, when Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, and was developed for practical use by two other Americans — the brothers Wright. The cotton-gin, on which the whole cotton textile industry is founded, was the invention of an American, as were also the sewing-machine, the typewriter, and all sorts of shoe machinery. So was the job printing-press with the type held, not on a horizontal plane,

but at any convenient angle with the paper to be printed — an invention out of which came the rotary press, which is to-day an indispensable instrument for the quick and wide circulation of news. It was America that built the first monitor and the first submarine; and it was England that built the first dreadnought. Turning to a totally different field of discovery, anæsthesia was an American invention; and its wide usefulness was first demonstrated in an American hospital. Asepsis, a discovery of equal value, was introduced by Lister, a British subject. Another Englishman invented and brought into use inoculation against typhoid fever. It was American surgeons and members of the Army Medical Corps, temporarily serving in Cuba, who showed the world how to prevent the spread of yellow fever. The immense rubber industry throughout the world is based on the invention of the American Goodyear, who discovered that the mixing of sulphur with rubber produced an elastic, waterproof material, capable of innumerable useful applications for which pure rubber was not fit. The great inventions in business organization, have, of course, proceeded from the freer countries, and not from those despotically governed, — such,

for example, as the organization of the ocean liners running to all parts of the world, which is in the main an English invention. The organization of the great business of taking petroleum out of the earth, piping the oil over great distances, distilling and refining it, and distributing it in tank-steamers, tank-wagons, and cans all over the earth, was an American invention. The conception of the huge and complex business of the United States Steel Corporation, and the putting of that conception into practice, is another American invention of great significance. The legal invention of the corporation with limited liability, which has led to an immense development of industrial and commercial productiveness, is English and American; and this management of industries by corporations set up in free governments has, in turn, become a great reinforcement of free institutions.

Obviously, we are not tracing here results of blind chance, or of any sort of coincidence or accident. We are recognizing the legitimate fruits of liberty. It is, of course, true that Germany has adopted, adapted, and used with great skill all the inventions that have been mentioned, and especially in organizing and using

her army and navy. She has also used them all in the remarkable development of her industries during the past fifty years; but she invented and brought into use none of them; nor did Russia, Austria, or Turkey. Most of the inventions mentioned are indispensable to the carrying on of the present war in Europe; and many of them were indispensable to the preparations for that war, carried on through long years before; but all of them, except the distinctly naval inventions, were made for peaceful uses — to promote the industrial productiveness and the well-being of the human race.

It is an interesting observation that universal education, to the lower grades of which all children are compelled, seems to have but slight effect on the kind of national efficiency here considered. For one hundred years past, systematic education for the whole people has been better planned and carried on in Germany than it has been in any of the freer countries. Large portions of the Italian population have had no access to schools until lately. England had nothing that could be called a system of popular education until 1870–71; France began to put universal education into force under the present Republic; and to this day millions of American

children have scant access to elementary education, and none at all to secondary. The plain fact is that the German system of education and government has not had freedom enough in it; and that the free peoples, among whom there exists a large amount of social and industrial mobility, are the peoples that have produced all the great applied-science inventions of the last century and this. The facts of the case are unquestionable. The explanation of them is, — that under free governments, and in communities which have a fair amount of social mobility, the rare men are surer to come forward into vigorous action, — the men who are competent, not only to invent or imagine the thing or the method that is next wanted, but to put their inventions into practical form, and make them useful in the actual industries of their nations and the world. Among a free people the remarkable human specimen is more likely to get his most complete and powerful development than among a people subject to autocratic government. We may reasonably believe, therefore, that there is a power in free institutions which leads straight to efficiency in the industries of the country, and, in the long run and after many experiments and failures,

to the efficient management of its governmental concerns, and that this efficiency can be brought to a higher condition in a republic or a constitutional monarchy than in any despotic or autocratic government.

There is another field of human activity — the development of great pioneers in thinking and imagining — in which the Germans are accustomed to claim leadership; but that claim is without warrant. In the first place, German literature and philosophy are, like German industrial development, comparatively young. That they should become preëminent so soon was not to be expected. In the next place, the German race has not yet developed leaders of thought in literature, philosophy, poetry, and statesmanship who can bear comparison with the supreme personages in England, France, and Italy. Germany has produced no men that can be placed beside Dante, Michael Angelo, and Cavour in Italy; Shakespeare, Milton, Newton, Farraday, and Darwin in England, or Pasteur in France. As to America, it seems to a native American profane to mention Bismarck and the German Emperor in the same breath with Washington and Lincoln.

The present war in Europe is going to put to a supreme military test this theory concerning the surest sources of national efficiency. The war ought to demonstrate in the end that German efficiency in war is not so great as that of England and France, if we include in the definition of military efficiency the management of the supporting industries, and skill in summoning and applying financial resources, as well as the management of troops in actual fighting. The war should demonstrate that a volunteer soldier is, on the whole, more effective than a conscript; because he has more personal initiative, more power of independent action, and more sense of individual responsibility. The first year of the war ought to prove that large and effective armies can be put into the field after the training of only a few months, if the volunteer recruits come from occupations which call for intelligence and coöperative good-will, and are inspired by ethical motives which strongly appeal to them as individuals. The war ought also to prove that the freer a people is, and the more accustomed to the exercise of a self-controlled liberty the more warmly and resolutely they will respond to calls on their courage, endurance, and love of country.

The only issue of the war that can possibly be satisfactory to the freer nations of Europe, or to Americans, is an issue which will further in Europe the cause of essential freedom — the freedom which can be developed under any constitutional form of government, but cannot be developed under an autocratic form. Therefore, we look forward with hope to a diminution in Europe of the autocratic forms and an increase of the constitutional forms, as well as to better security for both large and small states against sudden invasion. This better security implies a federal council of a few powerful states, the reduction of national armaments, and the creation of a federal force competent to impose peace.

A precious lesson of the war will be — towards every kind of national efficiency discipline is good, and coöperation is good; but for the highest efficiency both should be consented to in liberty.

CHAPTER XIV

LESSONS OF THE WAR TO MARCH NINTH

The observant world has now had ample opportunity to establish certain conclusions about the new kind of war, and its availability as means of adjusting satisfactorily international relations; and it seems desirable in the interest of durable peace in Europe that those conclusions should be accurately stated, and kept in public view.

In the first place, the destructiveness of war waged on the scale and with the intensity which conscript armies, the new means of transportation and communication, the new artillery, the aeroplanes, the high explosives, and the continuity of the fighting on battle fronts of unexampled length, by night as well as by day, and in stormy and wintry as well as moderate weather, make possible, has proved to be beyond all power of computation, and could not have been imagined in advance. Never before has there been any approach to the vast killing and crippling of men, the destruction of all

sorts of man's structures, — buildings, bridges, viaducts, vessels, and docks, — and the physical ruin of countless women and children. On the seas vessels and cargoes are sunk, instead of being carried into port as formerly.

Through the ravaging of immense areas of crop-producing lands, the driving away of the people that lived on them, and the dislocation of commerce, the food supplies for millions of non-combatants are so reduced that the rising generation in several countries is impaired on a scale never approached in any previous war.

In any country which becomes the seat of war an immense destruction of fixed capital is wrought; and at the same time the quick capital of all the combatants, accumulated during generations, is thrown into the furnace of war and consumed unproductively.

In consequence of the enormous size of the national armies and the withdrawal of the able-bodied men from productive industries, the industries and commerce of the whole world are seriously interrupted, whence widespread, incalculable losses to mankind.

These few months of war have emphasized the interdependence of nations the world over

with a stress never before equalled. Neutral nations far removed from Europe have felt keenly the effects of the war on the industries and trades by which they live. Men see in this instance that whatever reduces the buying and consuming capacity of one nation will probably reduce also the producing and selling capacity of other nations; and that the gains of commerce and trade are normally mutual, and not one-sided.

All the contending nations have issued huge loans which will impose heavy burdens on future generations; and the yield of the first loans has already been spent or pledged. The first loan issued by the British Government was nearly twice the national debt of the United States; and it is supposed that its proceeds will be all spent before next summer. Germany has already spent $1,600,000,000 since the war broke out — all unproductively and most of it for destruction. She is now issuing her second great loan. In short, the waste and ruin have been without precedent, the destruction of wealth has been enormous, and the resulting dislocations of finance, industries, and commerce will long afflict the coming generations in all the belligerent nations.

All the belligerent nations have already demonstrated that neither urban life, nor the factory system, nor yet corroding luxury has caused in them any physical or moral deterioration which interferes with their fighting capacity. The soldiers of these civilized peoples are just as ready for hand-to-hand encounters with cold steel as any barbarians or savages have ever been. The primitive combative instincts remain in full force and can be brought into play by all the belligerents with facility. The progress of the war should have removed any delusions on this subject which Germany, Austria-Hungary, or any one of the Allies may have entertained. The Belgians, a well-to-do town people, and the Serbians, a poor rural population, best illustrate this continuity of the martial qualities ; for the Belgians faced overwhelming odds, and the Serbians have twice driven back large Austrian forces, although they have a transport by oxen only, an elementary commissariat, no medical or surgical supplies to speak of, and scanty munitions of war. On the other hand, the principal combatants have proved that with money enough they can all use effectively the new methods of war administration and the new implements for destruction. These facts suggest that the war

might be much prolonged without yielding any results more decisive than those it has already yielded ; indeed, that its most probable outcome is a stalemate — unless new combatants enter the field.

Fear of Russian invasion seemed at first to prompt Germany to war ; but now Germany has amply demonstrated that she has no reason to look with any keen apprehension on possible Russian aggression upon her territory, and that her military organization is adequate for defense against any attack from any quarter. The military experience of the last seven months proves that the defense, by the temporary intrenchment method, has a great advantage over the attack ; so that in future wars the aggressor will always be liable to find himself at a serious disadvantage, even if his victim is imperfectly prepared.

These same pregnant months have also proved that armies can be assembled and put into the field in effective condition in a much shorter time than has heretofore been supposed to be possible ; provided there be plenty of money to meet the cost of equipment, transportation, and supplies. Hence, the advantages of maintaining huge active armies, ready for instant attack or

defense, will hereafter be less considerable than they have been supposed to be — if the declaration of war by surprise, as in August last, can hereafter be prevented. These considerations, taken in connection with the probable inefficacy against modern artillery of elaborate fortifications, suggest the possibility of a reduction throughout Europe of the peace-footing armies. It is conceivable that the Swiss militia system should satisfy the future needs of most of the European States.

Another important result has been achieved in these seven months of colossal war. It has been demonstrated that no single nation in any part of the world can dominate the other nations, or, indeed, any other nation, unless the other principal powers consent to that domination; and, in the present state of the world, it is quite clear that no such domination will be consented to. As soon as this proposition is accepted by all the combatants, this war, and perhaps all war between civilized nations, will cease. It is obvious that in the interest of mankind the war ought not to cease until Germany is convinced that her ambition for empire in Europe and the world cannot be gratified. *Deutschland ueber alles* can survive as a shout of patriotic enthu-

siasm, or as an expression of an ardent desire for German unity; but as a maxim of international policy it is dead already, and should be buried out of the sight and memory of men.

It has, moreover, become plain that the progress in civilization of the white race is to depend not on the supreme power of any one nation, forcing its peculiar civilization on other nations, but on the peaceful development of many different nationalities, each making contributions of its own to the progress of the whole, and each developing a social, industrial, and governmental order of its own, suited to its territory, traditions, resources, and natural capacities.

The chronic irritations in Europe, which contributed to the outbreak of the war, and the war itself have emphasized the value and the toughness of natural national units, both large and small, and the inexpediency of artificially dividing such units, or of forcing natural units into unnatural associations. These principles are now firmly established in the public opinion of Europe and America. No matter how much longer the present war may last, no settlement will afford any prospect of lasting peace in Europe which does not take just account of

these principles. Already the war has demonstrated that just consideration of national feelings, racial kinship, and common commercial interests would lead to three fresh groupings in Europe: one of the Scandinavian countries, one of the three sections into which Poland has been divided, and one of the Balkan States which have a strong sense of Slavic kinship. In the case of Scandinavia and the Balkan States the bond might be nothing more than a common tariff with common ports and harbor regulations; but Poland needs to be reconstructed as a separate kingdom. Thoroughly to remove political sores which have been running for more than forty years, the people of Schleswig-Holstein and Alsace-Lorraine should also be allowed to determine by free vote their national allegiance. Whether the war ends in victory for the Allies, or in a draw or deadlock with neither party victorious and neither humiliated, these new national adjustments will be necessary to permanent peace in Europe. All the wars in Europe since 1864 unite in demonstrating that necessity.

Again, the war has already demonstrated that colonies or colonial possessions in remote parts of the world are not a source of strength

to a European nation when at war, unless that nation is strong on the seas. Affiliated commonwealths may be a support to the mother country, but colonies held by force in exclusive possession are not. Great Britain learned much in 1775 about the management of colonies, and again she learned in India that the policy of exploitation, long pursued by the East India Company, had become undesirable from every point of view. As the strongest naval power in the world, Great Britain has given an admirable example of the right use of power in making the seas and harbors of the world free to the mercantile marine of all the nations with which she competes. Her free-trade policy helped her to wise action on the subject of commercial extension. Nevertheless, the other commercial nations, watching the tremendous power in war which Great Britain possesses through her wide, though not complete, control of the oceans, will rejoice when British control, though limited and wisely used, is replaced by an unlimited international control. This is one of the most valuable lessons of the great war.

Another conviction is strongly impressed upon the commercial nations of the world by

the developments of seven months of extensive fighting by land and sea, namely, the importance of making free to all nations the Kiel Canal and the passage from the Black Sea to the Ægean. So long as one nation holds the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, and another nation holds the short route from the Baltic to the North Sea, there will be dangerous restrictions on the commerce of the world — dangerous in the sense of provoking to war, or of causing sores which develop into malignant disease. Those two channels should be used for the common benefit of mankind, just as the Panama Canal or the Suez Canal is intended to be. Free seas, free interocean canals and straits, the "open door," and free competition in international trade are needed securities for peace.

These lessons of the war are as plain now as they will be after six months' or six years' more fighting. Can the belligerent nations — and particularly Germany — take them to heart now, or must more millions of men be slaughtered and more billions of human savings be consumed before these teachings of seven fearful months can get accepted?

For a great attainable object such dreadful

losses and sufferings as continuation of the war entails might, perhaps, be borne; but the last seven months have proved that the objects with which Austria-Hungary and Germany went to war are unattainable in the present state of Europe. Austria-Hungary, even with the active aid of Germany and Turkey, cannot prevail in Serbia against the active or passive resistance of Serbia, Russia, Rumania, Greece, Italy, France, and Great Britain. Germany cannot crush France supported by Great Britain and Russia, or keep Belgium, except as a subject and hostile province, and in defiance of the public opinion of the civilized world. In seven months Great Britain and France have made up for their lack of preparedness, and have brought the military operations of Germany in France to a standstill. On the other hand, Great Britain and France must already realize that they cannot drive the German armies out of France and Belgium without a sacrifice of blood and treasure from which the stoutest hearts may well shrink.

Has not the war already demonstrated that jealous and hostile coalitions armed to the teeth will surely bring on Europe not peace and advancing civilization, but savage war and an ar-

rest of civilization? Has it not already proved that Europe needs one comprehensive union or federation competent to procure and keep for Europe peace through justice? There is no alternative except more war.

CHAPTER XV

PROPOSALS ON WHICH THE WAR MIGHT BE ENDED: CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR. SALMON O. LEVINSON [1]

THE VANDERBILT HOTEL, NEW YORK,
April 21, 1915.

DR. CHARLES W. ELIOT,
Cambridge, Mass.

DEAR DR. ELIOT: — You have doubtless read the published Portland letter of Dr. Dernburg. He seems to have been profoundly impressed with several of the important suggestions contained in your article in the *New York Times* of March 12.

I am inclined to the hope that the position of Germany, as reflected through him, has measurably changed; indeed, the views of all of us have had to undergo marked modification as the war has progressed and as the fever of partisanship has somewhat abated.

Where Germany evidently errs most is in her failure to appreciate the neutral world's

[1] Published in the *New York Times* of May 3, 1915.

opinion of her treatment of Belgium. She seems to think her necessity for territorial expansion sufficient justification for any course, however brutal. Undoubtedly the needs of Germany are manifest and urgent in this respect; she has approximately the same area as France and about twice the population; her tendency to rapid increase in population and her energies along all lines of industrial and intellectual activities would seem to call for some present expansion, if it can be accomplished without conquest or perpetuating evil precedents.

I am anxious to have your views, not only on this subject, but more comprehensively as to the basis upon which this destructive conflict can be halted and millions of European youth saved from destruction, so that the Angel of Peace and not the Angel of Death may hover over the suffering peoples of these distracted nations.

I beg to express to you my sense of gratitude for the many interesting letters and conferences on the subject of the war with which you have favored me during the past three months. With your knowledge of the world's history, your comprehension of the play of in-

ternational forces, your sincere desire for permanent peace among the nations of the earth, and your persuasive and trenchant way of putting things, I have felt for months that you have the power and ability to suggest the basis for an immediate armistice and an enduring peace which would appeal not only to the neutral world but to the belligerent nations themselves.

Sincerely yours,

S. O. Levinson.

Cambridge, Mass.,
April 24, 1915.

Dear Mr. Levinson: — The sufferings and losses caused in nine months by the colossal war have been so enormous, and prolongation of the war is so sure to produce still greater damage and misery, that thinking people cannot help reflecting on the feasible conditions, if any, of an armistice or suspension of hostilities.

Americans, happily withdrawn from the actual scenes of combat and unaffected by the storms of passion which beat on the belligerent nations in Europe, ought to be able to see more clearly than those who are in the midst

of the fighting what the possible conditions of a suspension of hostilities have now become. At your request I have already attempted twice to state these conditions. I now try again with the aid of your suggestions on my previous efforts.

(1) The first condition is that every nation now at war should recognize the fact that no nation in the world can establish rule or dominion over any other civilized nation, large or small; because the majority of the civilized nations will, in the present state of public opinion and international law, inevitably resist domination by any single nation. If, therefore, the peace of Europe or the world is hereafter to be kept inviolate, it must be kept not by the overruling power of any one nation, but by international agreements entered into by a group or groups of nations which, after the experience of the past nine months, have rejected aggressive war as an available means of settling international disputes or of extending national power.

(2) The second condition for a suspension of hostilities is a general agreement that the small states in Europe shall have firmer securities for their peace and independence than they

now possess, that no European population shall be held to an unnatural allegiance contrary to their wishes, and that the national aspirations of the peoples of eastern and southeastern Europe shall be satisfied in some reasonable measure.

(3) The war having produced an unprecedented disturbance and dislocation of industries and commerce the world over, the third condition of an armistice must be the general acceptance of the proposal that the freedom of the seas, and of the canals or channels connecting great seas, be placed under international guaranties.

(4) The fourth condition of an armistice is general acceptance of the policy of the "open door" as the best means of promoting the trade of all manufacturing peoples.

(5) The fifth condition is the abandonment of the policy of seizing either distant colonies or adjoining provinces by force and holding them against the will of their populations, and the recognition of the principle that the only enlargements of territory which are worth a nation's having in this age of the world are those which are brought about by consent and with good-will, and are bound to the central or

parent state by the sense of mutual service and advantage.

(6) The sixth condition must be that Belgium receive adequate compensation for the losses which the German invasion and occupation have caused, the nature, scope, and amount of that reparation to be determined by an impartial arbitrator.

(7) It should further be generally understood, before any suspension of hostilities is attempted, that the main object of the international conference or council called to settle terms of peace will be to devise such a reorganization of Europe that national armaments can be safely reduced, and a permanent peace be secured through the establishment of a supreme international tribunal, the maintenance of an international military and naval force, and the stable development of international law.

If the experience of the past nine months has satisfied all the combatants that the views above stated are just, and fit for general acceptance, no one of the belligerent nations will have any sound reason for prolonging the war, and the present horrible destruction might cease. The great lessons of the war seem to

us detached Americans to have been already taught with overwhelming force.

I have only attempted to outline the fundamental conditions under which preliminary negotiations for peace might reasonably be opened. Many details would remain to be discussed in the ultimate international conference; and the constitution of the conference itself would be one of the first details to be considered in the preliminary conference of the belligerent powers. It is obvious also that, under the general conditions above described, many opportunities for discussion and compromise would present themselves, but at the present stage it is unnecessary and undesirable to consider any details.

The question to which I have addressed myself is this: What are the feasible grounds on which preliminary negotiations for peace might now be opened with some prospect of a satisfactory result? If you see any way to use the above answer to that question toward the promotion of a durable peace in Europe, I beg that you will use it at your discretion, provided that it be not published over my name. I regard the statement as the result of conversations and exchanges of letters between us dur-

ing the past two months, and beg to place it entirely at your disposition.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES W. ELIOT.

S. O. LEVINSON, ESQ.

CHAPTER XVI

THE SINKING OF THE LUSITANIA[1]

THE sinking of a great merchant vessel, carrying twenty-five hundred non-combatant men, women, and children, without giving them any chance to save their lives, was in violation of long-standing conventions among civilized nations concerning the conduct of naval warfare. The preëxisting conventions gave to a German vessel of war the right to destroy the Lusitania and her cargo, if it were impossible to carry her into port as a prize; but not to drown her passengers and crew. The preëxisting conventions or agreements were, however, entered into by the civilized nations when captures at sea were made by war-vessels competent to take a prize into some port, or to take off the passengers and crew of the captured vessel.

The German Government now alleges that submarines are to-day the only vessels it can

[1] A letter published in the *New York Times* of May 15, 1915.

employ effectively for attack on British commerce in the declared war zone about the British Isles; since the rest of the German navy cannot keep the seas in face of the superior British navy. Germany further alleges that the present British blockade of German ports is conducted in a new way, — that is, by vessels which patrol the German coast at a greater distance from the actual harbors than was formerly the international practice; and hence, that Germany is justified in conducting her attack on British commerce in a novel way also. In short, Germany argues that her military necessities compel her to sink enemy commercial vessels without regard to the lives of passengers and crews, in spite of the fact that she was party to international agreements that no such act should be committed.

The lesson which the sinking of the Lusitania teaches is, therefore, this: Germany thinks it right to disregard, on grounds of military necessity, existing international conventions with regard to naval warfare, precisely as she disregarded the agreed-upon neutrality of Belgium on the ground of military necessity. As in the case of Belgium she had decided many years beforehand to violate the

international neutrality agreement, and had made all her plans for reaching Paris in a few weeks by passing through Belgium, so on the sea she had decided months ago that the necessity of interfering as much as possible with British commerce and industries warrants her total disregard of the existing rules of naval warfare, and has deliberately contrived the sinking of merchant vessels without regard to the lives of the people on board.

Again, when Germany thought it necessary on her quick march toward Paris not only to crush the Belgian army, but to terrify the non-combatant population of Belgium into complete submission by bombarding and burning cities, towns, and villages, by plundering and shooting non-combatants, by imposing heavy fines and ransoms, and by holding non-combatants as hostages for the peaceable behavior of all Belgian citizens, she disregarded all the conventions made by the civilized nations within seventy years for mitigating the horrors of war, and justified her action on the ground that it was a military necessity, since in no other way could she immediately secure the safety of her communications as she rushed on Paris. The civilized world had supposed that each nation

would make war only on the public forces and resources of its antagonist; but last August Germany made ferocious war on non-combatants and private property.

The sinking of the Lusitania is another demonstration that the present German Government will not abide by any international contracts, treaties, or agreements, if they, at a given moment, would interfere with any military or naval course of action which the Government deems necessary.

These demonstrated policies and purposes of the German Empire raise the fundamental question — How is the civilization of the white race to be carried forward? How are the real welfare of that race and the happiness of the individuals that compose it to be hereafter furthered? Since the revolutions in England, America, and France, it has been supposed that civilization was to be advanced by international agreements or treaties, by the cooperation of the civilized nations in the gradual improvement of these agreements, and by the increasing practical effect given to them by nations acting in coöperation; but now comes the German Empire with its military force, immense in numbers and efficient beyond all

former experience through the intelligent use for destructive purposes of the new powers attained by applied science, saying not only in words, but in terrible acts: "We shall not abide by any international contracts or agreements into which we may have previously entered, if at the passing moment they interfere or conflict with the most advantageous immediate use of our military and naval force." If this doctrine shall now prevail in Europe, the foundations of modern civilization and of all friendly and beneficial commerce the world over will be undermined.

The sinking of the Lusitania, therefore, makes perfectly clear the nature of the problem with which the three Allies in Europe are now struggling. They are resisting with all the weapons of war a nation which declares that its promises are good only till it is, in its own judgment, under the military necessity of breaking them.

The neutral nations are looking on at this tremendous conflict between good-faith nations and no-faith nations with intense anxiety and sorrow, but no longer in any doubt as to the nature of the issue. The sinking of the Lusitania has removed every doubt; because

that was a deliberate act in full sight of the world, and of a nature not to be obscured or confused by conflicting testimonies or questions about possible exaggeration of outrages or about official responsibility for them. The sinking of the Lusitania was an act which outraged not only the existing conventions of the civilized world in regard to naval warfare, but the moral feelings of present civilized society.

The neutral nations and some of the belligerent nations feel another strong objection to the present German way of conducting war on land and sea, namely, that it brutalizes the soldier and the sailor to an unprecedented degree. English, French, and Russian soldiers on the one side can contend with German, Austrian, and Turkish soldiers on the other with the utmost fierceness from trenches or in the open, use new and old weapons of destruction, and kill and wound each other with equal ardor and resolution, and yet not be brutalized or degraded in their moral nature if they fight from love of country or with self-sacrificing loyalty to its spiritual ideals; but neither soldiers nor sailors can attack defenseless non-combatants, systematically destroy towns and villages, and

put to death captured men, women, and children without falling in their moral nature below the brutes. That he obeyed orders will not save from moral ruin the soldier or sailor who does such deeds. He should have refused to obey such orders and taken the consequences. This is true even of the privates, but more emphatically of the officers. The white race has often been proud of the way in which its soldiers and sailors have fought in many causes — good, bad, and indifferent; because they fought bravely, took defeat resolutely, and showed humanity after victory. The German method of conducting war omits chivalry, mercy, and humanity, and thereby degrades the German nation and any other nation which sympathizes with it or supports its methods. It is no answer to the world's objection to the sinking of the Lusitania that Great Britain uses its navy to cut off from Germany food and needed supplies for its industries, for that is a recognized and effective method of warfare; whereas the sinking of an occasional merchant ship with its passengers and crew is a method of warfare nowhere effective, and almost universally condemned. If war, with its inevitable stratagems, ambuscades, and lies must continue

to be the arbiter in international disputes, it is certainly desirable that such magnanimity in war as the conventions of the last century made possible should not be lost because of Germany's behavior in the present European convulsion. It is also desirable to reaffirm with all possible emphasis that fidelity to international agreements is the tap-root of human progress.

On the supposition that the people of the United States have learned the lesson of the Lusitania, so far as an understanding of the issues at stake in this gigantic war is concerned, can they also get from it any guidance in regard to their own relation to the fateful struggle? Apparently, not yet. With practical unanimity the American people will henceforth heartily desire the success of the Allies, and the decisive defeat of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. With practical unanimity they will support whatever action the Administration at Washington shall decide to take in the immediate emergency; but at present they do not feel that they know whether they can best promote the defeat of the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey by remaining neutral or by taking active part in

the conflict. Unless a dismemberment of Austria-Hungary is brought about by Italy and Rumania or some other Balkan State entering the war on the side of the Allies, it now seems as if neither party would acknowledge defeat until exhausted or brought to a sudden moral collapse. Exhaustion in war can best be prevented by maintaining in activity the domestic industries and general productiveness of the nation involved in war, and those of the neutral nations which are in position to feed it and manufacture for it munitions, clothing, and the other supplies that war demands. While remaining strictly neutral, North and South America can be of great service to the Allies. To be sure, as a neutral the United States will be obliged to give some aid to Germany and her allies, such for example as harboring the interned commercial fleet of Germany; but this aid will be comparatively insignificant. The services which the American republics can thus render to the cause of liberty and civilization are probably more considerable than any they could render by direct contributions of military or naval force. Kept free from the drain of war, the republics will be better able to supply food, clothing, munitions, and money

to the Allies both during the war and after the conclusion of peace.

On the whole, the wisest thing the neutral nations can do, which are remote from the theatres of war, and have no territorial advantages to seek at the coming of peace, is probably to defend vigorously and with the utmost sincerity and frankness all the existing rights of neutrals. By acting thus in the present case they will promote national righteousness and hinder national depravity, discourage, for the future, domination by any single great power in any part of the world, and help the cause of civilization by strengthening the just liberty and independence of many nations — large and small, and of different capacities and experiences — which may reasonably hope, if the Prussian terror can be abolished, to live together in peaceful coöperation for the common good.

CHAPTER XVII

THE HOPES FOR THE FUTURE OF EUROPE[1]

MR. PRESIDENT, MR. SMILEY, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: — I am going to speak to you — rashly — at the request of the Executive Committee made this afternoon; and I must ask your indulgence, because I have only had half an hour since I received this invitation in which to think over what I am about to say. I feel strongly the responsibility of speaking without adequate preparation on this most solemn and almost desperate subject, the peace of the world.

I came to the Conference this year because, having thought and written much about this subject ever since last August, I hoped that I might get, from the scholars and men of affairs who were announced to speak here, some fresh hopes for the progress of civilization. Like all the men and women who have from time to time attended this annual Conference, I have experienced since last August a heavy shock

[1] *A speech at the Lake Mohonk Conference, May 20, 1915.*

to cherished hopes and confident expectations concerning the peace and progress of the white race. You doubtless have all had the same experience; and now under these intensely adverse circumstances, we want very much, if we can, to encourage each other in clinging to some, at least, of the hopes we have cherished for more than twenty years.

I have not been altogether disappointed in what I have heard here. I have received from speakers who have addressed this meeting some new inspirations and some fresh encouragements; and I am very grateful for these leadings. This entire assembly feels gratitude to the men who have pointed us to some hopeful way of future action.

I just now wrote down a list of six hopeful things that have been mentioned here. The first is the development of international law. Now, international law is not law in the ordinary meaning of that word. What we call international law is simply a series of agreements or conventions made in the course of centuries by and among the different nations of Europe and America. This body of agreements has been a slow growth, but a hopeful and promising growth. It really has little to do with what we

ordinarily call law, and in particular it has no sanction behind it, and never has had. Therefore, the development of international law to which we now look forward is something different from, something better and stronger than, anything which the world has known before under that name; and we may reasonably entertain some hope that such a better development may prove to be possible. This is one chance or hope for the future. The second is that sense of international obligation which was treated so well by Mr. Marburg in the second paper before this Conference, — the increase in the sense of international obligation throughout the civilized world. You observe that both these two hopes depend upon the adoption of new or further agreements between or among nations. Another paper which interested us all was that which presented the possibility of effective cooperation among nations, and particularly cooperation among nations of the American hemisphere. That possibility again affords a new hope, not only for peace, but for great advances in commerce and trade, and in the national industries of the nations which are imagined as coöperating. But again coöperation among nations depends absolutely on the possibility of

making international agreements which turn out in practice to be binding. The fourth item on my list is the international federation or league based on common interests and common laws. That we heard of with satisfaction and anticipation of good — a federation or league among the nations of Europe. But still again the possibility of building such a structure in the near future depends on the possibility of making among nations a binding agreement. The fifth was the league of peace. With what pleasure we listened to the address on that subject, the possibility of creating a league of peace — comprehensive or partial, so that it be a strong union of nations leagued together to maintain peace and prevent war. Sixthly, in Professor Clark's paper we heard developed, with great persuasiveness, an argument for a league of peace based on the existing alliances. That looked more possible than any other league we had heard of; a league of peace that might grow out of the present alliance between Great Britain, France, Russia, and Japan. These are the six items on my list, not alike, yet resembling each other, and all dependent upon the possibility of making among nations, many or few, — but if few, then very strong

nations, — a league, international agreement, or federation which will hold and prove effective.

This survey brings me to the most discouraging fact of these terrible ten months, the fact which we must face and look at squarely and resolutely, namely, that there is at least one strong nation in Europe to-day that says, and says in act as well as in words, "We regard no previous agreement as binding on us in the face of an immediate military or naval necessity." There, ladies and gentlemen, is the most fearful fact which has been brought to the knowledge of the world within the last ten months. You perceive instantly that none of the six proposals I have alluded to is available for the purposes of humanity, unless an agreement among nations can be made and kept without regard to changing circumstances, until a new agreement is made by the same parties to meet the changed circumstances. This doctrine that new conditions abrogate treaties and contracts is the great new evil to which the civilized world is now exposed. How can we meet it? How can we overcome it? Only by a process of education through suffering, by dire experience of the consequences of violating the sanctity of a contract, of disregarding the sense

of international obligation, of failing to speak the truth, and keep good faith. How long may this process of education or training be? Years, decades, generations, — before the sense of international obligation and the sense of the sanctity of contract can be universal in the civilized world. Is this too despairing a statement? Must we endure the present condition of Europe until all its nations come to realize that there can be neither safety nor peace, unless built firmly on the general sense of truth, of obligation, of the sanctity of an agreement?

The subject for this evening was armaments; although the committee were compelled to break in somewhat upon that subject in the assignment of papers for this evening. Now, I find in the question of armaments, and of the means of reducing armaments, another hope for the future, and the immediate future, when this war is over. Has not this terrible catastrophe possibly taught all the nations in Europe that the method of competitive armaments followed inevitably by gigantic war is not available for the white race as a means of settling international disputes! Is it not conceivable that the war may teach as much as that out of all this suffering, out of this hideous destruction not only

of property but of life? May we not hope that the conviction will spread over Europe that war on the scale now possible, and with the modern means of destruction, is not an available means of settling international disputes? Imagine that conviction to come to prevail among thinking people, the fact that the armies are now conscript armies, putting into the field every able-bodied man of proper age, will help to spread that conviction; because if the war goes on another year on the present scale and at the present rate of destruction, every family in Europe will have had brought home to them the consequences of resorting to war as the arbiter in international disputes.

Suppose that conviction to be generally accepted; are there any means in sight of reducing armaments all over Europe! Any means of persuading the different peoples that they can be safe with reduced armaments? That is the real question. At present, no nation in Europe would feel safe, if it reduced its armaments. Not one; not the greatest; of course, not the smaller; and armaments cannot be reduced unless the nations feel safe against invasion after the reduction.

I remember pointing out in this room several

years ago, in the course of an active discussion from the floor, that there were two dreads in the world which must be removed, or two fears from which nations must be relieved, before lasting peace could come; one was the fear of invasion; the other was the fear of having cut off supplies of food and of raw materials for the national industries. That remains true to this day; and so far as anybody can see, it will always be true. No nation will risk invasion, sudden as it is to-day, — with hardly a day's notice, — unless it sees somewhere within reach the means of security. How can that security against invasion be obtained for the larger part, at any rate, of the nations of Europe? There is only one way: by the creation of an international legislative and executive council, or other political body, backed by an international force.

We have heard at this Conference and at many preceding Conferences, that the force of public opinion will prevent the invasion of a weak nation by a stronger, that discontinuance of commercial intercourse may be used as a weapon to prevent aggression on the part of a strong nation on a weaker; but there is not a single nation in Europe to-day that will trust itself to either one of those methods of protec-

tion. And would they not really be insane to trust to either one of those methods, in view of what we have seen in the last ten months? In former years I have heard many a time in this room demands for the immediate reduction of armaments by the nations of Europe without any security whatever against invasion. Where would the freer nations of Europe be to-day if any of those projects had been entertained by them? Where would they be? Dominated by the less free nations.

I regard, therefore, the reduction of armaments, first, as necessary to the prevention of the continuance of competitive armaments and therefore necessary to the prevention of war; but secondly, I believe that the only way to the reduction of armaments is through the creation of an international force strong enough to prevent aggression on the part of the strongest of the individual nations. Now, nations cannot be expected to change their habits, — habits in which generation after generation has been confirmed, — suddenly, or in a year, or on the exhortation of philanthropists, or lovers of the human race. They need time for such transitions. Can we see any mode of gradually altering the martial habits of the European nations?

There is one nation in Europe that has shown that way; it is a little one, the model republic of the world. It is a little nation which is divided into provinces or cantons, as we are divided into states, and among those cantons, four different languages are spoken and two different forms of Christianity are ardently loved. Switzerland has shown the way to keep a strong national force without maintaining a standing army and, therefore, without creating a military class. This Swiss system affords a means of transition from the armed camps of to-day to national forces strong for defense but weak for aggression.

Here we may discern a hope for the future of Europe, and not far away; because it is conceivable, as Professor Clark pointed out so clearly, that a strong league of like-minded nations, nations in which a large degree of public liberty already exists, capable of combining together in a durable league for the suppression of war, and capable of holding together, and of keeping sacred an agreement once made, should be the outcome of the present awful convulsion.

In all the proceedings of this meeting for the last two days, I have discerned no other hopes

but those I have now enumerated. Is that a reason for profound discouragement? Is that a reason for giving over the effort to bring peace about in the methods described? On the contrary, it seems as if we must all agree that we should continue to advocate strenuously the prevention of war, but that we should do so by the practical methods I have ventured to describe.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE MORAL EFFECTS OF WAR[1]

We meet here to-day, in accordance with a patriotic custom now fifty years old, to think about and praise the qualities and deeds of the young men who took part in the Civil War of 1861–65, a war which settled two things, — first, that the Constitution of the United States was a sacred contract which bound all the States of the Union until modified by new agreements beween the several States; and secondly, that the ancient industrial system called slavery was not to continue to exist in any part of the Republic. Both these results were of such high value to the United States in direct and permanent advantages, and to the world as lessons or examples, that by common consent they were worth all they cost in blood and treasure. There were some thinkers in those days who ardently desired these results, and believed that they could have been accomplished without war, if

[1] Memorial Day Address delivered in Sanders Theatre, Harvard University, May 31, 1915.

the American people and its leaders had only been more rational and more humane. Be this as it may, the Civil War did, as a matter of fact, accomplish these two beneficent results; and history has set them down to the credit of war in general.

In the judgment of historians and, indeed, of the civilized world, there have been righteous wars and also unrighteous. Out of some righteous wars have come no gains for humanity; and out of some of the unrighteous indisputable gains. Whether a war in progress will yield a balance of good or of evil to the human race as a whole, no mortal can tell until it is over, until the material wastes and losses have been computed, and its spiritual profit-and-loss account has been approximately made up. The generation which fights a great war through can seldom judge correctly its spiritual results on the national scale, or on the larger scale of the human race; but it can and it does estimate correctly the effects of fighting on the individual soldier or sailor, — on his moral fibre, and on his capacity for self-sacrifice and for deeds of personal courage and coöperative endurance. About these frequent good effects of warfare on the individual soldier or sailor the American

generation that fought the Civil War is in no doubt whatever, and never has been.

We are here to-day to remember lovingly and with reverence the characters and deeds of the brave and generous soldiers of our Civil War on both sides. Yes, on both sides. Men who fight strenuously even in a cause which their opponents hold to be unrighteous, and act humanely after either victory or defeat, win the respect of their adversaries, and may easily become, when peace is made, good friends and neighbors. That happened after the Civil War on an immense scale. It is barbarities before or after the fight and behind the battle front that embitter both combatants and non-combatants, and instil lasting national hatreds.

You surviving veterans of the Northern armies know perfectly well that the soldier who goes to war because he loves his country, or his home, or private liberty, or public justice, is not necessarily brutalized or degraded by fair fighting, even if it be fierce and prolonged. Brave and gentle men may stand up against each other in battle after battle, and kill and wound each other to their utmost, and yet remain gentle and just, as well as brave. The disbanding armies of the Civil War gladly and quietly returned

to peaceful life, and the soldiers were, as a rule, better citizens and more serviceable men for times of peace than they were when they went out to fight.

The effect of war on the private soldier depends on the motive which governs him in becoming a soldier. If he is governed by any motive of love, gratitude, or devotion, he is morally safe in taking part in fighting, no matter how fierce it may be, and often comes out of it a stronger and more useful man. If, on the contrary, he is driven to the terrible work of a soldier through fear of his rulers and officers, or as a result of the habit of obedience and submission in which he has been brought up, he may exhibit in fighting self-sacrifice, patience, and resignation, but he cannot hope for any new acquisitions of personal energy and directive force. If the soldier going to war was already a selfish, cruel, and coarse man, fighting will probably make him more and more brutal.

It is in vain for the undiscriminating advocates of peace to deny that war is capable of developing in good and serviceable men more effective goodness and serviceableness. Tens of thousands of young men killed in the Civil War, and hundreds of thousands of the survivors of

that dreadful four years' conflict testify to the truth of this statement; and we are here to-day to think of those young men again, and to bear our testimony to this potential good which may come, and often has come, out of the hideous savagery of war. This is the marvel of marvels — that a fine human soul can extract from the carnage and wreckage of war a finer virtue and greater spiritual power.

While, however, war is capable of developing noble and useful traits in human beings, it is also capable of developing in soldiers and sailors and their commanders traits which it were foul injustice to dumb animals to call brutal. When non-combatants — men, women, and children — are shot, drowned, or killed by exposure and lack of food, when women are violated, when wholesale robbery is committed by victorious troops, when defenseless communities are crushed by fines and requisitions, when, to win immediate military advantage solemn international contracts, entered into in times of peace, are disregarded, when non-combatants are used as a shield for troops advancing to an attack, when the Red Cross and the white flag, those precious symbols of humanity in war, are treacherously used, when commercial vessels are sunk without

regard to the safety of passengers and crew, the rulers or officers that plan, order, or permit such actions, and the soldiers or sailors that obey such orders, or commit such crimes without orders, are inevitably demoralized and brutalized. These shocking immoralities produce their worst results, when they are elaborately planned beforehand, and embodied in manuals for officers concerning justifiable severities in time of war. Even a war waged for a moral object — such as national independence or resistance to an oppressive alien rule — becomes a degrading and abominable thing if it be prosecuted in the spirit and by the methods of highwaymen and pirates. All these atrocious practices are flagrant violations of international morality as formulated and agreed upon in numerous treaties and conventions since the Napoleonic wars, as for example in the Vienna Congress of 1815, the Congress of Paris of 1856, the Red Cross Convention of 1864, the Brussels Conference of 1874, and the two Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907; but unfortunately there exists no international force authorized and competent to compel the observance of the accepted rules of international law. In the creation of a new international organization capable of putting be-

hind international law the same effective sanctions that support municipal law, lies the only hope that this shocking war may prove to be the last between civilized nations. But this is a real hope. It is the absence of sanction which has made international law, though morally admirable, ineffective at the pinch.

Before the historian or the political philosopher can state the moral effect of any particular war on the people that took part in it, he must learn how the war was actually conducted. The bad effects on a people who adopt barbarous and cruel practices in war may be concealed for generations; but they are sure to be revealed at last. The war of the Greek Revolution in the first quarter of the nineteenth century was one of the most ferocious in history — perhaps inevitably so, since it was a rising against the Turks. In the second Balkan War in the first quarter of the twentieth century this ferocity reappeared in horrible forms, but was exhibited not by and against the Turks, but among Balkan neighbors.

When modern warfare at its worst is compared with ancient at its best, certain moral improvements are plainly seen to have been accomplished in the course of centuries. The

wholesale butchery of a conquered people, the carrying into slavery of all the spared, — men, women, and children, — and the appropriating not only of new territory, but of all the goods and chattels of the people to whom that territory belonged, have ceased to be legitimate and usual methods of warfare; but war for conquest and booty has by no means ceased in the world. Forcible annexation of territory and forcible holding of a conquered people to an unnatural allegiance still persist. Before we can decide whether any given war is justifiable or unjustifiable, we must know with what motive it is waged, and for what objects. Even a war waged for an unjust object may not be morally injurious to the common soldier, who does not know the real motives of his rulers or commanders, and whose patriotic feelings may have been skilfully appealed to by his teachers and governors; but an unrighteous war is inevitably degrading to the rulers and statesmen who plan it and bring it about.

While a great war is in progress, the mind and heart of a belligerent nation may be swept by the passions of the moment into moral disaster and temporary downfall, or be stormed by evil powers and obsessions, so that the na-

tion surrenders itself to hatred, anger, and the desire for vengeance; but the nineteenth century supplied many instances of the extinction of national hatreds, and even of the transformation of enmities into cordial friendships. One must not imagine that all the misjudgments and antipathies which war breeds are likely to last indefinitely. The rapid shiftings of European national alliances for war or peace prove that nations, like individuals, cool down, and suffer their feelings to change with changing circumstances. The effects of victory in war on the mind and heart of a nation may easily be worse than the effects of defeat, particularly if the victory be overwhelming, and accompanied by supposed pecuniary gains. In spite of the essential barbarousness of war, a nation like a man, can be lifted by it out of selfishness, self-indulgence, and frivolity into self-sacrifice, hardy endurance, and solemn consecration. This may be one of the reasons that the white race has made favorable progress in civilization during the past one hundred and fifty years, in spite of the frequent occurrence of war.

Is it possible to discriminate at this day between righteous and unrighteous, justifiable

and unjustifiable wars? There are people, some excellent and lovely and some fanatical and disagreeable, who cry out when justifiable war is mentioned, that there is no such thing, that all war is now and forever abominable, ruinous, and accursed. Do the hard facts concerning human progress during the past two thousand years support this doctrine? Does the state of Europe to-day permit sensible men and women to believe that the men of violence and perverse ambition, who have always existed and still exist, should be free to work their will on submitting contemporaries? At such a thought all the grandeur and courage in human nature revolt. We who believe in liberty for all men, in the public justice which secures to the individual his own pursuit of happiness, unrestricted except by the right of every other man to pursue his happiness too, and in even-handed justice between man and man whether strong or weak, and between states whether large or small, think that we can define justifiable wars, as wars of resistance to alien rule, as wars of independence, as wars for increase of liberty for the masses of the people, and as wars of defense against aggressors. In these days, when many strong nations live by manu-

facturing more than by agriculture, the term "war of defense" has received an enlarged meaning. Such a nation is always, or frequently, obliged to import a large proportion of its annual food supplies; and the factory industries by which it lives must be free to obtain from without its own territory many of their raw materials, and free also to export their varied products. Deprived of this freedom to import and export, such a nation cannot long thrive; and any war in which it engages to preserve this freedom, when threatened, is properly called a "war of defense."

We have no difficulty in defining unjustifiable wars as wars of conquest or of aggression by one nation against another, and as wars for material advantage, — such as the extension of national trade, or the seizure of new territory as outlets for surplus population. Aggressive wars in the present century in imitation of some unjust wars in earlier centuries which were apparently profitable to those that waged them, without regard to the development of international ethics in the interval, are clearly unjustifiable. The prolongation of a war by the rulers or commanders of one of the contending parties, when it has been demonstrated that the objects, to

attain which that party went to war, are unattainable, or would be futile if attained, is always in the highest degree unjustifiable, because the further expenditure of blood and treasure is wasted.

Again, there is in generous human beings a criterion for justifiable wars which is not exact, and yet is often trustworthy. The humane judgment always inclines to the weaker party, and always feels that the strong have no right to pounce upon the weak, — particularly for a selfish object. Finally, the white race in the twentieth century has made up its mind that no single nation has a right to dominate or rule any other nation by either land or sea-power, and that resistance to such domination by force of arms is not only justifiable, but expedient.

We are commemorating to-day the actors in a war fifty years ago, which prevented the disruption of the American Union, and preserved for a long future an experienced free commonwealth strongly rooted in a broad and rich land. We are doing this in the midst of a European War of unexampled dimensions and unprecedented wastes and horrors, which is going to decide whether despotic military government or constitutional government shall prevail in

Europe, and whether the nations of Europe must continue to keep prepared for war on the instant under pain of submission to foreign rule, or may, by combination among themselves, on the analogy of the American Union, secure some degree of that comparative immunity from war and preparations for war which the United States has enjoyed since 1865. If the powers which represent public liberty and peaceful rather than warlike competitive development shall ultimately prevail in this titanic struggle, their victory will be due in part to the influence of the United States as a convincing example of the wise application of the federal principle. Then we may say to the young heroes of our Civil War — your sacrifices brought good not to your fellow countrymen alone, but to the human race. You builded better than you knew. Through your efforts and sufferings, government of the people for the people and by the people was preserved over a vast area on the American continent, and now through like sacrifices on the part of the European nations which most value freedom is to be developed and made secure in Europe.

CHAPTER XIX

SOME SURE INFERENCES FROM ELEVEN MONTHS OF THE WORST OF WARS[1]

THE inferences of the first importance are military and naval. In the conduct of war on land it has been demonstrated during the past eleven months that success in battle depends primarily on the possession and skilful use of artillery and machine-guns. The nation which can command the largest quantity of artillery in great variety of calibre and range, has developed the amplest and quickest means of transporting artillery and supplies of all sorts, and whose troops can use mortars, howitzers, and cannon at the highest speed and with the greatest accuracy, will have important advantages over an enemy less well provided, or less skilful. Before every assault by infantry artillery must sweep and plough the position to be captured; and so soon as the enemy has lost a trench or a redoubt, the enemy's artillery will try to destroy the successful troops with shell

[1] A letter published in the *New York Times* of July 18, 1915.

and shrapnel, before the enemy's infantry makes a counter-attack. Whenever troops have open ground to cross before they reach the intrenchments of the enemy, they encounter a withering fire from machine guns, which is so effective that assaults over open ground have, for the most part, to be undertaken at night or in fog, or by some sort of surprise.

In general the defense has great advantage over the attack, as regards expenditure of both men and munitions. So decided is the advantage of the defense, that Germany can dismiss all those apprehensions about invasion by the Russian hordes with which she set out on this war. Success in military movements on a large scale depends on the means of transportation at hand; and these means of transportation must include railroads, automobiles, and horse wagons, the function of the automobile being of high importance wherever the roads are tolerably good.

There is little use for cavalry in the new fighting; for aeroplanes can do better scouting and more distant raiding than cavalry ever could, and large bodies of infantry with their indispensable supplies can be moved faster and further by automobiles than cavalry could ever

be. The aeroplane also defeats the former use of cavalry to screen from the enemy's view the movements of troops and their trains behind the actual fronts. Moreover, cavalry cannot stand at all against the new artillery and the machine gun. An old-fashioned cavalry charge in the open is useless, and indeed impossible. Aerial warfare is still undeveloped, but the war has proved that the aeroplane, even in its present imperfect condition, is a useful instrument. The Zeppelin, on the other hand, seems to be too fragile and too unmanageable for effective use in war. Rifle fire is of far less importance than artillery and machine-gun fire ; and, indeed, the abandonment of the rifle as the principal arm for infantry is clearly suggested.

Elaborate forts made of iron and concrete are of little use against a competent invader, and fortifications round about cities are of no use for protection against an enemy that possesses adequate artillery. For the defense of a frontier, or of the approaches to a railroad junction or a city, a system of trenches is immeasurably superior to forts, particularly if behind the trenches a network of railways or of smooth highways exists.

Wounds are often inflicted by jagged pieces of metal which carry bits of dirty clothing and skin into the wounds; and the wounded often lie on the ground for hours or even days before aid can reach them. Hence the surgery of this war is largely the surgery of infected wounds, and not of smooth aseptic cuts and holes. A considerable percentage of deaths and permanent disabilities among the wounded is the inevitable result. Surgeons and dressers are more exposed to death and wounds than in former wars, because of the large use of artillery of long range, the field hospitals being often under fire.

From these changes in the methods of war on land it may be safely inferred that a nation which would be strong in war on land must be strong in all sorts of manufacturing, and particularly in the metallurgical industries. A nation chiefly devoted to agriculture and the ancient trades cannot succeed in modern war, unless it can beg, borrow, or buy from sympathizers or allies the necessary artillery and munitions. No amount of courage and devotion in troops can make up for an inadequate supply of artillery, machine guns, shells, and shrapnel, or for the lack of ample means of

rapid transportation. Only in a rough country without good roads, like the United States in 1861–65, or Serbia or Russia now, can the rifle, light artillery, and horse or ox wagons win any considerable success; and in such a country the trench method can bring about a stalemate if the combatants are well matched in strength, diligence, and courage.

The changes in naval warfare are almost equally remarkable. Mines and submarines can make the offensive operation of dreadnoughts and cruisers near ports practically impossible, and can inflict great damage on an enemy's commerce. Hence important modifications in the rules concerning effective blockade. In squadron actions victory will probably go to the side which has the gun of longest range well manned. Defeated war-vessels sink as a rule with almost all on board. Commercial vessels can seldom be taken into port as prizes, and must therefore be sunk to make their capture effective. There have been no actions between large fleets; but the indications are that a defeated fleet would be sunk for the most part, the only vessels to escape being some of the speedier sort. Crews would go down with their vessels. Shore batteries of long-range guns can keep at a distance

a considerable fleet, and can sink vessels that come too near. Mines and shore batteries together can prevent the passage of war-vessels through straits ten to fifteen miles wide, no matter how powerful the vessel's batteries may be. Every war-vessel is now filled with machinery of various sorts, much of which is delicate or easily disabled. Hence a single shell exploding violently in a sensitive spot may render a large ship unmanageable, and therefore an easy victim. A crippled ship will probably be sunk, unless a port is near.

To build and keep in perfect condition a modern fleet requires dockyards and machine shops of large capacity, and great metallurgical industries always in operation within the country which maintains the fleet. No small nation can create a powerful fleet; and no nation which lives chiefly by agriculture can maintain one. A great naval power must be a mining, manufacturing, and commercial power, with a sound banking system available all over the world.

The war has proved that it is possible for a combination of strong naval powers to sweep off the ocean in a few months all the warships

of any single great power, except submarines, and all its commerce. Germany has already suffered that fate, and incidentally the loss of all her colonies, except portions of German East Africa and Kamerun, both of which remnants are vigorously assailed and will soon be lost. Nevertheless, she still exports and imports through neutral countries, though to a small amount in comparison with the volume of her normal trade. Here is another illustration of the general truth that colonies are never so good to trade with as independent and prosperous nations.

Again, the war has proved that it is not possible in a normal year to reduce by blockade or non-intercourse the food supply of a large nation to the point of starvation, or even of great distress, although the nation has been in the habit of importing a considerable fraction of its food supply. An intelligent population will make many economies in its food, abstain from superfluities, raise more food from its soil, use grains for foods instead of drinks, and buy food from neutral countries so long as its hard money holds out. Any large country which has a long seaboard or neutral neighbors can probably prevent its non-combatant population

from suffering severely from want of food or clothing while at war. This would not be true of the districts in which actual fighting takes place or over which armies pass; for in the regions of actual battle modern warfare is terribly destructive — as Belgium, Northern France, Poland, and Serbia know.

A manufacturing people whose commercial vessels are driven off the seas will, of course, suffer the loss of such raw materials of its industries as habitually came to it overseas in its own bottoms — a loss mitigated, however, by the receipt of some raw materials from or through neutral countries. This abridgment of its productive industries will, in the long run, greatly diminish its powers of resistance in war; but much time may be needed for the full development of this serious disability.

Because of the great costliness of the artillery, munitions of war, and means of transportation used in the present war, the borrowings of all the combatant nations are heavy beyond any precedent; so that already all the nations involved have been compelled to raise the rates of interest on the immense loans they have put upon the market. The burdens thus being

prepared for the coming generations in the belligerent nations will involve very high rates of taxation in all the countries now at war. If these burdens continue to accumulate for two or three years more, no financier, however experienced and far-seeing, can imagine to-day how the resulting loans are to be paid, or how the burden of taxation necessary to pay the interest on them can be borne, or how the indemnities probably to be exacted can be paid within any reasonable period by the defeated nation or nations.

It follows from these established facts that a small nation — a nation of not more than fifteen millions, for example — can have no independent existence in Europe except as a member of a federation of states having similar habits, tendencies, and hopes, and united in an offensive and defensive alliance, or under guaranties given by a group of strong and trustworthy nations. The firm establishment of several such federations, or the giving of such guaranties by a group of powerful and faith-keeping nations, ought to be one of the outcomes of the war of 1914–15. Unless some such arrangement is reached, no small state

will be safe from conquest and absorption by any strong, aggressive military power which covets it — not even if its people live chiefly by mining and manufacturing, as the Belgians did.

The small states, being very determined to exist and to obtain their natural or historical racial boundaries, the problem of permanent or any durable peace in Europe resolves itself into this: How can the small or smaller nations be protected from attack by some larger nation which believes that might makes right and is mighty in industries, commerce, finance, and the military and naval arts? The experience gained during the past year proves that there is but one effective protection against such a power, namely, a firm league of other powers — not necessarily numerous — which together are stronger in industries, commerce, finance, and the military and naval arts than the aggressive and ambitious nation which heartily believes in its own invincibility and cherishes the ambition to conquer and possess.

Such a league is the present combination of Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, and Japan against the aggressive Central Monarchies and Turkey; but this combination was not formed

deliberately and with conscious purpose to protect small states, to satisfy natural national aspirations, and to make durable peace possible by removing both fear of invasion and fear of the cutting off of overseas food and raw materials. In spite of the lack of an explicit and comprehensive purpose to attain these wise and precious ends, the solidity of the alliance during a year of stupendous efforts to resist military aggression on the part of Germany and Austria-Hungary certainly affords good promise of success for a somewhat larger league in which all the European nations — some, like the Scandinavian and the Balkan, by representation in groups — and the United States should be included. Such a league would have to act through a distinct and permanent council or commission which would not serve arbitrary power, or any peculiar national interest, and would not in the least resemble the "Concert of Europe," or any of the disastrous special conferences of diplomatists and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, called after wars since that of 1870–71 to "settle" the questions the wars raised.

The experience of the past twelve months proves that such a league could prevent any

nation which disobeyed its orders from making use of the oceans and from occupying the territory of any other nation. Reduction of armaments, diminution of taxation, and durable peace would ensue as soon as general confidence was established that the league would fairly administer international justice, and that its military and naval forces were ready and effective. Its function would be limited to the prevention or punishment of violations of international agreements, or, in other words, the enforcement of treaty obligations, until new treaties were made.

The present alliance is of good promise in three important respects — its members refuse to make any separate peace, they coöperate cordially and efficiently in military measures, and the richer members help the poorer financially. These policies have been hastily devised and adopted in the midst of strenuous fighting on an immense scale. If deliberately planned and perfected in times of peace, they could be made in the highest degree effective toward durable peace.

The war has demonstrated that the international agreements for the mitigation of the

horrors of war, made by treaties, conferences, and conventions in times of peace, may go for nothing in time of war; because they have no sanction, or, in other words, lack penalties capable of systematic enforcement. To provide the lacking sanction and the physical force capable of compelling the payment of penalties for violating international agreements would be one of the best functions of the international council which the present alliance foreshadows. Some years would probably be required to satisfy the nations concerned that the sanction was real and the force trustworthy and sufficient. The absolute necessity of inventing and applying a sanction for international law, if Europe is to have international peace and any national liberty, will be obvious to any one who has once perceived that the present war became inevitable when Austria-Hungary, in violation of an international agreement to which she was herself a party, seized and absorbed Bosnia and Herzegovina, and became general and fierce when Germany, under Prussian lead, in violation of an international agreement to which she was herself a party, entered and plundered neutralized Belgium.

A strong, trustworthy international alliance

to preserve the freedom of the seas under all circumstances would secure for Great Britain and her federated commonwealths everything secured by the burdensome two-navies policy which now assures the freedom of the seas for British purposes. The same international alliance would guarantee for Germany the same complete freedom of the seas which in times of peace between Germany and Great Britain she has long enjoyed by favor of Great Britain, but has lost in time of war with the Triple Entente. This safeguard, with the general acceptance of the policy of the "open door," would fully meet Germany's need of indefinite expansion for her manufacturing industries and her commerce, and of room "in the sun" for her surplus population.

It is a safe inference from the events of the past six months that the longer the war lasts the more significant will be the political and social changes which result from it. It is not to be expected, and perhaps not to be desired, that the ruling class in the countries autocratically governed should themselves draw this inference at present; but all lovers of freedom and justice will find consolation for the pro-

longation of the war in this hopeful reflection.

To devise the wise constitution of an international council or commission with properly limited powers, and to determine the most promising composition of an international army and an international navy, are serious tasks, but not beyond the available international wisdom and good-will, provided that the tasks be entrusted to international publicists, business men of large experience, and successful administrators, rather than to professional diplomatists and soldiers. To dismiss such a noble enterprise with the remark that it is "academic," or beyond the reach of "practical" politics, is unworthy of courageous and humane men; for it seems now to be the only way out of the horrible abyss into which civilization has fallen. At any rate, some such machinery must be put into successful operation before any limitation of national armaments can be effected. The war has shown to what a catastrophe competitive national arming has led, and would probably again lead, the most civilized nations of Europe. Shall the white race despair of escaping from this hell? The only way of escape in sight is the establishment of a rational international community. Should

the enterprise fail after fair trial, the world will be no worse off than it was in July, 1914, or is to-day.

Whoever studies the events of the past year with some knowledge of political philosophy and history, and with the love of his neighbor in his heart, will discover, amid the horrors of the time and its moral chaos, three hopeful leadings for humanitarian effort, each involving a great constructive invention. He will see that humanity needs supremely a sanction for international law, rescue from alcoholism, and a sound basis for just and unselfish human relations in the great industries, and particularly in the machinery industries. The war has brought out all three of these needs with terrible force and vividness. Somehow they must be met, if the white race is to succeed in "the pursuit of happiness," or even to hold the gains already made.

THE END

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

I

PRESIDENT ELIOT'S ADDRESS AT THE SPECIAL ACADEMIC SESSION CALLED TO CONFER THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF LAWS ON PRINCE HENRY OF PRUSSIA, MARCH 6, 1902[1]

After a short greeting, the Prince was escorted into Sanders Theatre. At his entrance the audience rose and remained standing until he had taken his seat on the platform at the right of President Eliot. On the platform were seated the Governing Boards, the members of the Faculties, the invited guests, and the Prince's suite. President Eliot, sitting in the ancient President's chair, read the following address, at the close of which he conferred upon the Prince the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws: —

"This occasion is unique. Twice in the history of the University has a special academic session been held to do honor to the President of the United States, making a progress through the country; but never before has this democratic University been called together on purpose to do honor to a foreign prince. Weighty reasons must have determined such unprecedented action on the part of this Society of Scholars.

[1] From the *Harvard Graduates' Magazine*, June, 1902.

"These are the reasons: —

"Our students of history know the Teutonic sources, in the dim past, of many institutions and public customs which have been transmitted through England to this New England.

"The Puritan origin of the University makes us hold in grateful remembrance the heroes of Protestantism — Luther, Melancthon, Erasmus, and their kindred spirits — and the German princes who upheld that precious cause through long years of confused alarms and cruel warfare. The Puritan government of Massachusetts followed anxiously the vicissitudes of the Thirty Years' War, and was in the habit of ordering Public Thanksgiving to God for 'good news from Germany.'

"In watching the social and ethnological phenomena of our own times we have seen that the largest contribution which a European people made in the nineteenth century to the population of the United States came from Germany, and that the German quota was not only the most numerous but the best educated.

"As University men we feel the immense weight of obligation under which America rests to the technical schools and universities of the German Fatherland. From them thousands of eager American students have drawn instruction and inspiration, and taken example. At this moment hundreds of American teachers who call some German university their foster-mother are at work in schools, colleges, and

universities all the way from this icy seacoast to the hot Philippines.

"Our men of letters and science know well the unparalleled contributions Germany has made since the middle of the nineteenth century to pure knowledge, and also to science applied in the new arts and industries which within fifty years have so marvellously changed the relations of man to nature.

"Our whole people have the profoundest sympathy with the unification of Germany. We all believe in a great union of federated states, bound together by a common language, by unrestricted mutual trade, by common currency, mails, means of communication, courts of justice, and institutions of credit and finance, and inspired by a passionate patriotism. Such is the venerable American Union; such the young German Empire.

"We gladly welcome here to-day a worthy representative of German greatness, worthy in station, profession, and character. We see in him, however, something more than the representative of a superb nationality and an imperial ruler. Universities have long memories. Forty years ago the American Union was in deadly peril, and thousands of its young men were bleeding and dying for it. It is credibly reported that at a very critical moment the Queen of England said to her Prime Minister: 'My Lord, you must understand that I shall sign no paper which means war with the United States.' The

grandson of that illustrious woman is sitting with us here."

Here President Eliot rose, bowed to the President and Fellows, and to the Board of Overseers, and remained standing.

Prince Henry rose when his name was pronounced.

"Now, therefore, in exercise of authority given me by the President and Fellows and the Board of Overseers, and in the favoring presence of the friends here assembled, I create honorary Doctor of Laws Albert William Henry, Prince of Prussia, and Admiral, and in the name of this Society of Scholars, I declare that he is entitled to the rights and privileges pertaining to this degree, and that his name is to be forever borne on its roll of honorary members."

II

PRESIDENT ELIOT'S ADDRESS AT A BANQUET GIVEN MARCH 6, 1902, BY THE CITY OF BOSTON TO PRINCE HENRY OF PRUSSIA

MR. MAYOR, YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS, YOUR EXCELLENCY:[1] —

The nation's guests — Boston's this evening — have just had some momentary glimpses of the extemporized American cities, of the prairies and the Alleghanies, of some great rivers and lakes, and of prodigious Niagara; and so they have perhaps some vision of the large scale of our country, although they have run over not more than one thirtieth of its area. But now they have come to little Massachusetts, lying on the extreme eastern seacoast — by comparison a minute commonwealth, with a rough climate and a poor soil. It has no grand scenery to exhibit, no stately castles, churches, or palaces come down through centuries, such as Europe offers, and for at least two generations it has been quite unable to compete with the fertile fields of the West in producing its own food supplies. What has Massachusetts to show them, or any intelligent European visitors? Only the fruitage — social, industrial, and

[1] The Governor.

governmental — of the oldest and most prosperous democracy in the world.

For two hundred and eighty years this little Commonwealth has been developing in freedom, with no class legislation, feudal system, dominant church, or standing army to hinder or restrain it. The period of development has been long enough to show what the issues of democracy are likely to be; and it must be interesting for cultivated men brought up under another régime to observe that human nature turns out to be much the same thing under a democratic form of government as under the earlier forms, and that the fundamental motives and objects of mankind remain almost unchanged amid external conditions somewhat novel. Democracy has not discovered or created a new human nature; it has only modified a little the familiar article. The domestic affections, and loyalty to tribe, clan, race, or nation still rule mankind. The family motive remains supreme.

It is an accepted fact that the character of each civilized nationality is well exhibited in its universities. Now Harvard University has been largely governed for two hundred and fifty years by a body of seven men called the Corporation. Every member of that Corporation which received your royal highness this afternoon at Cambridge is descended from a family stock which has been serviceable in Massachusetts for at least seven generations. More than one hundred years ago Washington was asked to

describe all the high officers in the American army of that day who might be thought of for the chief command. He gave his highest praise to Major-General Lincoln of Massachusetts, saying of him that he was "sensible, brave, and honest." There are Massachusetts Lincolns to-day to whom these words exactly apply.

The democracy preserves and uses sound old families; it also utilizes strong blood from foreign sources. Thus, in the second governing board of Harvard University, — the Overseers, — a French Bonaparte, a member of the Roman Catholic Church, sits beside a Scotch farmer's son, Presbyterian by birth and education, now become the leader in every sense of the most famous Puritan church in Boston. The democracy also promotes human beings of remarkable natural gifts who appear as sudden outbursts of personal power, without prediction or announcement through family merit. It is the social mobility of a democracy which enables it to give immediate place to personal merit, whether inherited or not, and also silently to drop unserviceable descendants of earlier meritorious generations.

Democracy, then, is only a further unfolding of the multitudinous human nature, which is essentially stable. It does not mean the abolition of leadership, or an averaged population, or a dead-level of society. Like monarchical and aristocratic forms of government, it means a potent influence for those who prove capable of exerting it, and a highly diversified

society on many shifting levels, determined in liberty, and perpetually exchanging members up and down. It means sensuous luxury for those who want it, and can afford to pay for it; and for the wise rich it provides the fine luxury of promoting public objects by well-considered giving.

Since all the world seems tending toward this somewhat formidable democracy, it is encouraging to see what the result of two hundred and eighty years of democratic experience has been in this peaceful and prosperous Massachusetts. Democracy has proved here to be a safe social order — safe for the property of individuals, safe for the finer arts of living, safe for diffused public happiness and well-being.

We remember gratefully in this presence that a strong root of Massachusetts liberty and prosperity was the German Protestantism of four centuries ago, and that another and fresher root of well-being for every manufacturing people, like the people of Massachusetts, has been German applied science during the past fifty years. We hope, as Your Royal Highness goes homeward-bound across the restless Atlantic, — type of the rough "sea of storm-engendering liberty," — you may cherish a cheerful remembrance of barren but rich, strenuous but peaceful, free but self-controlled, Massachusetts.

El-c b
pso nec
125